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Dissertation Abstract:
In which ways do intellectuals affect social and political mobilization? How do they
impact the trajectory of contention – the kind of mobilization and its developments - through
their ideological work? Prominent intellectuals seem to play a relevant role in contentious
politics, yet this role is still undertheorized. In this project, I analyze this question in the context
of contemporary Arab Salafism, a particularly literal interpretation of Sunni Islam. I seek to
unpack the processes by which prominent Islamist intellectuals impact and shape two Salafi
currents originating and operating across Jordan during the 1990s and beyond. The first current
is labeled 'Quietist' Salafism, as its members engage mostly in preaching, proselytizing and
provision of social services; they refrain from direct political activities or overt confrontation
with state authorities. The second current is known as 'Jihadi' Salfism, and espouses instead a
confrontational and at times violent stance vis à vis state power. I posit that Islamist intellectuals
in both instances impact mobilization in similar ways through three main mechanisms: diffusion,
whereby they facilitate the spreading and transmission of ideas and concepts formulated
elsewhere; elaboration, whereby they build upon the existing body of knowledge on a given
subject, providing novel insights, interpretations or at times formulating new ideas altogether;
and systematization, whereby they (re)organize the otherwise relatively fragmented or incoherent
worldview of their followers and acolytes. Together, these mechanisms compound into a process
that I call ‘the social appropriation of tradition', by which group members, harking back to
elements belonging to a shared and exemplar tradition, rearticulate the central aims of the group
to include sustained social and political mobilization. In this way we may properly locate the
intellectual efforts of prominent thinkers within a theoretical framework, parsing out and
assessing their contribution to episodes of political contention.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

Intellectuals in Contention
What roles do intellectuals play in the processes of social action and political mobilization?
More specifically, in which ways do their ideological productions impact the trajectory – the kind of
mobilization and its developments - of such processes? The literature on social and political
contention has long recognized the importance of ideas in accounting for episodes of collective
action – social movements, campaigns, protests, revolutions, civil wars, clandestine political
violence, and so on. Scholars proposed terms such as frames, ideologies and discourses to
conceptualize the contribution of ideas to the emergence of social action and political contention.
However, it is rather startling how relatively few works have theorized the role of individuals and
communities at the center of the ideological production connected with social and political
mobilization.
I aim at exploring the role of intellectuals, scholars, thinkers connected to episodes of social
action and political contention. In particular I will address the role of their ideological productions,
i.e. the ideas they produced, the set of discourses in which they were embedded in the course of
their intellectual activity. I ask: how do these works spur and sustain social and political
mobilization? What is the relationship between ideological, intellectual work and the trajectory of
contention among groups and movements who claim to take cues and inspirations from such
productions? Put differently, I intend to unpack the processes by which ideas impact political
mobilization, specifically ideas formulated by recognized prominent ideologues. I address these
questions in the context of Salafism, a contemporary Islamist current.1 I contend that a specific

1

I chose the term ‘current’ to indicate Salafism in light of the most frequent way to refer to it in the Arab and Jordanian
press, where the Arabic equivalent (tiyaar) is commonly utilized.
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process, the social appropriation of tradition,2 describes how Salafis appeal to and deploy a
traditional religious reference in order to spur social and political action. In this way we may
properly locate the intellectual efforts of prominent thinkers within a theoretical framework, parsing
out and assessing their contribution to episodes of political contention.
Salafism is a branch of Sunni Islam.3 Currently, it is arguably the most important trend
within the galaxy of political Islam. For example, groups such as Al-Qa’idah and the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)4 are Salafi groups. However, Salafism is not confined to such episodes of
armed militancy, nor is exhaustively represented by them. It is instead an approach to Islam. It
preaches a literal reading of the Quran and the collection of ahadith,5 the only two sources it
recognizes as legitimate in the Islamic tradition (turath).6 Salafis do not admit different
interpretations or exegesis of these sacred sources. They claim the Qur’anic text and the collection
of ahadith contain an evident, clear message. It cannot be the object of different – let alone
divergent – understandings; there may not be allegorical or metaphorical readings. Because of this
literalism, Salafis espouse a rigid and uncompromising understanding of Islam, so that labels such
as radical, fundamentalist or extreme can be easily – if not always appropriately or unambiguously applied to them. They stand for a puritanical approach which seeks to replicate the community life
under the Prophet Muhammad and the following three generations of Muslims.7
However, while sharing the same doctrinal principles, Salafis also espouse very different
attitudes towards politics and society.8 In the context of the present study, I will focus on two such

2

I would like to thank Gavan Duffy for suggesting me this specific phrasing in one of our numerous conversations on
the issue of mechanisms and processes. In particular, he pointed out how it was possible to combine the idea of social
appropriation in the case of Islamist thinkers by adding a qualifier (tradition).
3
This brief presentation of Salafism is for merely introductory purposes. For a more elaborate introduction to Salafism
in the Muslim world and particularly in Jordan, see chapter 4.
4
See Chapter 6, fn. 12 for a brief discussion about ISIS different acronyms.
5
The ahadith (singular: hadith) stand for the deeds and the preaching of prophet Muhammad. Together, they represent
the Sunnah of the prophet.
6
See Lahoud, Nelly. Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries. Routledge, 2005, for a discussion
of the concept of turath.
7
See Wiktorowicz, Quintan. The Management of Islamic Activism – Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood and State Power
in Jordan, SUNY Press 2000, pp. 113-4.
8
See Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29.3 (2006):
207-239. p. 208.
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divergent attitudes of Salafism by taking Jordanian Salafis as a paradigm experience. In this
context, I will present two movements: first, the case of ‘Traditional’ or ‘Conservative’ Salafis,
often times also called ‘Quietist’.9 They refrain from direct or institutional political engagement.
They choose instead to focus on preaching, praying, studying and a degree of community service.
Their impact is therefore more noticeable at the civil society or grass root level where instead their
action is concentrated. Therefore, Quietist Salafis may refuse in principle the incumbent regime
while resorting to a (temporary) acceptance of the political status quo. They do not challenge or
contest openly state institutions and attendant power relations. Subsequently, I will discuss ‘Jihadi’
Salafis, who look instead to establish soon, if not here and now, an ‘Islamic state.’ They articulate
this view in spite of - and one might even say because of - state opposition to such a project. This
often leads to the adoption of confrontational and violent strategies. Jihadi Salafis represent a
minority not only within the vast universe of Islamist groups and movements, but also within
Salafism. Nevertheless, their militant political stance and their extreme strategies to bring about
social and political change put them in the forefront of academic research as well as news headlines.
I present these two cases in order to show the mechanisms and processes whereby Salafi
ideologues and preachers, by virtue of their ideological productions and scholarly work, impact
political and social mobilization. From these cases I evince and submit the presence of three
mechanisms (diffusion, elaboration and systematization) that compound into a process which I call
the social appropriation of tradition. I present my theoretical framework in Chapter 3. I rely on a
Gramscian social theoretical framework within which I articulate my theory of ideologues’ impact
on political and social mobilization. I use the language of mechanisms, processes and episodes of
contention as outlined in Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam’s Dynamics of Contention (henceforth,

9

See fn. 2. I use these labels as they are widely adopted in the literature on Salafi movements; however, they remain
highly problematic and somewhat improper, as I will observe later on.
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DOC).10 I contend that intellectuals and scholars, through their work and production act as
ideologues by:
1. Facilitating the spreading and transmission of ideas and concepts formulated elsewhere.
This is where ideologues’ scholarly network properties are most in evidence. The
literature refers to this mechanism as diffusion.11
2. Elaborating on the existing body of knowledge on a given subject. They provide novel
insights, interpretations, at times they formulate new ideas altogether. This is where
ideologues’ creative capacities, scholarship and knowledge are most in evidence. I call
this mechanism elaboration.
3. Systematizing the otherwise relatively fragmented or incoherent worldview of their
followers and acolytes. This is where the ideologues’ more systematic and rigorous
thinking, as well as their social connection (‘organicity’12) with the public they address,
are most in evidence. I call this mechanism systematization.
These mechanisms compound into a specific process, which I label the social appropriation
of tradition. Social appropriation is defined as “a process by which group members successfully
redefine the central aims of the group to include sustained contentious action.”13 The social
appropriation of tradition indicates then a process whereby this redefinition entails harking back to
elements belonging to a shared and exemplar ‘tradition.’ As mentioned above, such tradition is
represented by the experience of the early Muslim community. It is an intelligible system of
meaning within the Salafi discourse. Some of its elements may resonate to a larger or smaller extent
to the wider Muslim publics. It offers references to a past collective experience which provides
meaning, purpose, direction and orientation. Salafis’ articulation of this discursive tradition as the
template for just political and social order exemplifies this process. The social appropriation of

10

McAdam, Doug, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Oxford University Press, [2007] 2015.
12
For a discussion of the concept of ‘organic intellectuals,’ see Chapter 3, section “Gramscian Intellectuals: a
Philosophy of Praxis, Subalterns and Hegemony.”
13
McAdam et al., 2001, p. 27.
11
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tradition represents therefore a process particularly significant in Salafism within the wider context
political Islam.14
For these reasons, I submit that these mechanisms and processes help us understand the
ways in which the intellectual and scholarly productions of prominent Salafi thinkers and preachers
impact dynamics of mobilization, action and contention.
Salafis: Contentious politics, Islamism and Gramscian intellectuals
In this dissertation, social and political mobilization stand at the center of analysis. The two
movements under examination – Quietist and Jihadi Salafis – at first seem to engage in rather
different kinds of activities. It is apparent how Jihadi Salafis operate at the political level as a
clandestine and potentially revolutionary group: theirs is a textbook case of contentious politics.
Tilly and Tarrow situate contentious politics in the domain at the intersection of politics, collective
action and contention:15 by means of collective action state and non-state actors engage in a struggle
over power relations in an episodic, public and informal fashion.16 The action of the Quietist Salafis
instead seems to fit uneasily within this definition: where is the contention if, by definition, they are
‘quiet’? Given that Quietist Salafis developed schools and structured seminars, run research centers,
and fund charities, how is their action episodic? At the same time, we have to admit the possibility
that political contention may very well congeal in practices and behaviors that are not so
immediately and openly ‘contentious.’ As I will show in Chapter 5, Quietist Salafis’ approach to
politics – abstention from institutional participation and refrain from direct confrontation with state
authority – is merely a tactical, not substantial departure from the Jihadis’ more open posture.
Quietist Salafis still look forward to establishing an Islamic state. However, while the Jihadis
propose a top-down, immediate usurpation of political power, the Quietists softly advance a bottom

14

Interview with Dr. Muhammad al-Khair Eiedat, Amman, 5/26/2015.
Tilly et al., 2007, p. 7.
16
As I will elaborate later, this power struggle is usually (yet not necessarily) brought forth against the state.
15
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up transformation of existing power relations by means of societal and mores reformation. They
delay in this fashion, in an indefinite future, the building of the Islamic state.
Hence, one could argue that their choice of being non-political or a-political when it comes
to certain bounded domains (institutionalized politics and clandestine violence) is indeed a political
choice in a broader understanding of the political – any action which comports or engages in the
competition for power.17 If we consider Quietist Salafis’ modus operandi in this way, we may posit
the following. First, their actions and strategic choices are focused on the social. It is social
mobilization and social action. Second, this social action is also political. It does entail competition
over power: it aims in the long run to achieve peacefully what the Jihadis want to achieve in the
short run at all costs, even violently. Thus, I would still categorize the Quietist Salafis’ mobilization
within the realm of contentious politics. At the same time I would also refer to it, so to offer a more
apt description of their behavior, as social action. There is no contradiction in doing so. Certain
kinds of social actions may be instances of political contention. It depends which point during this
trajectory we are currently observing, whether consequences and impacts on power relations are
more immediate or more remote. We should not regard what Quietist Salafis do (preaching,
studying, proselytizing) as non-political, hence non relevant or beyond the purview of the present
research. We ought to notice instead when and how the social can be a gateway to the political: 18 in
this case to contentious politics.
To examine these two movements, I bring together three streams of research that only
rarely, and only recently, have crossed paths. First, the study of social and political mobilization
emerges from a rich research tradition that has re-defined over time its main focus: from the study
of disorder and mob behavior, to social movements, to contentious politics. As already mentioned,
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For an analysis and definition of power and political action, see Stoppino, Potere e Teoria Politica. Mulino, 2001.
With specific reference to social movements, see Tugal, Cihan. Transforming Everyday Life, Theory and Society 38.5
(2009): 423-458.
18
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Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam19 propose a new way of addressing the study of political contention.
They suggested singling out recurrent mechanisms and processes across contexts as opposed to
theorizing conflict processes as a whole. Charles Kurzman20 builds on Tilly, Tarrow and
McAdam’s work. He advocates placing ideas and perceptions at the center of analysis, exploring
how structural features are mediated by actors.
Second, I rely on studies on Islamism. For a long time, research on political contention and
research on Islamic activism or politics ran on parallel tracks: it seemed that the many elements they
had in common (collective action, social mobilization and contestation) were obscured by their
undeniable (mainly cultural) differences by the different locales on which they focused (mostly
Western countries for the former, mostly Arab or Muslim countries for the latter). Students of
comparative politics and sociology tended to focus on (western, usually progressive or leftist21)
social movements; area study experts and anthropologists focused on Islamic activism (and more
recently on political Islam and Islamism). Moreover, prevalent attitudes and discourses about the
progressive nature of western and especially American social movements (minority rights, social
justice, anti-war protests and so on) appeared markedly different from an Islamic wave allegedly
bent on casting the Arab and Muslim world back into the dark ages.22 This representation may be
overdrawn, but it hints both at the geographical and historical confines of social movements theory
and at the lack of proper theorizing in the case of political Islam. However, in the last decade, we

19

McAdam et al., 2001. Tilly et al., 2007. McAmad, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "Methods for measuring
mechanisms of contention." Qualitative Sociology 31.4 (2008): 307-331. McAdam, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow.
"Introduction: Dynamics of contention ten years on." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 16.1 (2011): 1-10.
20
Kurzman, Charles. "Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in social-movement theory: the Iranian
revolution of 1979." American Sociological Review (1996): 153-170; "The Qum protests and the coming of the Iranian
Revolution, 1975 and 1978." Social Science History 27.03 (2003): 287-325; The unthinkable revolution in Iran.
Harvard University Press, [2004] 2009; and "Introduction: Meaning-making in social movements." Anthropological
Quarterly 81.1 (2008): 5-15.
21
Della Porta, Donatella. Clandestine Political Violence. Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 18.
22
See for example one of the most quoted books on the subject: Sivan, Emanuel. Radical Islam – Medieval Theology
and Modern Politics. Yale University Press, 1985.
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have seen a convergence of the two tracks;23 and, more specifically for the present study, works on
Salafism, particularly of the Jihadi kind, have mirrored policy interest on the topic.24
Last, works on the sociology of intellectuals provide coordinates to locate and define the
individuals under investigation.25 Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals,26 and the research that took
inspiration from his foundational insights,27 represent the framework I adopt to theorize about the
relationship between Islamist scholars and their publics. The edited volume Popular Intellectuals
and Social Movements28 offers various contributions regarding the role of intellectuals in Third
World countries. In some instances, intellectuals happened to impact in significant ways the
trajectories of social action and political contention of different movements by virtue of their
ideological productions. I aim thus at providing a more systematic and rigorous understanding of
such process by combining insights from these three fields of research.
The proposition that ideas impact politics – in this case, contentious politics – seems quite
uncontroversial. The political process model, the dominant paradigm to address the study of
contention, lists ‘framing’ as one of its core components together with political opportunity
23

Wiktorowicz, 2000; Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach, Indiana University Press, 2003. Beinin, Joel,
and Frédéric Vairel, eds. Social movements, mobilization, and contestation in the Middle East and North Africa.
Stanford University Press, [2011] 2013. Bayat, Asef. "Islamism and social movement theory." Third World
Quarterly26.6 (2005): 891-908; Making Islam democratic: Social movements and the post-Islamist turn. Stanford
University Press, 2007. Life as politics: How ordinary people change the Middle East. Stanford University Press, 2013.
Lacroix, Stephane. Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism. Brookings Doha Center, 2012.
Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. Mobilizing Islam: Religion, activism, and political change in Egypt. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002.
24
Wagemakers, Joas. "Framing the "Threat to Islam": Al-Wala’wa Al-Bara’in Salafi Discourse." Arab Studies
Quarterly (2008): 1-22. "Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's Critique of Jihadi
Practices." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34.7 (2011): 523-539. Wiktorowicz, 2006; Meijer, Rojel, ed. Global
Salafism: Islam's new religious movement, Hurst & Co, [2009] 2014. Lahoud, 2005; Karagiannis, Emmanuel. "Defining
and Understanding the Jihadi-Salafi Movement." Asian Security 10.2 (2014): 188-198. Rougier, Bernard. Qu'est-ce que
le salafisme?. Presses Universitaires de France-PUF, 2008.
25
Eyerman, Ron. Between culture and politics: Intellectuals in modern society. Polity press, 1994.. Karabel, Jerome,
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Africa, And Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 2006..
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structures, resource mobilization and repertoires of contention.29 In this model, framing would
represent the theoretical box within which to locate our interests for the scholars’ intellectual
productions. However, students of framing processes have not addressed adequately the interactive
and intersubjective nature of such process;30 nor they have convincingly argued for the very usage
of the concept of framing as opposed to ideology or discourse.31 In sum, framing theory has not
been able to accommodate satisfactorily the focus on perceptions and ideas emerging from recent
developments on social and political mobilization.32
According to this view, people’s perceptions – or, better, shifts in those perceptions – should
be a prime focus of any attempt to analyze the emergence and development of political contention
or social mobilization. The question then can be articulated as how do ideas impact social and
political mobilization, as opposed to only when or whether. Understanding in which ways this
occurs requires us to ask which mechanisms and processes we may identify as “heuristic devices”33
to capture better how ideas contribute to and shape political outcomes.
As I address religious groups and movements that make direct (as the Jihadi) or indirect (as
the Quietist) claims onto the political, it is then important to recognize how religious beliefs
configure a specific worldview. In this sense, the impact of religion onto social and political life
eschews simplistic boxing in one of the containers of the Political Process Model. It is not possible
to speak of opportunities, resources, repertoires and frames as if they were hermetically sealed
containers, each carrying a necessary ingredient for social and political mobilization.
Transcendental (religious) beliefs and the attendant configuration of a certain ideology stand in

29

McAdam et al., 2001, chapter 1.
Steinberg, Marc W. "Tilting the frame: Considerations on collective action framing from a discursive turn." Theory
and society 27.6 (1998): 845-872; "The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action: A Dialogic Analysis of Repertoires of
Discourse among Nineteenth-Century English Cotton Spinners." American Journal of Sociology 105.3 (1999): 736-780.
31
Oliver, Pamela, and Hank Johnston. "What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social movement
research." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5.1 (2000): 37-54.
32
Kurzman, 2008.
33
“The Post-Structural Consensus in Social Movements Theory”. Rethinking social movements: Structure, meaning,
and emotion. Eds. Jeff Goodwin, and James M. Jasper. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 119.
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front of formation of motives (frames), perception of structures (opportunities and threats), means
(resources) and ways (repertoires) to engage in social and political mobilization.34
I submit that providing a theoretical account as to how religious inspired ideologies inform
social action and political contention is of great importance to understand better the phenomenon of
contemporary Salafism. To do this, I intend to locate Salafi Islamist thinkers’ ideological
productions in specific historical, social and economic contexts; and then analyze how such
productions impact the emergence and mobilization of Jordanian Salafis.
It then follows that it is important to maintain the centrality of perceptions of structural
features in investigations of this kind. In this vein, a Gramscian approach would suggest how the
intellectuals’ relation to their public is pivotal to understand such perceptions: intellectuals may be
defined as social actors producing, elaborating and spreading ideas who influence people’s
perceptions and worldviews. For these reasons I contend that Salafi thinkers and scholars may be
considered such intellectuals within a distinct cultural space or discourse in relation to specific
publics. Unpacking this relation is my primary task. Hence, I will outline how the works of
prominent Islamists provided coordinates to inform Jordanian Salafis’ perceptions of social and
political conditions; and therefore how ideological production and social action and political
contention are linked.
I do not claim that such relation is a deterministic one; nor do I aim to provide law-like
generalizations. I offer a mid-range theory: the social appropriation of tradition explains modern
day Salafism social and political mobilization in the context of political Islam. However, why
engage in such an endeavor in the first place? I offer three sets of reasons: the first is an issue in
terms of approach to non-Western settings; second and connected to the first, there is a theoretical
motive to pursue this study; and, last but not least, I will outline the current policy relevance of
Salafism.
34

See Wald, Kenneth D., Adam L. Silverman, and Kevin S. Fridy. "Making sense of religion in political life." Annual
Review of Political Science, 8 (2005): 121-143, p. 126.
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Studying Islamism and Mobilization: an Unavoidable Tension?
Theorizing about Salafi scholars’ impact on political mobilization is a (modest) attempt at
‘provincializing’35 the experiences and attendant theoretical explanations originating in western
contexts. Most theories about social mobilization are built on the study of Western (North American
and West European) experiences. I briefly pointed out how other contexts, including the Middle
East, have been comparatively rather neglected. The new, wider perspective in terms of
geographical scope is to be welcomed. It not only allows bringing to light unduly unexplored locals,
but also better understanding in turn Western cases from a comparative perspective.
However, the challenge remains insofar as the following holds true: there is no investigation
that may start a priori from an a-theoretical position. There is no scholar simply walking into
research collecting information and conjuring up a theory letting the data speak for themselves. If
anything, we need a theory to carry out the process of data and information collection to actually
decide what to include and what to discard in such a process. We may hence ask: in addressing
these instances of political mobilization, which analytical lenses are more appropriate? Social
theories (mostly) developed out of cases of mobilization in western countries and settings? Or shall
we rely on the insights of the area studies approach and studies on political Islam, with their fine
grained descriptions and sensitivity to specific cultural and ideational repertoires?36
I believe it is necessary to ponder over this carefully. One ought to be cognizant of some of
the pitfalls that may surface by overlooking the issue. Moreover, there are the tradeoffs that any
choice necessarily entails. More specifically, I am concerned about how categories that would fit
nicely western experiences and histories (since scholars developed them to explain exactly those
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Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe, Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton University
Press, [2000] 2009.
36
A similar distinction was offered by Burke. Addressing political mobilization in the Islamic world, they depicted
these two research traditions as distinct ‘Weberian’ and ‘Marxist’ approaches. The former takes on ideas and precepts
of Islam, is mostly elite focused and pays attention to the role of charisma. In short, it insists on the ‘Islamic side’ of the
phenomenon, to the point of being unsurprisingly dubbed 'new Orientalism'. The Marxist tradition, or 'new social
history', considers socio-economic conditions more relevant, and focuses on the 'social movement-social protest side’ of
the phenomenon. Burke, Edmuns. “Islam and Social Movements: Methodological Reflections”, in Burke, Edmund, and
Ervand Abrahamian, eds. Islam, politics, and social movements. University of California Press, 1988.
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phenomena) may be ill-equipped to make sense of other contexts. I do not submit that conceptual
coordinates across different contexts are irremediably different and fundamentally alien (a risk that
works such as Orientalism37 warn us about); rather, I wish to take notice of the hybrid encounter
between western modernity and indigenous sensibilities characterizing the post-colonial world.
In other words, I claim that one must recognize that the former colonial world – which I still
address as ‘Third World’ in light of the political and critical connotation of such term - has gone
through historical experiences that cannot be simply assumed as comparable with the colonizing
world; yet at the same time, one must not call for irreducible and essentialist differences in the
workings of politics.38 This tension has affected the study of contentious politics in non-western
settings.
The recent convergence on social and political mobilization and Islamic activism seeks to
provide “insights on Islamic movements [that] can contribute to social movement theory, and
insights from social movement theory [that] can assist the study of Islamic movements.”39
However, it should not imply either merely subsuming experiences of Islamic activism under
theoretical models first developed from different settings and contexts; neither it should suggest to
do away with undeniable cultural differences, whose recognition, in any case, makes the project for
a single approach so more challenging. As Kurzman argues, “[t]he field holds itself in tension,
unable to deny the obvious cultural differences between Islamic activists and Western scholars, yet
unwilling to claim irreducible difference for fear of falling into Orientalist patterns”.40
I believe this tension is somewhat unavoidable. As I adopted a Gramscian social theoretical
perspective and as I chose Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam’s approach on the politics of contention, I
hope that this may allow for culturally specific and idiosyncratic elements to be inserted within and
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Said, Edward W. Orientalism. Pantheon Books, 1978.
See also on this Sangmpam, S. N. Comparing apples and mangoes: the overpoliticized state in developing countries.
SUNY Press, 2012.
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inform a rigorous theoretical framework. I remain conscious of the limitations involved in any
choice.
Theory and the Salafi Case
Given these premises, the second reason to engage in this research is theory building.
Salafism offers indeed an interesting case. Ideologues and thinkers may adopt the same discursive
repertoire; but they construct different ideological and political programs and inform different kinds
of social actions. My analysis comprises movements and groups from the Arab Middle East
belonging to the same broad ideological (doctrinal) system. Muslims who describe themselves as
Salafis share the same ideational and doctrinal tenets. These ideological principles show little
variation – if any – across different political practices (for example, regardless of whether they
engage or not in acts of violence). Wiktorowicz, in an influential article on modern day Salafis,
summarized this by claiming that a common ‘aqida (‘creed’) would allow for various ‘manahij
(‘practices’ or ‘programs’).41 Therefore, in relation to the purpose of this study, it would be possible
to evince more clearly in which ways a common ideological discursive space may harbor vastly
different practices. To put this otherwise, from the common religious-ideological tenets of Salafism
we may be able to single out which role ideologues played in shaping trajectories of contention and
mobilization. The mechanisms and process I have submitted in this study suggest that they tend not
to vary across different discursive practices. Therefore, we may be confronting identical channels to
interpret and understand ideologues’ impact on social and political life.
Secondarily, this lends to postulate similar mechanisms and processes even beyond the case
of Jordanian Salafis. It would follow that the role of intellectuals within episodes of political
contention may manifest significant similarities regardless of the context or specific ideological
content. I will discuss this in the concluding chapter: I propose expanding in the future this research
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See Wiktorowicz, 2006.
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on the basis of the results presented in this dissertation- possibly theorizing about ideologues and
political contention more in general.
Jordanian Salafism: an Overview
The third reason to undertake this study is the relevance of Salafism in the context of
contemporary Islamist movements. It is true that Salafism may represent only a section of a much
wider galaxy of Islamic activism (to confine ourselves only to the Sunni world, thus without
considering the various branches, for example, of Shi’a Islamic activism). And it is fair to say that
Salafis’ views may elicit contempt, when not outright condemnation and opposition, in
contemporary Middle East. This happens not only when it comes to liberal or secular Arabs, but
also amongst fellow Muslims, whose understanding of Islam could well be at odds with Salafism.
Having said this, Salafism is an Islamic current related to a number of important recent
developments: the creation of vast charity networks rivaling the ones of older movements such as
the Muslim Brotherhood,42 the emergence of the ‘Sahwah’ movement in Saudi Arabia during the
1990s,43 the rise of Salafist An-Nour (‘the Light’) party in Egypt,44 and, last but not least, the rise of
notorious formations such as Al-Qa’idah and ISIS. Indeed, Salafism represents arguably the most
relevant kind of Islamic activism in the contemporary Arab world. Outside these confines, one
might even submit how groups such as Somalia’s Shabab or Nigerian Boko Haram are Salafi
inspired movements. Understanding how ideologues partake in the processes of social mobilization
and political radicalization through their intellectual and scholarly work may shed light on these
events and dynamics.
The groups and movements I analyze emerged and operate mostly in Jordan. However, the
very features of modern-day Salafism make it hard to restrict its study within nation-state
42
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boundaries. Groups originating in a given country may end up spreading in other ones; networks
form across state borders; and, importantly for this study, ideologues and leaders tend to study,
travel and operate all over the region.
In the case of quietist Jordanian Salafis, a number of prominent scholars and preachers
(Muhammad Nasir al-Albani, Salim al-Hilali, ‘Ali Hassan al-Halabi) gave birth and sustained the
emergence of the socially oriented variant of Salafism. Before Al-Albani moved to Amman from
Syria in the early 1980s, Salafism was a rather marginal phenomenon in Jordan. His disciples and
followers, after his death in 1999, founded the Al-Albani Center for Methodological Research in the
outskirts of Amman. The center quickly became a major institution for the preaching and spreading
of traditional Salafism, attracting believers from around the world. This branch of Salafism is still
the most numerically significant in Jordan, and winning over more and more adepts as of late.45
Traditional Salafis represent a widespread movement featuring a specific way to understand and
live Islam. More importantly for the present study, they have engaged in a quite elaborate and
thoughtful reflection to explain and justify their position vis à vis politics in general and state power
in particular. They renounce any kind of direct or institutional engagement with politics, and tend to
have generally good relations with the regime.
Jordanian Jihadi Salafis tend to reject instead accommodation with the state and call for a
direct – confrontational and often violent – engagement with politics. Largely influenced by Saudi
Wahhabism, the first jihadi Salafis appeared in Jordan in the early 1990s. Figures such as Abdullah
Azzam, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada al-Filastini contributed mobilizing and at
times directly organizing radical groups in Jordan and then in the wider Middle East. Notorious
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organization such as Al-Qa’idah fi-l-Bilad al-Rafidayn46 and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria find
their ideological roots in Jihadi Jordanian Salafism.47
Plan of the Study
In the present study, I examine the episodes of mobilization revolving around two of the
most prominent Salafi thinkers in the contemporary Arab world, namely Nasir al-Din al-Albani for
the Quietists and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi for the Jihadis.48 For the former, we confront an
amorphous mass movement; for the latter, the establishment of a vanguardist formation. These two
cases are not so much selected to ensure comparability or representativeness; rather, I selected them
in that they more readily manifest the phenomenon of interest.49 I analyze these two scholars’
production and how it was received by their target audiences. Secondary literature, discussions with
local experts and Jordanians affiliated with Salafism pointed me to the most relevant works of both
scholars. In analyzing such texts, I tried to evince how they sought to outline an ideational construct
– an ideology – that could be mirrored in the concrete contentious manifestations I mentioned
above.
Discussions with Jordanian academics and researchers were an invaluable source of
information, both about the features and trajectory of Salafism at large and in Jordan in particular. I
ran some twenty extensive, in depth interviews with individuals of diverse background and
experiences: Members of Parliament, ministry officials, party and community leaders, Salafi
preachers and sheikhs, and, last but not least, Salafis themselves. These interviews allowed me to
ponder over how the work prominent Salafi scholars contributed to the emergence of the episodes
of contention at hand.
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Finally, the dissertation is organized as follow. In the following chapter, I will offer the
literature review I briefly touched upon above. I will then outline in Chapter 3 my theory in detail,
elaborating on a Gramscian theory of intellectuals to account for the emergence and mobilization of
Jordanian Salafism. Subsequently, Chapter 4 will provide a historical narrative to locate properly
the rise of Salafism in Jordan. The two main strains mentioned above will be dealt with in chapter 5
(Quietist Salafism) and 6 (Jihadi Salafism). I will conclude in chapter 7 with final considerations
about the theory I proposed, what we can learn about Salafism and its politics, and a possible venue
for future research.
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Chapter 2 – A Land of Three Rivers: Combining Perspectives

Geography as a Metaphor
Are streams of academic literature akin to lakes or rivers? I suggest looking at them as
rivers. I intend to offer a picture of cross-fertilization across disciplinary boundaries: an
‘Academic Mesopotamia,’ a land where fruitful cross-fertilization between the Tigris of the
‘Discipline’ and the Euphrates of ‘Area Studies.’1 Can the theoretical rigor of Political Science
enrich the study of Muslim politics? Can in-depth knowledge of the region contribute to the
development of the study of politics?
I am not seeking to bridge entire disciplinary fields: only, I would like to show how a
‘joint irrigation’2 is possible and beneficial by making some research traditions work together.
Perhaps I am more daring in terms of geographical metaphor, as I intend to bring together not
just two, but three rivers!
I look at three major research fields to understand how ideologues influence and impact
political contention in the context of political Islam: the study of social mobilization and political
contention, the study of the sociology of intellectuals, and the study of political Islam. Of course,
these three fields are so vast as to represent seas rather than mere rivers. That is why I zero in on
specific subsets of such literatures that more directly pertain to my project. I shall focus on the
issue of framing theory when it comes to contentious politics; on the relation between
1

I borrow this image from Valbjørn, Morten. "Toward a ‘Mesopotamian turn’: disciplinarity and the study of the
international relations of the Middle East." Journal of Mediterranean studies 14.1/2 (2004): 47-75. See also Teti,
Andrea. "Bridging the gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the disciplinary politics of the area studies
controversy." European Journal of International Relations 13.1 (2007): 117-145; Sil, Rudra, and Peter J.
Katzenstein. "Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: Reconfiguring problems and mechanisms across
research traditions." Perspectives on Politics 8.02 (2010): 411-431; and Haklai, Oded. "Authoritarianism and
Islamic Movements in the Middle East: Research and Theory‐building in the Twenty‐first Century." International
Studies Review 11.1 (2009): 27-45.
2
Valbjørn, Morten, cit., p. 48.
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intellectuals and social class; and on the main approaches to social and political mobilization in
the study of political Islam.
Before doing that, I wish first to discuss the study of religion from a Political Science
approach. I do so to explain in brief where I locate my project; and to clarify at the outset how I
intend to think about religion as a social phenomenon.
On the Study of Religion in Politics
Why dedicating a section to this topic? For one, Political Science manifested for many
decades a limited interest towards the study of religion. Classic modernization theorists represent
perhaps the main culprit.3 In their contention, modernization and secularization tended to
proceed hand in hand. This proposition resulted in the now much contested and discredited
‘secularization theory:’4 the march of progress would increasingly divest religion of any
significant impact in modern politics or social life.5 Religious institutions and actors would
decline in importance. People’s religiosity was bound to fade away. Most Marxist scholars
would agree: various articulations of the ‘opiate of the people’ famous dictum foresaw the
progressive and eventual demise of religion from the modern world.6

3

Rostow, Walt Whitman. The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto. Cambridge university press,
[1959] 1990 and Middle Eastern political systems. Prentice Hall, 1971; Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some social
requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy." American political science review 53.01
(1959): 69-105. Lerner, Daniel. The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East. Free Press, 1958.
For more recent studies, see Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. Sacred and secular: Religion and politics
worldwide. Cambridge University Press, [2003] 2011.
4
For an overview of the different meanings of the term ‘secularization’, see Philpott, Daniel. "Has the study of
global politics found religion?." Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 183-202.
5
Berger, Peter. The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion. Open Road Media, 2011.
6
These trends can be traced even further back in European philosophical tradition. Besides Karl Marx and Frederick
Engels, we may recall August Compte’s positivism, Frederick Nieztsche’s nihilism and Sigmund Frued
psychoanalysis between the mid XIX century and the beginning of the XX century. For all these thinkers, religion
was bound to disappear from the emerging modern world, in a process of maturation and growth either social or
collective (Marx and Engels, Compte) or personal (Freud and Nietzsche, although the latter’s position on the matter
is more ambiguous).
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Consequently, social sciences predicting secularization became more secular in their
outlook: in line with to their argument, they could not waste time addressing an ever-receding
phenomenon. As Wald and Wilcox put it, the secularization of the field, “originates with the
nature of political science as an academic discipline, specifically the intellectual development of
the field, the social backgrounds of scholars, obstacles to empirical research on this subject, and
the agenda-setting process in political science.”7 Religion, in a secularizing world, was by
definition separated from political power.8 But the resurgence of religion in the contemporary
world questioned the very assumption that modernity equals secularism:9 to understand modern
politics, it has become important to understand religion.10
What has been the result of these efforts? As Eva Bellin suggests, “the subfield [of
Comparative Politics] has still failed to reckon with the power of religion as an independent
variable, the non-instrumental aspect of religious behavior, and the malleability of religious
ideas, as well as their differential appeal, persuasiveness, and political salience over time.”11
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Wald and Wilcox echo Bellin: the renewed interest in the study of religion and politics “is
unlikely to persist unless specialists in the subject tie their work to broader theories of political
behavior and change.”12
Religion, Ideas and Political Contention
Is then religion a force for maintaining the status quo or to spur change? Well, it depends.
Scholars have recognized how religion has Janus-like qualities. Religion as a social phenomenon
makes it possible to morph discourses and practices of subservience and preservation into a
language for defiance and change. How can this happen? A good starting point is Swidler’s
understanding of political culture as a “toolkit for action.”13 She argues that in ‘settled’ and
‘unsettled’ lives (periods of relative calm versus times of uncertainty and displacement) the same
cultural elements may serve different purposes. In similar ways, Billings and Scott present an
overview which more specifically addresses the role of religion as a legitimizing or challenging
cultural force.14
Williams attempts more directly to explain how religion may impact preservation and
change. Religion is at the same time culture (in a Geertzian sense of shared system of meaning)15
and ideology (as a program of action for Swidler ‘unsettled lives’ periods).16 As culture,
Williams claims, “[r]eligion influences political relationships because religion is central in the
creation of symbolic worlds.” This creation allows for the “ordering of relations among societal
members – part of the essence of politics.” In this sense, religion affects political life ‘behind the
12

Wald and Wilcox, cit., p. 529.
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16
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backs’ of participants: “its influence is often effective without the active awareness of those
experiencing it.”17 On the other hand, religion can also be ideology, a specific program for social
and political action that instead ‘pulls people from ahead.’18 In this vein, the relation between
religion, power and political ideologies (often European totalitarian ones) has been explored in
particular by Gentile.19
Smith provides a concise explanation to this peculiar quality of religion. Primarily and
initially, religion supports the status quo: it explains what is out there. But the very
transcendence of religion (its specific and distinct feature vis à vis mere political ideologies)20
indicates a perfect world, the hereafter, that stands for how things should be down here: “that
which is sacred and transcends temporal, earthly reality, also stands in the position to question,
judge and condemn temporal, earthly reality.”21 To explain how this condemnation leads to
mobilization and contestation, we need to account for how ideas operate. This problem is, of
course, anything but new, nor does it pertain solely to the role of religion in social affairs. As
Berman points out,
“Political scientists must be able to explain the backstory, why some of the innumerable ideas in
circulation achieve prominence in the political realm at particular moments and others do not.
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Since no true intellectual vacuum ever exists, what is really at issue here is ideational change,
how individuals, groups, or societies exchange old ideas for new ones.”22

Therefore, of the multitude of ideas present at any given moment within the space of
political culture, some will have a social and political impact, and others will not. Of the ideas
affecting social and political outcomes, some will shore up the status quo, others will contest it.
In focusing on religious inspired ideas defying the incumbent system, I seek then to connect the
ideational domain of political culture to the realm of contention. The Political Process Model
(PPM) is now the most accepted model to address such domain. It has grown out of the study on
social movements and the theories developed therein (known as Social Movements Theory, or
STM). As an interdisciplinary field, SMT welcomed contribution from the social sciences as a
whole, and it primarily developed thanks to American based sociologists in the 1960s. The PPM
presents a set of elements that inform and explain mobilization and contention - resources for
mobilization, political opportunity structures and frames (at times expanded to four to include
also repertoires of contention). In relation to religion, Wald et al submit,
“[b]y now a well-established research tradition, SMT provides important clues to the mysteries of
religiously based political activity. Most important, the various approaches incorporated under the
SMT rubric identify what we consider the central questions that need to be asked in order to
account for religion as an idiom of political conflict and offer the potential to treat religiously
based movements on their own terms.”23

However, despite the potential embedded in the SMT in addressing the role of religion in
politics; and despite “the growth of disciplinary interest in the religious factor,” Wald and his
colleagues reach a rather somber conclusion: this “increased attention highlights the need for a
22
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stronger infusion of social science theory in this emerging subfield. Despite all the research
generated by the relevant disciplines, neither political science nor religious studies have offered a
comprehensive explanation for the genesis of religiously based political action.”24
My study is an attempt in this direction. To clarify where I intend to locate this
contribution, I will offer here a bird’s eye view of the evolution of the field of social and political
mobilization. I shall then focus on the concept of framing and framing theory, where I deem the
most outstanding problems to tackle the theme of religion in politics actually lie.
Evolution of the Field: a Bird’s Eye View
The early explorations of collective, non-institutionalized behaviors tended to depict
political mobilization (especially in cases of riots, protests and demonstrations, but also social
movements) as episodes of suspended rationality, mob behavior and public danger. They were
thus considered as relatively marginal phenomena, unduly altering social peace and stability. 25
The main theoretical thrust was to explain them as episodes of panic, turmoil dictated by the
psychology of mass behavior.26
Social and political mobilization outside channels considered legitimate (often because
institutionalized, such as elections) seemed to dismiss also the (potential) righteousness of
grievances and needs behind it. Taking grievances seriously phased out the approach predicated
on mass psychology. People did not engage in contention because of some sort of suspension of
rationality or sheer misapprehension, but because of claims, needs and aspirations – in other
words, dissatisfaction with the status quo. However, it became soon apparent that while
24
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dissatisfaction and desire to improve one’s lot are widespread, mobilization is not. Two major
approaches confronted this issue from vastly different angles.
The Marxist approach worked on the concept of ‘ideology’27 with the works of Lenin,28
Gramsci29 and Hall,30 amongst others. Marx himself emphasized the limiting aspects of ideology
(the ensemble of ideas, conceptions and consciousness derived from the world of material
production), as it would impede, for the most part, an emancipatory assessment of power
relations.31 Marxists’ problem was to explain the lack of mobilization – in particular, of the
proletariat against the capitalist class – when one would expect to see it given ‘objective
interests’ of given social groupings. Classic Marxist contention spoke of the working-class
failure or incapacity to properly understand such interests and then act rationally upon them. The
concept of ideology indicated here a partially obfuscated apprehension of social, economic and
political life. This misapprehension would hamper not only the possibility of mobilizing to alter
the status quo, but even, in the most extreme cases, of conceiving mobilization as a desirable and
needed course of action.32 A richer theorization over the origins, functions and workings of
ideology shall wait the fundamental contribution of Gramsci, whose work will be made available
to the English speaking academic world only after the publication of Selection from the Prison
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Notebooks edited by Hoare and Nowell Smith.33 We shall return to this when dealing with the
Gramscian insights on mobilization, ideology and culture.
A rationalist approach developed more or less at the time of the tumultuous 1960s in the
US. Its founding figure was Mancur Olson, with his influential The Logic of Collective Action.34
As Hirschman (1982) interestingly pointed out,35 the reception of Olson’s work was at first
uneven: it explained why mobilization is unlikely to occur while America was witnessing an
unprecedented wave of contention! Soon enough however Olson’s became an unavoidable work
when addressing collective action, famously positing how individual rational calculations – in
particular the free-rider problem – made it illogical to start and join social and political
mobilization. Therefore, if for the Marxist approach it was rational to mobilize and join
collective action, for Olson inspired rational choice theory the opposite was true.
Between the late ‘70s and mid-80s the study of social movements in particular and
mobilization more in general sees the emergence of three perspectives which will eventually
congeal in the Political Process Model (PPM). Resource Mobilization Theory (RTM) builds off
of Olson’s theory and thus continues the rationalist tradition. McCarthy and Zald36 reject the idea
of an immediate (and unmediated) causal effect on mobilization of grievances. However, unlike
Olson, they suggest to focus on the resources available to the would-be protesters and activists
that may solve the collective action problem: financial assets, spaces and locations, access to
media and state officials, cohesive leadership, clear program of action, societal allies, etc…
While welcoming the finer grained analysis of social mobilization, students were not
satisfied with the RTM approach for two main reasons. First, it did not deal with the kind of
33
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social and political environment in which mobilization emerged and had to confront. And
second, it seemed to stress too much the rational side of protests when scholars had reasons to
believe – often given their own participation in such movements - how elements such as
passions, commitment, identity and visions seemed to be part and parcel of mobilization.
The first problem with RMT gave rise to arguably the most prolific approach within the
study of mobilization. Largely in debt with structuralist political sociology of the 1960s,37 the
Political Opportunity Structures (POS) approach looked primarily at macro institutional, social
and economic parameters to evaluate the likelihood and the kind of mobilization. Elements such
as state capacity, regime type, societal cleavages, alliance alignments and capital-labor relations
took the center stage in a highly structuralist perspective: the focus shifts here from the
rationality of the agents to “conditions” that “cannot be molded by actors’ purposes.”38 And,
unlike Marxist scholarship, class struggle and political economy were either de-emphasized or
simply structural elements alongside others. Tilly39, McAdam40 and Tarrow41 will contribute
most significantly to this research, which will encompass not only social movements, but also
macro phenomena such as state formation or collapse, nationalism, democratization and
revolution. In particular, Skocpol’s influential work on social revolutions deemed structural
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imperatives so powerful as to render actors’ wishes, preferences and outlooks rather marginal
and ultimately inconsequential. Hence, “[r]evolutions are not made. They come.”42
The POS account was also consonant with the re-claiming of the state as a fundamental
locus of analysis which developed in the mid-80s.43 Furthermore, a bridge could be conveniently
built with RMT instrumental rationality: “expanding opportunities”, brought about by “changes
in institutional rules, political alignments or alliance structures that grant more leverage to
aggrieved groups with which to press their claims”, do in fact “derive their causal force by
changing the cost-benefit calculus of insurgents and antagonists alike.”44
What POS could not satisfactorily answer was the second major weakness detected
within the rationalist approach, i.e. the dearth of consideration for actors’ perceptions, wishes,
passions and identity-based claims. If anything, the structuralist schools seemed to downplay
those even more.
Framing Theory and the Study of Mobilization and Contention
It is at this juncture that the study of social and political mobilization and the study of
(political) culture converge. Goffman’s first adoption of the term ‘frame’45 was deployed by
Benford, Snow and their associates in the mid-1980s in the study of social mobilization.46
Framing theory, or more simply ‘framing’, developed into a voluminous literature out of Benford
and Snow’s foundational contribution.47 Framing theory allowed ideational factors to sit
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alongside RMT and POS. It tried to do this by “linking together social psychological and
structural [what POS emphasized]/organizational [what SMT emphasized] factors and
perspectives in a theoretically informed and empirically grounded fashion.”48 How did framing
theory propose to do this?
Framing theory pertains to the creation of frames and their deployment in the context of
social and political mobilization. Movement leaders, organizers, and political entrepreneurs
engage in frames construction. Benford and Snow define frames as “interpretive schemata that
signifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects,
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action in one’s present or past environment.”49
How are frames connected to mobilization? Frames are tools to represent and express grievances
and dissatisfaction (‘injustice frames’), providing a diagnosis of the ills affecting a given
community or group. They also offer a prognosis, i.e. a solution contrived by movement leaders
for potential adherents and bystanders. And last, a frame shall culminate into a call to action,
capitalizing on the success of both the diagnosis and prognosis. 50 In order to perform
successfully these functions, a frame has to ‘resonate’ with the target audience. For a frame to
resonate, an intervening process, frame alignments, must obtain: “[b]y frame alignment, we refer
to the linkage of individual and SMO [Social Movement Organization] interpretive orientations,
such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and
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ideology are congruent and complementary.”51 Frame alignment may occur by frame bridging,
amplification, extension or transformation.52
Framing theory is to be welcomed in that it adds three important elements for analysis of
mobilization. First, it is readily apparent how in this sense frames are eminently individual
cognitive constructs. Framing theory allows reinserting agency in a field of inquiry otherwise
heavily focused either on a structural level of analysis (with POS); or concentrated at the mesoorganizational level (with RMT). Second, it provides a theoretical scaffold for dealing with
ideational factors, especially (political) culture. As observed previously,53 scholars have often
treated culture as a structural factor, investigating how a certain system of values or meaning
would orient agents’ behavior or practice. The impact of agents’ ideas on the structure did not
receive a comparable amount of attention. Framing theory analyzes precisely how specific
depiction and representation of structural features and of resources contribute to mobilization.
Last, framing theory opens up the systematic study of agents’ cognition and perceptions.
In POS, actors simply respond to systemic incentives and constraints. Such structural imperatives
are deemed necessary and sufficient to explain mobilization. In RMT, individuals act as
instrumentally rational actors to overcome free-riding and collective action problems. With the
concept of frames, these considerations are accompanied by assessments of agents’ social
psychological dispositions. However, it is at this point, when framing theory invites the
investigation of cognition and perceptions, that the theory manifests its weaknesses.
If, as it were, framing theory is to represent the linchpin for the insertion of (political)
culture, ideas and cognition in the study of mobilization – and hence allowing my own study to
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proceed with the analysis of religion in such context – then we should pay close attention to five
major problems.
First, the definition of frame I have presented addresses the agent solely as an individual.
In studying mobilization, we face a collective phenomenon. How does framing theory connect
the individual and the collective levels? Rucht and Reidhardt proposed to consider frames as
“collective patterns of interpretation with which certain definitions of problems, causal
attributions, demands, justifications and value-orientations are brought together in a more or less
consistent framework for the purpose of explaining facts, substantiating criticism and
legitimating claims.”54 However, they do not indicate how to bridge methodological
individualism upon which frames are predicated at the micro level and their macro
manifestations as ‘collective patterns of interpretations.’55 As Gillan notes, “[t]he ambition of
much framing scholarship is to delineate important processes that mediate predictably between
political culture, SMOs and individual behaviour. Since frames are identified at the collective
level but conceived as causally effective at the individual level such work introduces a
problematic dualism.”56 Alimi and Johnston provide the terrain to come up with a solution to this
dualism: framing, “goes to the heart of all collective action and is the raison d’être of the
framing approach’s utility, namely, that the shift from quiescence to action presumes a prior shift
in shared perception, consciousness, or interpretation of what is necessary and/or possible.”57 But
Johnston and Oliver consider indeed a problem that, “[f]irst, frames are individual cognitive
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structures, located ‘within the black box of mental life’ that orient and guide interpretation of
individual experience. Second, frames become important in analyzing collective action insofar as
they are shared by enough individuals to channel individual behaviors into patterned social
ones.”58 This observation highlights how the linkage between individual and collective frames of
action is implied, rather than explained, in the original formulation of the theory. The
mechanisms and processes by which this happens are underspecified.
Second, framing theory harbors a dangerous dualism. Frame is a cognitive and largely
unconscious structure while also a strategic and voluntaristic process. Hence, on the one hand
framing theory refers to lenses through which social actors – individuals and groups alike – filter
and understand events and dynamics. On the other, it stands also for the “‘discursive work’
through which political entrepreneurs position events, causes, or projects within narratives
carefully selected from an array of available choices.”59 Put otherwise: frames are snapshots of
reality, mental schemata; framing is the process whereby such snapshots come about.60 Framing
theory does not clearly differentiate between these two different conceptualizations. 61 This
problem presents us with a further and third difficulty for framing theory.
This seemingly dualistic ontological nature of frames (structure versus process) makes us
wonder: is framing theory postulating a strategic operation in perceptions and grievances
construction – or even manipulation and fabrication – at the hands of specific actors? Or is it
proposing frames emerge out of deeply held – even emotionally or primordially rooted – feelings
about ‘what is out there’ in the hearts and minds of individuals? As Steinberg puts it, “[i]t is
58
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problematic to characterize social movement framing as both an exercise in the reality
construction of genuinely held senses of injustice and identity, while simultaneously holding that
activists and SMOs strategically manipulate and align frames to mobilize consensus.”62 Other
authors have instead argued that the constructivist/strategic dichotomy is not set to limit the
utility of framing theory: “While actors instrumentally frame situations so as to press their case,
their very understanding of what is instrumental is shaped by taken for granted frames. In that
sense, frames are both strategic and set the terms of strategic action.”63 In a similar move,
Desrosiers, in studying ethnic violence and framing, claims that, “[f]rame analysts acknowledge
that strategic communication takes place amidst very real settings, structures and opportunities,
which framing does not claim to study. But while framing theory may not account for these
settings, it does shed light on how people make sense of them, interpret them and communicate
them. Framing gives us the means to develop an integrated approach to the study of interpretive
and communication micro-processes behind episodes of (ethnic) violence.”64 In my view, these
propositions do not dent Steinberg’s core contention: they simply claim that frames are two
things at the same time, and that it is not a problem – while I think, with Steinberg, that it is!
While I recognize the plausibility of these arguments, they look less tenable in light of the last
two critiques I would like to offer.
The fourth problem is the assumption linking frame and underlying discourse. Frame is
predicated on the, “presumption (in analytic practice if not in theory)[…] that this framing
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discourse is an internally stable enough vehicle for the transmission of meaning so that
interpretive strategies for mobilization and action are possible.”65 In other words, for frames to
explain mobilization they must be steady and coherent. But this assumption is a very demanding
one. Any discourse, including the specific discourse out of which frames emerge, is more often
than not hardly a stable construct. It is fluid, complex and internally inconsistent. The interactive
and communicative process that framing theory claims to detect and depict demands instead a
stable, quasi-fixed discourse. It is on such discourse that actors bent on mobilizing their target
audience insist and draw from. They do this thanks to the frames they create via the framing
process. Thus, stripped down, the communicative process between senders and receivers seems
overly simplified in its dynamic: skillful political entrepreneurs at one end, and a receptive
public at the other end. In light of these considerations, the concept of frame seems
underequipped. It cannot sustain properly the weight of theoretical claims that do not rest on
assumptions of discursive cohesiveness and internal consistency. And it cannot account for the
attendant proposition of a one way interaction in the context of the framing process. In order to
solve this issue, proponents of framing theory have advanced a series of items that may account
for frames success, i.e. successful mobilization.66 However, we still confront the tautological
spin this solution offers: how are frames successful in mobilizing? Because they check all the
marks. How do we know they do? Because we witness successful mobilization.
Fifth and last, the concept of frame is not useful to discuss how certain ideas emerge in
the first place: focused, as it is, on transmission and reception, framing theory does not shed light
on the generation of new insights out of a certain discourse. Frames may still be useful to explain
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how ideas are parceled out and conveyed to a target audience; but framing theory is thin when it
comes to the origin and development of those very ideas. As Gillan noticed, “while claiming to
bring the realm of beliefs and values into a theory of social movements criticized for its
ignorance of culture, the focus on processes of framing has pushed the ideas themselves to the
periphery of that approach.”67 Framing theory, in privileging the concept of frames, disposed of
the concept of ideology. I contend that the latter is more appropriate when we need to confront
issues of ideas generation, development and, ultimately and crucially, influence.68
We may for the time being think of ideologies as complex systems of beliefs entailing a
social theory and normative prescriptions.69 As a social theory, ideologies are not merely
snapshots or filter to assess reality. They are constructs to comprehend the ensemble of social
reality, connecting its various parts according to a logic or rationale. Gerring notes that
‘consistency’ is one of the very few (mostly) agreed upon features of ideology.70 However, this
observation merely indicates more constituency vis à vis political culture and discourse; not
unassailable or lack of internal contradictions as some understandings of frames propose.
Furthermore, as a set of normative prescriptions, ideology spells out the ‘ought to be’ beyond the
‘is.’ In this sense, it fits nicely the study of religion in politics in that, as we discussed before,
religion always treads on the verge between mere assessment of reality and call for change in
order to bring it in line with a preferred order. Last, ideology allows to study where ideas
originate and emerge. This point is crucial in the present project as it requires singling out the
loci of ideological production and identifying them in specific societal actors:
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“Social networks, especially among small groups of intellectuals, are central in creating new
theories and new ideologies. Rochon […] calls these networks critical communities, loci of
ideological production. He distinguishes this ideological production from movement activities,
particularly framing, which promote the ideas to a wider public. In this view, framing does not
create ideological change, but can be a way of recruiting people into a context within which
ideology can change.”71

In conclusion, we can say the following. First, “[i]t is essential to appreciate the
intellectual aspects of ideology (what Heberle calls the debate of ideas over the centuries) as well
as their function in motivating action.”72 Second, frames and ideologies do not exclude one
another. They are rather complementary concepts, performing different functions. Students of
frames have indeed indicated how, “reference to a general conceptualization of ideology glosses
over these core framing functions, thereby making the problems of consensus and action
mobilization appear less complicated than is often, and probably typically, the case.”73 Hence, I
do not advocate for a simplistic substitution of frames with ideology. But I do hold ideology as a
more useful concept for the task of my project. This choice stems from two considerations: first,
frames may emerge out of ideologies, but the reverse seems hardly the case. Ideologies deserve
to be granted more attention. Furthermore, in this study, concerned with the role of intellectuals,
frames do not offer enough theoretical leverage to analyze the complex social theories that these
individuals and ‘critical communities’ may produce. In focusing my analysis on ideologues at the
intersection of religion, politics and mobilization, I prime ideology over frame.

71

Oliver et al, cit., p. 45.
Ibid.
73
Snow, David, and Scott Byrd. "Ideology, framing processes, and Islamic terrorist movements." Mobilization: An
International Quarterly 12.2 (2007): 119-136, p. 129.
72

37

Dynamics of Contention, Cognition and Meaning Making
In Dynamics of Contention (DOC),74 Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam brought to bear the
wealth and tradition of the PPM. At the same time, DOC seeks to amend what the authors
perceived being the major limitations in the field of social mobilization: a prevailing focus on
social movements; the separation between large N studies on wars and civil conflicts and small
N studies of revolutions; a western bias in terms of case selection and underlying cultural
assumptions; and a strong emphasis on structural factors to explain contention.75 Their study is
considered a major turning point for the study of social mobilization and contentious politics.
The framework they proposed, while criticized at times on accounts of excessive complexity, 76
introduced the language of mechanisms, processes and episodes.77 This innovation entailed a
fundamental shift: from the language of causes of contention and attendant covering theories, to
pathways or medium-range theorization about causation. Let us examine this work more closely.
In DOC, Tilly and his associates perform three main moves. First, they expand the scope
of their research to any social activity that may represent ‘contentious politics.’78 Contentious
politics is, “the episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their
objects”. Moreover, “at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the
claims and the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.”79
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Contentious politics entails actors making claims that, if realized, would bear on the interests of a
third party.80
Second, DOC does not try to get rid of the “classical social movement agenda,”81 whose
main theoretical contribution was the PPM. Rather, they seek to insert dynamism into such
model: “[w]here the classic social movement agenda assigned central weight to social change,
political opportunities, mobilizing structures, frames, and transgressive forms of action, we try to
identify the dynamic mechanisms that bring these variables into relation with one another and
with other significant actors.”82 The authors are not interested, “in the strength of the correlations
between variables but in how variables are linked to one another through causal mechanisms.”83
This claim comes in the contexts of the existing body of knowledge about mobilization. We
know the conditions and elements that may engender it. We also know that contention and
mobilization take even the most reputed and attentive scholars off guard when they do occur.
Timur Kuran has probably provided the most compelling account as to why we are not (and
likely never will be) able to predict the emergence of mobilization.84 Hence, Tilly and his
colleagues do not seek “to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for mobilization, action,
or certain trajectories, we search out recurrent causal mechanisms and regularities in their
concatenation.”85 I focus precisely on the ways (mechanisms) in which specific social actors’
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impact mobilization, an attention to the process whereby this happens as opposed to the
necessary or sufficient conditions that bring about mobilization.
Third, Tilly and his colleagues “treat social interaction, social ties, communication, and
conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as
active sites of creation and change.”86 Hence, this perspective permits to look at social
interactions as discursive practices: the performance of acts – behavioral and speech acts – which
intend to communicate meaning.
The work of Tilly and his colleagues mirrors both previous and later developments in the
study of mobilization and contention that stress the cognitive and meaning-making aspect of
discursive practices. Eyerman and Jamison describe how a cognitive approach would depict
social mobilization:
“A social movement is not one organization or one particular special interest group. It is more
like a cognitive territory, a new conceptual space that is filled by a dynamic interaction between
different groups and organizations. […] It is apparent that the cognitive praxis does not come
ready made to a social movement. It is precisely the creation, articulation, formulation of new
thoughts and ideas - new knowledge - that a social movement defines itself in society.”87

It is readily apparent how Tilly and his colleagues echoed this proposition in their call for
attention to social interaction as a creative site for change. Kurzman further expanded on
different occasions on the fundamentally cognitive aspect of mobilization.88 For Kurzman, the
implications of DOC bring the study of contention to an analysis of meaning-making practices.
First, he contends, “[h]umans constantly seek to understand the world around them, and that the
86
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imposition of meaning on the world is a goal itself, a spur to action, and a site of contestation.”89
Second, “[m]eaning-making is not limited to social movements. All action involves meaningmaking, just as all action involves contention. However, social movements may be a particularly
conducive site to privilege meaning-making, because their activities foreground resistance to the
dominant norms and institutions of society. They raise questions about the possibility of
alternative world-views and alternative dispensations.”90
Popular Intellectuals and Alternative Worldviews
Who works for such alternative worldviews? Who produces these ‘alternative
dispensations’? Mobilizing frames and ideologies do not simply emerge spontaneously within
episodes of contention: we can study and research their origin and trajectory. I do not want to
recommend a completely voluntaristic process, and I have warned above about such position.
But I do suggest that some individuals and actors are more responsible than others when it comes
to the production and diffusion of ideas, as well as to their deployment within processes of social
and political mobilization.
In addressing this issue, Baud and Rutten propose the figure of “popular intellectual,”91
an individual closely related to the emergence, development and trajectory of mobilization. They
lament how social movements or similar phenomena are often reified, their agency taken for
granted: ideas may be taken to rise ‘spontaneously’, with no specific agent bearing some degree
of responsibility for it.92 Relatively scant theoretical work has been done on the relationship
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between episodes of contention (the outcome to be explained) and the individuals (or community
of individuals)93 elaborating, systematizing and spreading the ideas and practices along which
political mobilization is articulated. While in fact we have a rich literature on contention and
mobilization; and while we have, as I will show in this section, a vast literature on the sociology
of intellectuals, we lack systematic attempts at bridging these two.
This is unfortunate, Baud and Rutten conclude, in that, “[t]he relationship between
intellectual representation and political activities is one of the most politicized issues in social
movements and contentious politics. Intellectual work is measured in terms of coherence and
veracity; political activity is judged almost exclusively in terms of success. This tension makes
the position of popular intellectuals highly complex.”94 Popular intellectuals are thus those
individuals who, “seek to define the problems of subaltern groups, articulate their grievances,
and frame their social and political demands.”95
Their usage of the phrasing ‘subaltern groups’ promptly refers to the vocabulary of
Italian philosopher and political activist Antonio Gramsci, to whom they refer explicitly. The
expression indicates how popular intellectuals are indeed ‘popular’ in a class-based sense:96 it
stresses the popular intellectual’s position vis à vis power, which is a subordinate one insofar as
‘popular’ indicates subaltern groups within a set of power relations. This subaltern position of
the popular intellectuals (and therefore not, obviously, of all intellectuals) enables and at times
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compels97 them to articulate and put forward alternative worldviews to amend the subaltern
position of the groups they hail from and may still be part of.98
The work of Gramsci on the intellectuals, and the following reception and development
of his insights, is part of a broader literature on the sociology of intellectuals. This research has
tried to define these social actors and analyze their function within society. My focus on popular
intellectuals considers therefore a more limited segment of this social category (insisting on their
more immediate impact on mobilization and contention and recalling their position in relation to
power).
Defining an Elusive Actor: The Sociology of the Intellectuals
I offer the following review by latching on the previous discussion on social and political
mobilization. In particular, the concepts of frames and ideologies, and the problem they seek to
amend in explaining contention, represent elements bridging the study of mobilization with the
study of the intellectuals. Considerations regarding ideational and discursive elements implied
that structural properties and features are not given. They are perceived, filtered and differently
understood by actors variously located in a structure that we may describe in terms of geography
of power.99 As already noted by Steinberg, framing theory is predicated upon a constructivist
ontology, albeit at times not explicitly. Every actor engages in constructing social reality; but in
doing this, paraphrasing Orwell, some actors are indeed more equal than others. And in this
97

I qualify this stance later on when considering Saba Mahmood’s work on political Islam. See fn. 178.
I will elaborate on this point at length in presenting my theory. For the moment, I offer a brief reflection on
Gramsci when he speaks of intellectual and moral reform: "What ensured that not all intellectuals would be simply
reactionary and conservative and fail to elaborate new ideologies, ‘to organize the intellectual and moral reform?’
Part of the answer was in the development of organic intellectuals, which might encourage a congruence of interests
and views between the intellectual elite and masses." Olsaretti, Alessandro. "Beyond class: The many facets of
Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals." Journal of Classical Sociology 14.4 (2014): 363-381, p. 377. It is also worth
mentioning here how Gerring, op. cit. p. 980, suggests ‘contrast’ (i.e. standing in opposition to) as amongst the most
widespread conceptualizations of ideology.
99
Dabashi, Hamid. Islamic liberation theology: Resisting the empire. Routledge, 2008. See in particular the
introduction.
98

43

regard, the intellectual is a social actor whose pronouncements and thinking on society,
hierarchy, difference, the public good, identity, sense of right and wrong are particularly relevant
and consequential. This happens by virtue of her education, insightfulness, scholarship, erudition
or a combination of those; or else thanks to other qualities like personal charisma, eloquence and
persuasiveness.
The figure of the intellectual is a relatively recent – modern – construct. Brym locates the
first emergence of the term in the XVII century, but it did not gain ground in the common
parlance until the late XIX century with the Dreyfuss Affaire in France.100 A systematic study of
the intellectuals had to wait a few more decades with the publication of Julien Benda’s The
Treason of the Intellectuals in 1928. Its normative bent, evident form the title, makes manifest
the tension between a discussion of the intellectuals as they are versus how they should
behave.101
Benda lamented the intellectuals’ abdication from the role of guarantors of truth and
justice, favoring instead material rewards and personal interests. Other contemporary authors
will follow this tradition, namely Noam Chomsky102 and Edward Said.103 But for the purpose of
the present discussion, more important is the perspective that Benda inaugurated from an
analytical standpoint. He portrayed the intellectuals as a ‘class in themselves’: like the
Dreyfussards, this tradition sees the intellectuals as a relatively homogenous group within
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society, hence featuring its own dynamics, function and interests. On the other hand, other
analytical traditions viewed the intellectuals as ‘class-less’ or else as ‘class-bound.’
The focus on intellectuals and social class is one possible venue for the construction of a
sociology of the intellectuals. The other one is searching for a definition of the intellectuals in
terms of their shared characteristics and features.104 Camic and Gross define a loose scholarship
as ‘old sociology of ideas’ where this attempt featured prominently: what different
conceptualizations of the intellectual have in common is “the assumption that in most societies,
and certainly in all modern societies, groups of persons can be found exhibiting the defining
properties of the intellectuals.”105 By framing intellectuals this way (“as an objective social
category”), the old sociology of ideas “tended to efface important forms of variations among
specialized knowledge producers.”106
In line with most of the scholarship on the subject, I contend that articulating the
intellectuals/class relationship allows pondering over the impact, influence and function, if any,
of intellectuals on society and politics. Gramsci provides a lucid assessment of the relational
character of the intellectual as a societal actor and her function within a power structure:
“[t]he most widespread error of method” is that of searching for “this criterion of distinction in
the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations
in which these activities [...] have their place within the general complex of social relations. [...]
Perhaps the most vital function of an intellectual is his role as an expert in legitimation.”107

Karabel similarly claims that this issue is more important than conjuring up a viable
definition of the intellectuals: “[a] sociologically rigorous definition of the intellectual will
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depend, then, neither on specific ideological commitments or personal qualities, but rather on a
distinctive location within the larger social structure.”108 Li echoes this position: “[the task of]
defining intellectuals functions more as a project or mobilizing call rather than an empirical
inquiry. […] Who are the intellectuals is itself a site or object of struggle within cultural
fields.”109 Finding a good working definition is no doubt important; however, such definition,
comprising the various attributes of the intellectuals, depends upon the position they occupy
within a social and political structure. Hence, I am not looking for an ‘ideal type intellectual.’
In the context of a relational perspective, if Benda is considered the father of the class-inthemselves approach, students look at Karl Mannheim and Antonio Gramsci as the classic
representatives of the class-less and the class-bound traditions respectively. These three authors,
writing in the interwar period, faced the same kind of historical questions: what is the relation
between intellectuals and power? Are the intellectuals a force for change or pro-status quo? What
is their function in society, and how do they operate within it? The different answers they
provided gave birth to three separate, although of course by no means airtight, streams of
research.
The ‘new class’ theory, heralded by Yugoslavian dissident Djilas, represented one of the
most important developments in the class-in-themselves tradition during the Cold War era.110
This new bureaucratic class dominating socialist regimes acquired in effect an independent status
from the social forces (primarily the working classes) it was supposed to emanate from; and it
merged the bureaucratic, managerial qualities of technocrats with the theoretical and ideological
propensities of the intellectuals. Gouldner further contended how this kind of intelligentsia is
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glued together by a “culture that gains authority not through force but through the power of
ideas”, and subverts “all establishments, social limits, and privileges, including its own.”111
Subsequent works tried to define more precisely when and how intellectuals become a class,
without positing this as an unproblematic point of departure.112 However, this research tradition
is in fact predicated on a rather demanding assumption: a commonality of interests, perspectives
and strategies of individuals who often instead seem divided by bitter opposition and rivalries.
Suffice to think about the classic left versus right ideological divide which blatantly (and perhaps
even more acutely so than the general public) affects the intellectuals.113
The class-less approach is based off of Mannheim’s definition of the intellectuals as
“social groups whose special task … is to provide an interpretation of the world for [the society
in which they live].”114 This tradition recognizes how intellectuals do come from various social
groups, and how, consequently, their societal and ideological alliances prevent or at least hamper
the emergence of a unified intellectual class. At the same time, their links with such social
formations are not decisive. In a way, intellectuals transcend class.115 Edward Shils elaborated on
a popular theme about intellectuals, i.e. their alienation from society. 116 While we cannot assume
a class commonality amongst them, “[i]t is practically given by the nature of the intellectuals’
orientation that there should be some tension between the intellectuals and the value-orientations
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embodied in the actual institutions of any society.”117 For Shils the intellectuals seem thus
located in space where their distinctive features – theoretical as opposed to manual labor – sit
uneasily between, on the one hand, the social groups they come from but from which are now
only loosely connected; and, on the other hand, the political power which seeks to recruit them
given their knowledge, expertise, charisma and social reputation.
Lastly, the class-bound tradition stresses the importance of social forces and social
origins in determining the identity and orientation of the intellectuals. As expected, Marxist
scholarship contributed mostly to this approach. Lenin himself had argued for the revolutionary
role potentially played by liberal intelligentsia in the quest for enfranchising the Russian
proletariat, only to remain disappointed by their more prominent bourgeois character.118
Consonant to his overall social theory, Gramsci is at pain to explain where ideology actually
comes from and in which ways it may transform, instead of sustaining, a capitalist polity. He
then looks at the function of specific groups within society that partake in fabricating and
articulating a certain ‘weltanschauung’ (‘worldview,’ the same term used by Mannheim as his
thinking and Gramsci’s seem clearly to converge). In the words of Gramsci:
“Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself,
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and
an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political
fields.”119
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I will discuss Gramsci’s theory more at length in the next chapter: suffice to say for the
moment that it is hard to overestimate his contribution in the study and sociology of the
intellectuals. Regardless of one’s view on the issue of the intellectuals/class relation, as Karabel
points out, “[h]ow Gramsci proposes to transform the participation of intellectuals in the
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat from a regrettable necessity into a positive asset
constitutes one of the most distinctive features of his thought.”120 In other words, Gramsci’s
understanding of the intellectuals signals a direct and unavoidable connection between political
activism – specifically, but not only, antagonistic or contentious politics – and theoretical,
ideological elaboration.
The works mentioned earlier by scholars such as Said and Chomsky take a class-bound
approach. Other authors, critical while not Marxist, supported this perspective. Michel Foucault,
in his elaboration of the power-knowledge nexus, attributed great importance to the working of
the intellectuals. 121 In a striking resemblance to Gramsci’s thinking, Foucault looks at the
intellectuals not only in the traditional, Dreyfussard way championed by Benda; but also, as the
individuals strategically located in the ganglia of societal reproduction, “specific sectors, at the
precise points where their own conditions of life and work situate them (housing, the hospital,
the asylum, the laboratory, the university, family and sexual relations).”122
Beyond this tripartite classification, Brym proposed a fourth category: intellectuals
“embedded in a shifting network of class and other group affiliations.”123 He notices how classless approaches, by neglecting social ties, have blunt tools to account for the influence of such
factors onto the intellectuals, hence making it more challenging to articulate the relational
120

Karabel, Jerome. "Revolutionary contradictions: Antonio Gramsci and the problem of intellectuals." Politics &
Society 6.2 (1976): 123-172, p. 129.
121
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage, 1977, p. 67-69.
122
Ibid, p. 70
123
Brym, cit., p. 7633

49

character of the intellectual vis à vis society. At the same time, class-bound and class-inthemselves approaches shove aside problems of ideological differentiation - either amongst the
intellectuals themselves, or in relation to the class they allegedly hail from and should, therefore,
represent. Brym claims that this approach “seeks to overcome both these problems by focusing
on the intellectual’s web of shifting group affiliations.”124 Brym references Bourdieu’s work, in
particular his concepts of field of power and cultural capital: “to explain intellectuals’ ideologies
and political allegiances, one must trace their paths of social mobility as they are shaped by the
capacity of classes, ethnic groups, religious orders.”125 From this perspective, therefore, it is
rather simplistic to categorize intellectuals as forming a class, or being class less, or being
members of a class: “[t]hey are embedded in social networks whose ties to various classes and
other collectivities shift over time and help account for their ideologies and political
allegiances.”126
Brym makes a valid point. I believe it is possible to reconcile Brym’s critique of the
classic tripartition with a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the class-bound
approach, a reading, as we shall see, consonant with more recent interpretations of Gramsci. Let
us consider Eyerman, who agrees with Brym’s argument: “[t]he intellectual is neither a fixed
social stratum nor a special attribute of gifted individuals, it is an emergent role constructed and
performed by actors out of cultural traditions in historical contexts.”127 Thus, refuting a
transhistorical definition of the intellectual, Eyerman puts it squarely as a historically and
culturally contingent social actor, so to “avoid both deterministic structuralism and a focus on

124

Ibid.
Ibid, p. 7632
126
Ibid.
127
Eyerman, Ron. The Cultural Sociology of Political Assassination: From MLK and RFK to Fortuyn and Van
Gogh. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 455.
125

50

unique individuals.”128 Gramsci’s notion of historic bloc, and the attendant concepts of organic
and traditional intellectuals, resonates with Eyerman’s insight.
The overview on the sociology of the intellectuals I presented here was merely cursory
for two approaches (class-in-themselves and class-less) that I maintain least useful for the
development of my project. I submit instead the class-bound perspective, relaxed in its rigid
understanding of the intellectuals-social class relation, to be instead the theoretical tradition most
conducive to explore the role of intellectuals in episodes of social and political mobilization.
Such episodes necessarily entail participation from larger sectors of the population. The classbound perspective, especially in its Gramscian variant, offers theoretical tools to make sense of
the features of the intellectuals-social class relation enabling the former to impact the latter.
Mobilizing Islam, or Why We’re Here
The last river to navigate, contemporary Islamic activism, has been the subject of a great
deal of academic research, especially since 9/11. Scholars have devoted time in providing
surveys of the field to put order over a cross-disciplinary, and highly contentious, topic.129 In a
similar vein, I here categorize the main theories scholars formulated. I intend to highlight their
different presuppositions and contentions; and thus, based on such discussion, explain why a
contentious politics approach is particularly helpful in explaining contemporary Islamic politics.
The categories that I propose are not meant to be exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. They have
overlapping boundaries, and some works may fit in more than one category. Nonetheless I hope
them to be a useful compass.
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I group the main theoretical strands of Islamic activism under six headings: essentialism,
Marxism, social-psychological approach (strain theory), institutionalist approach, globalist
accounts and last contentious politics and SMT.
Essentialism
Essentialism is the “belief in the real, true essence of things, the invariable and fixed
properties which define the ‘whatness’ of a given entity.”130 This essence is what ultimately
explains individuals’ behaviors at a micro level and societal and political outcomes at a macro
level.131 Essentialism contends it is possible, for any given society, to evince such unalterable
traits from its foundational texts, particularly holy scriptures, where the coordinates for
understanding the world and making sense of life are lied out. It follows that essentialism
assumes immutability and constancy against history, change and context. It manifests the traits
of Said’s ‘orientalism’132 in its attempt to explain why predominantly Muslim societies have not
conformed to the dicta of modernization theory.133 In choosing between “Mecca and
mechanization”, Muslim societies (must) opt for the former.134 In this view, Islam shows its
fundamental incompatibility with modernity. It refutes its values, opposing progress and
proposing a stultifying adherence to a sacred tradition. As March put it, for the essentialist camp
“there is an inevitable alienation from the modern secular nation-state because of its incongruity
with more authentic and essential Islamic expectations.”135
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Contemporary Islamic activism (also and especially in its militant and violent
manifestations) is thus the emergence of such true, naked essence: Islam is necessarily political,
secularization is not and cannot be within its horizon.136 Muslim societies can achieve
modernization only by disposing of such backward cultural understandings: but one is left
wondering how can they modernize if those traits are ingrained in their very essence? Opposition
and clash seem thus inevitable in this schema since essence and identities are not negotiable or
reconcilable items across different cultures and civilizations. 137
The critiques leveled against an essentialist approach contributed to its sidelining, at least
within academia.138 In the words of Sayyid: “Said’s critique concentrates on castigating
Orientalism for its monolithic caricature of Islamic phenomena.” He concludes saying that this
critique has “produced a theorization of Islam which seemingly rejects essentialism.”139
Are we throwing away the baby with the bathwater? Are there not any valuable lessons
we can draw from the essentialist literature? Were we to deny any importance to the foundational
text, we would also imply a fundamental irrelevance of such text, specifically in its content and
core message.140 As I will illustrate, this is one of the perils of other approaches that tried to
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counter essentialist contentions. A qualified and more sophisticated essentialism may instead
claim: “[t]here can be little doubt that Muslim consciousness has a certain leaning towards
politics which stems directly from the spirit of Islamic precepts.”141Sadik al-Azmeh speaks in
fact of ‘orientalism in reverse,’142 Bassam Tibi separates clearly Islam and Islamism along
classic western categories: the former a religion, the latter a political ideology. While Islam as a
faith does not conflict with modernity, Islamism is inherently (‘essentially’) opposed to
secularism, liberalism, pluralism, etc…143
Marxism
Be that as it may, the reaction to the most vulgar forms of essentialism spurred alternative
theories about Islamic activism, advancing radically different positions. An orthodox Marxist
approach would portray Islam as a tool at the hands of capitalists to control and subdue the
working class. In this way, Islam is both stripped of inherent autonomous agency and of its
assumed specific political bent as essentialism would claim. In a sense, Islam would not be any
different from other world religions in maintaining and fostering - as a superstructural element unequal power relations in the context of capitalism.144 However, Islamic activism fits uneasily
in this model. Political Islam has been in fact more of a language of resistance and defiance than
submission (going back here to the Janus-like qualities of religious discourse).145
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Turner has linked the rise of political Islam to the penetration of neoliberal practices in
the post-colonial state.146 Butko offers a Gramscian analysis to present political Islam as a
counter hegemonic project: Islamists’ success is rooted in their appropriation of religious
symbols, discourse, and language to express socioeconomic grievances, utilizing them as
instruments to enact radical political change.147
Nevertheless, most works in this tradition still take Islamist ideology to be just a
(spurious) reflection of underlying socio-economic conditions, hence at the end of the day
irrelevant as an explanatory element.
The Socio-Psychological Paradigm and Strain Theory
The socio-psychological approach elaborates on the dislocations and traumas that
modernization wrought on non-Western societies. In ways similar to the developments of
Western Marxism with the Frankfurt School, this paradigm looks at the consequences of
modernization writ large, exploring domains such as anomie, alienation, and cultural
displacement.148 In particular, it attributes to Islam the function of a coping mechanism in
relation to the psychological strains engendered by the failure of diverse modernization projects
in the Third World. The kind of modernization that these countries experienced has been
economically uneven, socially disruptive and culturally problematic. Islam helps coping with the
most dire consequences of economic and societal exclusion (recalling here some of the Marxist
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scholarship insights). Moreover, it makes sense of cultural uprootedness spurred by rapid mass
urbanization and industrialization of formerly largely agricultural societies.149
Ayubi argues that the post-colonial Arab state failed to win over its subjects with a
successful modernizing project:150 a failure to modernize, especially to spur sustained and
widespread economic development, generated resentment, anger, frustration and disillusionment.
Islam and its political manifestations represent the language that the masses adopted to express
such sense of mistrust in the post-colonial state and its developmental project.151 According to
Zubaida, nationalist or socialist movements may have well played the same function, had they
not failed in opposing imperialism, and if “their leaderships and ideologies” had not been
“subordinated to and utilized by the ruling cliques and . . . consequently tainted.”152
The social-psychological paradigm accounts for a host of dynamics stemming from
(uneven) modernization, if not in a relatively parsimonious fashion. Besides, Islam is not pinned
down as an inherently political, let alone violent, religion, again taking cues from Marxist
approaches. However, there are two main problems. First, it takes Islam as a residual category. A
politicized Islam is what’s left on the plate of viable psychological comforts and political
ideologies after all the others have failed: liberal democracy, (Arab) nationalism, (Arab)
socialism, third-worldism, Soviet or Chinese inspired communism, etc... Islamic discourse as a
force with its own agency and force is thus either dismissed or greatly downplayed. It is at best a
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reaction to external forces (colonialism, neoliberalism, industrialization, you name it), not an
independent element in historical developments.153 Confronted by the vexed question, ‘why
Islam and not something else?’ strain theory risks sliding into culturalist arguments about the
rootedness of Islam in this or that society. Second, if Islam is a mechanism to cope with ‘uneven
(economic, political, social) development,’ then political Islam is too an ‘uneven’ response, a
symptom of a disease that does not conform to the norm. Again, here political Islam - and the
agency of social actors who campaign for it so forcefully - is basically an epiphenomenon.
Institutionalist perspective and the inclusion-moderation thesis
While economic underdevelopment and uneven modernization are ubiquitous in the
Third World, it seems that Muslim societies display unique traits in terms of their political
militancy. Hafez discards explanations based on economic accounts - whether grounded in class
struggle logic or wider strains of economic and social modernization. He claims instead that the
repressive, authoritarian nature of most regimes154 in Muslim countries is the primary cause of
the rise of Islamic militancy: “Muslims become violently militant when they encounter
exclusionary states that deny them meaningful access to political institutions and employ
indiscriminate repressive policies against their citizens during periods of mass mobilization.”155
Hafez’s thesis brings back state institutions and their functioning at center stage.
Exclusion breeding militancy mirrors the inclusion-moderation thesis: mechanisms of
political inclusion for Islamist groups seem to decrease their adoption of militant and violent
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strategies for attaining power.156 However, despite its parsimony and clear suggestions to policy
makers,157 institutional arguments do not address properly a number of problems. Schwedler has
outlined how the inclusion moderation-thesis is plagued by teleological assumptions and
definitional issues.158 Hafez’s work presents the same issues: moderation is understood primarily
(only?) as abandonment of violent and militant practices; there is no discussion of ideological
shift occurring: it is simply assumed it follows strategic adaptations. In this way, we have no
tools to understand radical, but not violent or militant movements, such as, in our case, quietist
Salafis. Consequently (and from an anti-essentialist perspective), can we address Islamic social
and political manifestations which are not violent and militant kind? Furthermore, shifting the
focus from political economy to political institutions simply presents the researcher with the
same set of problems: is political Islam an epiphenomenon, a tool for(militant) mobilization? If
we ask ‘why Islam and not something else?’ do we have a better - or even just different - answer
than the ones provided by Marxist approaches or strain theory? I do not think so. Islamic
activism is a mere mode to express anger, frustration or articulate opposition and resistance, a
reaction with no independent agency. Indeed, Hafez claims that there is no basic difference in
terms of dynamics of militant mobilization between Islamists and other kinds of groups.

156

Buehler, Michael. "Revisiting the inclusion-moderation thesis in the context of decentralized institutions The
behavior of Indonesia’s Prosperous Justice Party in national and local politics." Party Politics 19.2 (2013): 210-229.
Gurses, Mehmet. "Islamists, democracy and Turkey: a test of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis." Party Politics
20.4 (2014): 646-653. Driessen, Michael D. "Public religion, democracy, and Islam: Examining the moderation
thesis in Algeria." Comparative Politics 44.2 (2012): 171-189.
.
157
One of the main contentions of this literature pertains to indiscriminate repression of Islamist groups, which is
very likely to alienate more moderate groups and radicalize further the more extreme ones. See Ashour, Omar. The
de-radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements. Routledge, 2009.
158
Schwedler, Jillian. "Can Islamists Become Moderates?: Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis." World
Politics 63.2 (2011): 347-376; and Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge
University Press, 2006. Also, Cavatorta and Merone argue for the presence of the inverse mechanism: see Cavatorta,
Francesco, and Fabio Merone. "Moderation through exclusion? The journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from
fundamentalist to conservative party."Democratization 20.5 (2013): 857-875. For a post-Arab Spring account, see
Volpi, Frédéric, and Ewan Stein. "Islamism and the state after the Arab uprisings: Between people power and state
power." Democratization 22.2 (2015): 276-293.

58

Here again we return to inherent tension when studying Islamic politics. On the one hand,
I would not want to single out Islamic activism as a sui generis phenomenon, as an essentialist
position would recommend. On the other, not recognizing the weight and role of (Islamists’)
ideology runs the opposite danger of not considering its role at all.159 It ends up providing an
account fitting all militant groups in all contexts. In other words, Hafez did not need to
paraphrase Gurr’s title Why Men Rebel and simply adopt it fully.160 Can we exclude ideational
factors so brazenly?
Let us consider Moaddel’s work. He wished to explain the origins of different political
ideologies (liberalism nationalism, Islamic modernism, Islamic fundamentalism) in the Muslim
world, trying to locate the “proximate conditions for ideological production.”161 He looks at two
variables: the nature of the target of a discourse-based ideology (a pluralistic versus a monolithic
target) and the location of the target in relation to the state (state institutions or civil society). The
model is rather complex in its theoretical premises and the causal claims advanced are, at best,
soft and qualified. This might explain its relative unpopularity. But it is a daring attempt to
combine ideologies (their origins, content, and dissemination), the political (including
institutional) conditions for their emergence.
Globalist
However, by and large, the reactions to essentialism we have considered thus far
downplay ideology and religion as important elements in their discussion. The approach I label
as ‘globalist’ offers instead a response along ideational lines. It originates within the wider
debate on modernization and secularization I briefly mentioned at the beginning of this
159

See for example Hafez, cit., p. 21, where Islamist frames of mobilization merely respond to structure and
strategy, and they do not inform or shape behaviors.
160
Gurr, Ted Robert. Why men rebel. Routledge, [1970] 2015.
161
Moaddel, Mansoor. Islamic modernism, nationalism, and fundamentalism: episode and discourse. University of
Chicago Press, 2005.

59

chapter.162 A globalist perspective inserts the rise of Islamic activism and militancy in the
context of global religious resurgence. The Fundamentalism Project163 is the manifesto of such
scholarship (if anything for the sheer ambition of a five-volume endeavor). This project sought to
make sense of what it referred to as “'modern' religious fundamentalism”164 (a label somewhat
discarded in more recent studies): “modern becomes a 'code word' for the set of forces which
fundamentalists perceive as a threat which inspires their reaction.” Modern religious
fundamentalists oppose in particular “secular rationality, religious tolerance and relativism,
individualism.” 165
The globalist perspective takes cues from the socio-psychological paradigm as it
considers the unsettling effects of modernization. It primes religion as force which provides
meaning and purpose against the Weberian iron cage. Religious tradition plays an important role
in this sense: “If the group or leader appeals to a sacred text or tradition, how is this source
interpreted and applied?”166
The Fundamentalist Project and works with a similar ethos167 make a powerful case for
de-essentializing Islam as the only religion with marked political impact. However, this positive
trait tends to conflate Islamic revivalism with religious resurgence more in general. We therefore
lose leverage to assess whether there is, indeed, something about Islam or Islamic revivalism and
162
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what that might be. The politicization of Islam has received much more attention than any other
similar trend amongst world religions. And second, while the contributors are at pains in granting
fundamentalists (including Islamists) a degree of agency, the main thrust remains trapped within
the archetype depicting Islamism as a reaction to the dynamics of modernity, rather than as parts
and parcel of the construction of such modernity in the first place.
Roy and Kepel offer a globalist view of Islamic politics. The institutional solutions that
political Islam proposed so to confront the challenges of modernity are awfully weak;168
therefore, globally, Islam is on a retreat as a viable political alternative.169 One consequence is
the relegation of Islam to the private sphere, away from the public sphere of politics, a move Roy
calls “neofundamentalilsm.”170 Ismail contests this position spelling the decline (even demise) of
political Islam: this is not only confined to the sphere of institutional politics, but pertains to all
domains of life where Islam is making inroads as a civil society rooted phenomenon. The failure
to found any viable ‘Islamic State’ is not decisive evidence for the regression of political
Islam.171 Also contesting the French scholars are Mandaville and Mamdani: the historical and
global trends that brought about the emergence of political Islam and Islamism in particular are
here to stay.172
But again, a globalist approach does not provide sharp theoretical tools to single out
specific features that make Islamic revivalism at the center of current world politics. Confronted
with the question ‘why Islam and not something else?’ it may fall into essentialist explanations,
but rather it provides an all too vague ‘because of religion’ answer.
Contentious politics/SMT
168
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No single research tradition can, on its own, aptly explain phenomena as complex as
Islamic activism, and the literature on contentious politics is not different. Yet the adoption of
this perspective is relatively recent: it may have learned lessons from previous studies and
tackled some outstanding problems more convincingly. Pioneered by Bayat173 and Kurzman174 in
the late 1990s, we can consider Wiktorowicz’s edited volume the manifesto of this approach.175 I
have discussed above the main contours of SMT and contention politics, and I maintain that this
perspective to study Islamic activism has the potential to:
Insert Islamic mobilization within the vast domain of social and political mobilization. It
allows comparing Islamic activism with similar or equivalent phenomena and hence
doing away with essentialist claims.
Relate such mobilization to political institutions and socio-economic conditions. POS
provides theoretical leverage to do just that.176
Offer a nuanced perspective of actors’ motivations. They may behave strategically as
rational actors (as RMT submits). At the same time, SMT has highlighted how identity
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construction, sense of purpose and meaning making are part and parcel of any
mobilization effort.177
Point out, decisively for this project, how actors adopt, (re)elaborate and deploy elements
from a shared discursive space, as framing theory and discourse dialogical analysis focus
on these very aspects.178
Importantly, Meijer lastly ads: “SMT, although a research program that also derives from
the West, is far less morally committed to a certain political model, and is politically unbiased
and therefore more open and flexible than civil society theories, which are imbued with Western
liberal political values and goals.”179 Mahmoud similarly contends it is “crucial to detach the
notion of agency from the goals of progressive politics.”180 In this sense a contentious politics
approach is well suited to appraise a movement such as Salafism. A “normativity of freedom”181
would impel us to see a struggle for progressive emancipation inscribed into social and political
mobilization – and thus be ill-equipped when addressing a phenomenon which is not progressive,
such as Salafism.
But contentious politics and SMT (while perhaps originating with a built-in bias for
progressive politics) are not necessarily tied to that spirit. I am striving not to superimpose pre177
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conceived notions about the nature of politics and meaning making. I believe that the flexibility
and reach of a contentious politics approach allows steering clear from unwarranted assumptions
about the intentions and purpose of the actors we are dealing with.
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Chapter 3 - The Social Appropriation of Tradition: A Theory on Religious
Intellectuals and Mobilization

Gramsci, Mechanisms and Salafi Scholars
In the introduction, I outlined the basic contours of my theory, the social appropriation of
tradition. Here I offer a more comprehensive presentation. I develop it out of the discussion of
Chapter 2, where I showed how I intend to combine insights from the study of political
contention, Islamic activism and sociology of the intellectuals.
I will proceed as follows: first, I continue my examination of Gramscian intellectuals. In
particular, I describe their features referring to the ensemble of their social relations. In order to
do so, I will summon here classic concepts of the Gramscian vocabulary, such as philosophy of
praxis, historical bloc and hegemony. Second, I define ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse,’ which I relate
to the Gramscian analogues of ‘philosophy’ and ‘common sense’ respectively. I do this to move
from a theoretical discussion about the intellectuals to a political one about mobilization. We
may then look at prominent Salafi ideologues and thinkers as popular religious intellectuals.
Last, I present the process of social appropriation of tradition. I present the three
mechanisms - diffusion, elaboration and systematization - that compound in such a process.
Borrowing from DOC insights,1 I submit that these mechanisms and process explain how the
works and pronouncements of specific social actors (intellectuals, here represented by Islamist
ideologues) may spur and sustain social and political mobilization.
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Gramscian Intellectuals: a Philosophy of Praxis, Subalterns and Hegemony
We have already encountered Gramsci (1891-1937) in the previous Chapter: a social
theoretist who spoke (amongst a host of other things!) about mobilization and intellectuals.2 I
here outline the basic contours of his social theory so to as clarify in which ways I think about
mobilization, intellectuals, and the relation between the two.
As a Marxist scholar, Gramsci’s understanding of historical materialism is profoundly
different from, and at times even at odds with, the more economically deterministic version of
Marxism heralded in the 1920s and 1930s by the Soviet experience.3 Such a mechanistic and
structurally over-determined framework would never suit him. Gramsci maintains that human
beings emerge out of a complex and contradictory history and attendant social relations, which
cannot simply be reduced to the realm of material production.4 Human activity is always at one
time material and ideational/philosophical (as Gramsci indicates, there is no separation between
homo sapiens and homo faber). It is at this juncture that we should recall the Marxian notion of
ideology,5 an integral part of any human activity and inseparable to material life. In this sense, he
is mostly concerned with the role of people in working out their own emancipation, under
specific historical circumstances and social relations, not as passive objects in the thralls of preordained historical developments.
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Indeed, for Marx himself human beings are fundamentally relational and social.6 Gramsci
follows in these footsteps. He tries to develop a theory that combines human agency and social
structure in a non-reductive and non-deterministic fashion. He does so by elaborating further on
the idea of acting and doing, evidently rooted in Marxism with its emphasis on labor as creative
endeavor, yet as I contended never divorced from certain understandings of the world – a certain
ideology. In fact, by virtue of acting and relating to others, each individual partakes in the
(re)production of community and society at both the material and ideational levels. The societal
relations thus emerging represent a structure. Within this structure, each individual is endowed
also with the potential to impede or subvert societal (re)production (recalling, again, the
potentially positive aspect enshrined within the Marxian idea of ideology). However, the
structure does not determine a priori individuals’ willingness and capacity to preserve or change
society, although it surely influences them by offering possibilities and presenting constraints.7
In other words, Gramsci intends to steer clear both from unbridled voluntarism8 and structural
determinism.
A Philosophy of Praxis
The ‘philosophy of praxis’ represents the crowning of this effort. In one of the most
famous passages of the Notebooks, Gramsci explains what he means by it: “[i]n this way we
arrive also at the equality of, or equation between, 'philosophy and politics', thought and action,
that is, at a philosophy of praxis. Everything is political, even philosophy or philosophies and the
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only 'philosophy' is history in action, that is, life itself.”9 Let us examine this passage. Life is
thought (philosophy) and action (politics): it is thinking combined with and expressed by doing,
that is a ‘philosophy of praxis.’ There are then two main corollaries. First, insofar as history is
the unfolding of life and lives, the philosophy of praxis is history itself. Second, any history - and
thus any life - is inherently political:10 the philosophy of praxis implies that any life experience is
imbued within politics.
Therefore, politics cannot be separated from considerations regarding history. In order to
relate theory and history, Gramsci proposes the concept of ‘historical bloc.’ It indicates a
configuration of power articulated in a set of social and economic relations, institutions, values,
norms and practices - put in Marxist parlance, a specific arrangement of structure and
superstructure. In the context of a given historical bloc, every individual will make experience of
life in relation to her position within such power laden structure (whence the structural influence
on human agents): a certain societal position and activity will orient (though never determine!) a
certain worldview.11 It follows that individuals sharing the same position are likely to experience
similar lives and thus develop similar and shared worldviews. These emerge within the confines
of incumbent ideational and material circumstances, and insofar as they attribute shared
meaning(s) to life, they must be collective and not individual.
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The philosophy of praxis as a theory of acting and thinking implies that every human
being is a ‘philosopher,’ in the sense that everyone has the capacity to partake in such a
collective creation of certain worldviews, or ‘conception of the world’ as Gramsci refers to them
(see the excerpt below). Holding human beings as philosophers in this fashion does not say
whether these worldviews will be antagonistic or quiescent to the incumbent power structure; nor
whether they will be simplistic or sophisticated, widely shared or harbored by a tiny minority.
What we can say is that,
“Each man [...] carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher', [...] he
participates in a particular conception of the world, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and
therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into
being new modes of thought.”12

Organic and Traditional Intellectuals
Who are then the intellectuals in this scheme? As I have discussed in the previous
Chapter, Gramsci maintains that every social class in a historical bloc gives birth to its own
‘organic’ intellectuals who express the identity of the class and articulate its interests, aspirations
and grievances.13 This process means that some individuals, qua philosophers, have the potential
to emerge as organic intellectuals out of a certain class. Not everyone does; but everyone might,
as everyone is a philosopher participating, to lesser or larger extent, to conjuring up ‘conceptions
of the world.’ Hence, to be an intellectual is to perform such function for and on behalf of a
social class. It is in this sense that Gramsci’s intellectuals are ‘class-bound.’

Gramsci, et al., 1971, p. 9. Emphasis added.
In Gramsci’s own words: “Every social group, coining into existence on the original terrain of an essential
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of
intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in
the social and political fields.” Gramsci and Buttigieg, 2011, Q12, §1.
12

13

69

Gramsci’s intellectual is an emerging category, that is to say fluid and evolving. He offers
the famous distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals:14 yet the two are more like
poles of a continuum rather than dichotomous categories. Traditional intellectuals are not
qualitatively different from organic ones: they too emerged as organic intellectuals out of
historically bound social classes, but they became “progressively detached from their original
functions in relation to a specific socio-economic structure, as the latter declined and began to be
replaced by another.”15 A classic example would be the priesthood of the Catholic Church. The
priests were the organic intellectuals within a specific historical bloc (feudal Europe). They
contributed sustaining and preserving that power arrangement by justifying the domination of
feudal lords and bishops’ temporal clout. As that historical configuration declined with the rise of
modern capitalism, their function and attendant position within society changed too:
“[i]ntellectuals who were once organic to one class thus became ever-more detached from the
world of production.”16 The traditional intellectual is not an irrelevant actor; rather, her
connection to up-and-coming social and economic forces is progressively severed. But given that
the embeddedness within a societal class grants the intellectual her ability to be an impactful
force within society, the traditional intellectual has thus lost much of the capacity to do so. In
fact, for Gramsci, the organic intellectual partakes directly to societal and political processes:
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Olsaretti, Alessandro. “Beyond class: The many facets of Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals.” Journal of Classical
Sociology 14.4 (2014): 363-381, p. 369.
16
Olsaretti, ibid. See also Hier, John. Contemporary Sociological Thought: Themes and Theories. Canadian
Scholars’ Press, 2005, pp. 41-43.

70

indeed, she is the product of such processes. There is no retreat into the ivory tower for a truly
organic intellectual.
Intellectuals and Subalterns
Consequently, the intellectual is not a discrete category.17 It is a relational one, and a
matter of degree. This move prevents Gramsci from recklessly falling into a vanguardist
position, where an enlightened minority of ‘professional intellectuals’ (think of the Leninist party
type) offers solutions to the masses.18 These would be then relegated to a position of subalternity
not only vis à vis the ruling class, but also in relation to their own intellectuals. Gramsci, always
keen to confer the subaltern agency in the revolutionary process,19 proposes a relation between
the (organic) intellectuals and the masses characterized to a degree by reciprocity as opposed to
sheer domination of the former on the latter.20 This relation is therefore fundamentally
interactive, pedagogical and mutually influencing: “the impact of the social context – and
ultimately of the masses – on the production of ideas by high intellectuals, [...] happens through
influence on the theoretical agenda of intellectuals and influence on their recruitment pool. The
subaltern cannot speak themselves but do influence intellectual production, however,
indirectly.”21 I thus concur with Olsaretti when he states, “much of Gramsci’s theoretical effort
consisted of understanding the importance of the individual intellectual’s contribution, while
qualifying it within the social context in which it took place.”22 The nature of these social
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relations, culturally rooted in a historical bloc, configure a mutually influencing process between
intellectuals and masses while always recognizing the preeminence of the former over the latter
when it comes to constructing (more) coherent worldviews.
Therefore Gramsci grants the intellectuals explicit political tasks, namely “'to organise the
reform of moral and intellectual life [...] to fit culture to the sphere of practice itself can
accelerate the historical process that is going on, rendering it more homogeneous, more coherent,
more efficient in all its elements.”23 To illustrate this task, we need Gramsci’s most famous
theoretical concept, hegemony, and explore what is the role of the intellectuals in sustaining or
disrupting it.
Hegemony
Hegemony works at two levels: “first, internally, the formation within the social group of
self-discipline and self-government, that is, the self-constitution of the group into a coherent and
active political actor; and second, externally, the extension and dissemination of the group’s
conception of the world throughout the society.”24 Intellectuals, as we have seen, elaborate
precisely on the identity of their class; and then disseminate its worldviews - its preferences,
desires, claims, morals, and so forth. They are, for Gramsci, at the center of the hegemonic
process. As Fulton argues, “[t]here is a direct connection in Gramsci between social control and
intellectual elaboration. That which is hegemonic in the thought and behavior of people is also an
intellectually detailed and integrated system of interpretation and organization, though this
integration and detail exist outside the people and in the intellectuals.”25
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In other words, a class exerts hegemony, and hence becomes the ruling class (classe
dirigente), when its values and worldviews are internalized by its own members as well as by the
other classes - which become then subaltern as a consequence of this internalization. The
hegemony the ruling class won over the subalterns is the product of a dialectical and symbiotic
relation between coercion and consent (in Gramsci’s words, “consent armored by coercion”).
The ‘political society’ is the domain of coercion: it represents, in a capitalist modern society, the
security apparatus of the state - its police, courts, secret services, prison system, and so on. The
‘civil society’ is instead the domain of consent: institutions such as the family, the educational
system, the media, the Church, trade and professional unions, NGOs, clubs, entertainment
industry, etc... As the union of coercion and consent results in hegemony, so the union between
political and civil society results in the ‘integral state’ (lo stato integrale).
It must be noted that political society, civil society and integral state are for Gramsci
fields where hegemony is produced and reproduced: hegemony is never a fait accompli or a
permanent feature of a historical bloc. It is instead a continuous stream of practices, discursive
and coercive, aiming to ensure the perpetuation of hegemony itself. Intellectuals organic to the
ruling class perform their function by offering dispensations about either the necessity, or
appropriateness, glory, prestige, desirability, potential, success of the incumbent power
configuration. But, crucially, in those very fields (political and civil society) it is possible to
wage ‘wars’26 to resist hegemony: or, more appropriately, to wage a counter-hegemonic struggle.
Counter-Hegemony
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The subaltern classes (hence those classes not wielding power in relation to the ruling
class) are the ones Gramsci expects to lead this charge.27 As we have mentioned earlier,
everyone harbors the potential, qua philosopher and thus capable of crafting worldviews, to
question and challenge established power relations, even hegemonic ones. I will elaborate on this
below when addressing the issue of common sense.
The subalterns may direct the struggle for the hegemony to the institutions of coercive
power (for example, the Bastille in Paris in 1789 and the Winter Palace in Petrograd in 1917).
This is the ‘war of movement,’ a direct strike at the heart of the political society. Or else, they
may engage in a ‘war of position,’ which is therefore “characterized by a series of moral and
intellectual contests, whose ultimate goal is the construction of social and political reality.”28
This strategy would challenge not the coercive side of hegemony, but the consensus that shores it
up.
Whether it is war of movement or war of position, organic intellectuals of the subaltern
classes are the ones who propose a rationale, a strategy, and a future vision to start waging the
struggle. As Ives and Green argue,
“In Gramsci’s view, it is necessary for subaltern groups to produce their own
category of organic intellectuals and linguistic innovations as effectively as
dominant social groups create their organic intellectuals, in that the intellectuals
remain in contact with, or organic to, the social groups’ life experiences so as

27

This position in Gramsci is consonant with his Marxist convictions: we should expect mobilization out of social
groups who most have to benefit from change. This argument is opposed by rationalist theories of mobilization. See
Chapter 2, section “Evolution of the Field: a Bird’s Eye View.”
28
Fontana, 2005, p. 116.

74

to provide organisation, direction, and leadership in the movement to achieve political power and
hegemony.”29

It is in this sense that Baud and Rutten proposed the figure of the ‘popular intellectual,’30
an organic intellectual who can perform specific functions pertaining to mobilization: popular
intellectuals “seek to define the problems of subaltern groups, articulate their grievances, and
frame their social and political demands.”31 Again, this contention clearly stems from the
original formulation of Gramsci about the organic intellectuals: “they aim, unlike traditional
(status-quo oriented) intellectuals, to replace existing conceptions of the world.”32 In order to do
so, they help making “critical an already existing [cultural] activity.”33 In Gramsci’s social
theory, intellectuals are strategically located in relation to social and political mobilization and
can thus act upon those: “[i]ntellectual is thus understood as a situated social practice, not a fixed
quality, and intellectuals by the specific social relations which constitute that practice. Like
Gramsci, I view these social relations, and thus intellectuals, in connection with social
movements, collective forces for social change.”34 The intellectuals’ function is linked to social
and political forces, dynamics, processes to which they fundamentally partake, but that they
cannot determine, influence or shape in any deterministic fashion.
For these reasons, Gramsci’s theory of the intellectuals represents a solution to the
conundrum of ideology as false consciousness. The subalterns may launch a counter-hegemonic
project not because of hard and fast laws of historical development, nor because of the
29
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enlightened guidance of revolutionary professionals, but because of the connections and
interactions with organic intellectuals. As Reed argues, Gramsci “theorizes a dialectical and
referential relationship between the philosophy of praxis and subaltern thought [...] as a
necessary and strategic step for the development of counter-hegemony,” which, “while
necessarily guided by working class organic intellectuals, needs to develop from below. This
requires the latter social actors to consider existing subaltern cultural practices as potential
political resources.”35
Counter-hegemony, in this sense, is a process whereby, “socially and historically given
worldviews associated with the status quo are critically disarticulated from within an existent
ideological complex,” a struggle to change “cultural and material conditions.”36 This can be
accomplished in that the philosophy of praxis “teaches that reality does not exist on its own, in
and for itself, but only in an historical relationship with the men [sic] who modify it.”37 Organic
intellectuals become the link between subalterns’ potential to mobilize and actual mobilization:
“only when there is a genuine dialogue between intellectuals and nonintellectuals, that an
effective political force, a ‘historical bloc’, capable of transforming society can come into
being.”38
In doing so, they act as popular intellectuals. Consistent with Eyerman and Jamison’s39
contention that social movements are first and foremost knowledge production endeavors,
Olsaretti claims, “Gramsci sought to integrate the study of high intellectuals’ contribution to
knowledge with that of broader intellectual groups dedicated to the organization and
dissemination of knowledge produced by high intellectuals and ultimately link it to the culture or
35
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common sense of subaltern masses too.” Therefore, Gramsci’s sociology of intellectuals is,
“especially relevant to whether and how subalterns ‘can speak,’ that is, how they interact with
knowledge production, and how they can resist hegemonic forces, thus engaging in counterhegemony.”40
Ideology and Discourse, Philosophy and Common Sense
I have illustrated how organic intellectuals may preserve hegemony or, as popular
intellectuals, wage a counter-hegemonic project; and I have argued they do so by virtue of
ideational endeavors - their ideological production. I intend here to clarify what I mean by that.
What do intellectuals actually do to influence politics? I propose ‘ideology’ as a term more
suitable than ‘frames’ to understand intellectuals’ role in social and political mobilization.
Ideology
Yet, what do I mean exactly by ideology? In fact, there are few more debated terms in the
social sciences than ‘ideology’!41 Ideology is first and foremost an ideational construct. It is a set
of ideas and propositions individuals and groups actively put forth when pondering over politics
and society. Since I have made ample references so far to Marxist terminology and its
deployment of a specific definition of ideology, I want to clarify I do not utilize the term in that
fashion. The Maxian and Marxist concept of ideology will provide nevertheless cues and
inspiration to reflect upon the enabling and constraining elements of any ideational construct.
I consider ideology a political project: it aims at sustaining or altering power relations.
Surveying the vast literature on the concept of ideology, Gerring observed that the
academic consensus posits consistency as its prime attribute: ideology is coherent, cogent,
40

Olsaretti, 2014, p. 365. I will elaborate on the concept of ‘common sense’ below.
The literature on the concept of ideology is virtually boundless. For two introductory and survey works, see
McLennan, David. Ideology. University of Minnesota Press, 1986 and Larrain, Jorge. The Concept of Ideology.
University of Georgia Press, 1979.
41

77

systematic, articulated. Gerring also added stability, contrast and explicitly political subject
matter as corollaries: therefore, ideology tends to be steady and endure over time; it rivals other
ideologies; and it is not equivalent with kin concepts such as ‘political culture’ or ‘worldview.’42
These characteristics ought not to be understood in absolute terms, but rather relatively to less
coherent, more fleeting and perhaps only partially political ideational constructs.43 Hanson
echoes this view when he claims that ideologies are, “proposals...to define clear and consistent
criteria for membership in a proposed polity.”44 When talking about social and political
mobilization, Oliver and Johnston define ideology as “a system of meaning that couples
assertions and theories about the nature of social life with values and norms relevant to
promoting or resisting social change.” Consequently, “ideology links a theory about society with
a cluster of values about what is right and wrong as well as norms about what to do.”45
Therefore, ideology is basically social theory plus normativity. I find Gerring’s core features of
ideology consonant with Oliver and Johnston’s definition for its deployment in social movement
theory.
Where do ideologies come from? An almost tautological answer would point at
ideologues, whose main business is the crafting of ideologies! As I have argued, Gramsci’s
assistance is crucial here: we can think of ideologues as intellectuals who propose ideas about
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society by means of a descriptive and normative theoretical framework. 46 Yet they cannot
simply fabricate such ideas ex nihilo. Ideologues conjure up and devise ideologies always within
the constraints and possibilities of a given discursive setting. This setting, so to speak, is the
stage where and out of which ideologies appear: it is an ideational structure, and like any
structure it limits and enables at the same time.47
Let me elaborate on this point as I am about to link ideology with discourse. Like Oliver
and Johnston, Moaddel contends that ideology is a set of organized signs. What are these signs
about? They address “historically significant problems,” but the content of any given ideology
cannot be reduced to such problems: “as ideologies are expressed by signs, the arbitrary status of
signs means that its meaning is not derived from its social referent - the signified - but from its
relation to other symbols, or signifiers within a discursive code.”48 In my view, here Moaddel
dismisses too readily the ‘social referent,’ that is the non-discursive item to which the sign refers.
The arbitrary status of signs does not imply their perpetual instability: not in relation to one
another, or in relation to the signified. In other words, ‘historically significant problems’ may not
tell us about the specific content of an ideology, but surely they must be taken into account!
Discourse
Moaddel is right however when he claims that ideology is inscribed in, derives from, and
is articulated along a ‘discursive code.’ Just like ideology, the term ‘discourse’ has been the
object of great deal of investigation. As I have discussed in my presentation of framing theory,
scholars have made use of the concept of discourse in theorizing about frames. The problem, I
46
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contended, was considering discourse as a relatively stable and coherent system of signs and
meanings.49 Instead discourse is, for lack of better terms, much messier! It is a system of signs
that unlike ideology is not organized. It lacks consistency and coherence, it is not as stable, and it
is not necessarily political. Discourse offers no social theory, and there are no clear normative
injunctions.
Yet discourse is fundamental to understand both the emergence and the working of
ideology itself: we may think of discourse as the raw materials that ideology seeks to refine much like obtaining gasoline from crude oil, getting rid of water, rocks, and other unnecessary
residuals. Similar to Moaddel, other scholars contended that discourse consists of “the
fundamental categories in which thinking can take place. It establishes the limits of discussion
and defines the range of problems which can be addressed.”50 Just like ideology, discourse is
historically bounded while not historically determined; and just like many ideologies may be
present at any given moment, so too we confront a multiplicity of discourses.
Spillman further elaborates upon how discourses exist and produce meanings in history:
“the particular meanings and values which emerge in discursive fields exist in historically
specific repertoires that we create and recreate: in this sense, culture is contingent and
creative.”51 Therefore, the concept of discourse helps making sense of the relation between
historical circumstances and the emergence of specific ideologies. Discourse intervenes in the
relation between structural determination and cultural autonomy. As I have argued, a good
theoretical account should, “avoid reducing meanings [i.e., the agents’ cultural activity] to social
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structures; but it should also avoid reducing social structures to meanings.”52 Gramsci’s notion of
‘historical bloc’ answers this concern, combining structural coordinates and dispositions with
agents’ ideas and practices.
How then is discourse connected to politics and contention? Bakthin claimed that the
struggles over meaning occurring in a discursive field “are at the core of ideology in action.
Discourse is ideological when the meaning it provides offers understandings about power,
difference and hierarchy.”53 Hence, ideologies emerge out of discourse as ideational constructs
which talk coherently about power. In a creative (and often conflictual) effort, individuals and
communities can mold discourse into a more consistent and compelling ideational product that
refers to power relations. We call such product ideology. In this sense, ideology is a political
action: it thought and action, like the philosophy of praxis suggested. It is important to notice the
following: what I have said so far does not imply that, “ideologies are acted upon all the time, or
that political action is primarily the product of ideologies. The significance of ideology,” Mullins
states succinctly, “is not that it causes one to do but that it gives one cause for doing.”54 Focusing
on ideology, in other words, does not mean to forgo other, non-ideational element. Quite the
contrary: it compels us to look closely into how social agents arrange, discuss, understand such
elements in their intellectual and ideological effort to preserve or change a certain power
configuration.
Philosophy and Common Sense
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Gramsci’s social theory bears striking resemblance with the accounts of ideology and
discourse I presented here. Gramsci proposed the concepts of ‘philosophy’55 and ‘common
sense’56 to explain how a hegemonic project may succeed. Common sense is the subaltern’s
fragmented, unsystematic and accepted worldview.57 Much like discourse, it provides people
coordinates as well as the raw material to make sense of their world and lives; but it does so in an
incoherent manner. The contradictory nature of common sense “is not the product of some sort
of intellectual or psychological deficiency on the part of the masses. Rather, the contradictory
nature of common sense is largely defined by the contradictory nature of the ensemble of social
relations, economic exploitation and the various exclusions they produce and reproduce.”58
Insofar as common sense processes and makes sense of this ensemble (congealing, for example,
in the worldviews discussed above), it harbors the potential to rearticulate (or ‘disarticulate,’ as
Reed59 suggests) those very power relations and thus challenge them: while politically quiescent,
common sense might ground and undergird counter-hegemonic mobilization.60
This process is all but an automatic or mechanic transition; it is not either ideationally or
materially determined. To mobilize the subalterns against existing power relations, common
sense needs be systematized into what Gramsci calls ‘philosophy:’ “[t]he disjointed and
unreflecting character of common sense has drawbacks [...] for its usefulness as a tool of mass
political mobilization. The common sense of the subaltern masses, lacking the coherence of
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philosophy, is necessarily limited for the sake of mobilization, and it is indeed closely associated
with the subordinate status of the groups that rely only on this form of worldview.”61 In other
words, common sense is more easily a way to acquiesce rather than a way to change. And yet,
there is no other route: as Gramsci argued, “the starting point must always be that common sense
which is the spontaneous philosophy of the multitude and which has to be made ideologically
coherent.”62 You cannot force your way against the common sense (as any politician
campaigning will readily attest…).
We can thus establish a parallel between philosophy and ideology on one side and
common sense and discourse on the other. These two sets mirror and complement each other,
insisting on different perspectives when we analyze social and political mobilization: ideology
and discourse highlight specific ideational elements that spur and inform contention; philosophy
and common sense ground those elements in a larger social theory within which we can locate
the intellectuals and the masses.
To better illustrate this parallel, let us consider the following:
“[p]hilosophy cannot be in opposition to common sense [...], nor is there a fundamental
qualitative difference between philosophy and common sense, but there is nevertheless an
important difference of degree between the two. Philosophy, in fact, has the hallmarks of an
ideological construct belonging to hegemonic groups and pertaining to their leadership
functions.”63

Philosophy in Gramsci is thus akin to ideology: it is coherent, systematic, and explicitly
political. At the same time, to sustain hegemony or to spur counter hegemony, philosophy needs
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to relate to the common sense of the masses. If we think about common sense as a discursive
field, we can claim it is the space where a host of meanings and cognitive coordinates are
generated and arranged. Common sense as discourse means therefore that other meanings and
different assessments of social reality can be created within and out of it. Common sense is not
inert matter. It is endowed with political potential:
“the heterogeneity and relatively apolitical nature of common sense could be reorganized into
more stable symbolic forms that could function as weapons in the political arena. Importantly,
both dominant and subordinate groups can produce ideologies; much of Gramsci's work is on the
importance of the intellectuals who produce both ruling and challenging ideologies.”64

The importance of intellectuals lies precisely in their capacity to craft ideologies drawing
on common sense. Common sense is a reservoir intellectuals can exploit and draw upon in the
context of their socio-political function. This dynamic does not entail a top-down process
(imparting wisdom and purpose on abject masses). Were this the case, we would fall into what
Mullins was warning us against (a simplistic take on ideology as the first or even the sole cause
of social action) or into what Karabel deemed a dangerous vanguardist position. To understand
how ideology impacts social and political mobilization we need to think about a more complex
dialogical affair, as Steinberg would put it.65 Constructing (counter) hegemony requires
connecting two social groupings with different capacities and skills, yet complementary rather
than opposed to each other. Crehan further clarifies:
“Those who live the harsh realities of subordination, however capable they may be of everyday
resistance, cannot, in Gramsci’s view, themselves come up with the coherent, effective counternarratives necessary if the existing hegemony is to be overcome. But it is just as true that
64
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intellectuals cannot themselves devise these narratives unaided. It is their interaction with the
subordinated [...] that educates the intellectuals.”66

There is nothing mechanical about the interaction between the subaltern and the
intellectual, as there is no unmediated and direct correspondence between sets of social,
economic and political issues and the ideologies that arise to address them.67 That is why in the
same context (the same ‘historical bloc’) we witness the proliferation of competing ideologies
out of the same discursive fields. Ideology, as Spilmann noted,68 is a creative effort: while we
may be able to conjure up ways in which this effort is carried out, its specific content cannot be
known a priori. Steinberg correctly pointed out that ideologies ‘talk’ to each other and to the
environment writ large they inhabit. 69 In this process, they change both themselves and their
environment – they have, in other words, social and political impact.
Salafi Scholars as Intellectuals: Making Religion into Ideology
In reviewing the political science approach to religion,70 I observed how religion can be
both ideology and culture.71 Religion manifests some of the properties of other ideational
systems. For example, like nationalism or communism, it provides meaning. At the same time,
religion uniquely features transcendence, an other-worldly bent not akin to even radical secular
formulations of nationalism (the individual living also vicariously through the nation, and vice
versa) or communism (the workers’ utopia located in a yet to be achieved perfect future). I
contend in fact that, in order to be conceived, such secular formulations do not presuppose the
presence of any element transcending human beings: the nation is nothing but the sublimation of
66
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a collectivity of individuals; a communist society is attained by the change of existing power
relations amongst social classes. Religion needs instead postulate a space located outside the
purview of humankind, independently existing, that is, from any consideration about individuals
or social (human) constructs alike.72
I saw fit delving a bit more into my understanding of religion because I want to clarify
the ways in which it is similar, and the ways in which it is different, from other ideational
constructs. How shall we then treat religion given what I have submitted so far? How do
Gramscian social theory and the vocabulary I proposed above help us deal with religion as a
social phenomenon? Williams again puts it succinctly:
“[Gramsci] kept ideology and culture analytically distinct by separating the relative articulation
and coherence of ideology from the practical lived aspects of culture/common sense. He took
religion seriously as a source of social power because of its abilities to combine the experienced,
everyday, ‘life-world’ of the people with an intellectually elaborated theoretical system. In that
sense, religion is a tremendous political resource, combining the emotional and cognitive
elements of action with a universalist legitimation.”73

In relation to the philosophy of praxis, Fulton further argues: “religion is always political
for Gramsci. It is part of the interior character of religion as a total praxis, a form of power and
activity in society.”74 Intellectuals can tap of course into the political potential of religion. They
can use religious discourse as a tool to promote subservience or rebellion. Such discourse would
provide cultural references, symbols and signs to explain social reality (a social theory) and an
ideal socio-political order (normative dispensations). Hence, when the elaboration upon religious
72
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discourse is carried out by thinking about authoritative meaning, and thus power relations and
hierarchy, these intellectuals can act as popular intellectuals and ideologues.
In this sense, we can consider Salafi scholars and thinkers as organic intellectuals, and
thus capable of impacting politics and society. They are authoritative religious figures seeking to
provide consistency, coherence and purpose to an unsystematic and fragmented popular common
sense featuring important religious referents, symbols and narratives in its fabric. They do so by
virtue of their pronouncements on a number of issues affecting communal and personal life.
Unlike non-religious actors, they refer to and draw from a religious discursive field to craft their
ideological constructs.
What do Salafi scholars actually do? What is the result of their political action and
thinking - of their ‘philosophy of praxis’? In other words, how do they impact social and political
mobilization?
Mobilizing the Past: Social Appropriation of Tradition
Salafi scholars, qua organic intellectuals, have elaborated an ideology through their
works and pronouncements. They explain current social reality (ideology as social theory); and
they offer a template to discern right and wrong (ideology as normative dispensations).75 This
template is grounded on a past experience – a tradition – that offers solutions to rectify current
ills, both mundane and spiritual. On the basis of such tradition, they call for action. We can
notice how tradition here is not paired, politically, with status quo, submissiveness or
preservation. Tradition instead may undergird change, dissidence and outright rebellion.76 We
may dismiss the pairing dichotomy tradition/status quo versus modernity/change: as Asad
75
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suggested, “one needs to recognize that when one talks about tradition, one should be talking
about, in a sense, a dimension of social life and not a stage of social development.”77 The
tradition that Salafis summon, far from being a historical relic, is instead a living, felt and most
prominent dimension of social life.78 It is, in other words, present and embedded in the discursive
cultural reservoir of the individuals and communities Salafis seek to address. As Gramscian
theory would contend, this tradition is part of their common sense.
It is precisely such religious tradition (the perfect community of the early days of Islam,
as I will illustrate more in details in the following Chapters) that Salafi scholars can make into
the backbone of their ideology. They can build a political project upon an apparently inchoate
vision and seemingly politically inert material. In this way Salafi scholars act as ideologues,
religious and popular intellectuals, as they spur and sustain social and political mobilization.
As I have stressed repeatedly, there is nothing automatic or certain about this process; but
within it, organic intellectuals do play a “central role” in the “articulation and reinvention of
intellectual traditions in new contexts.”79 In this study, Salafi thinkers and scholars are precisely
such intellectuals: they reach back to a religious tradition and make it into a project aiming to
impact existing social and political relations.
I call this process the ‘social appropriation of tradition.’ In choosing these terms, I hope
to capture the commonalities that any given political project manifests across historical, cultural
and geographical theatres; and, at the same time, I intend to illustrate the peculiarities and
idiosyncratic features that render such political project historically and empirically different from
others. It is in this sense that I am here proposing a mid-range theory. In fact, the process of
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‘social appropriation’ is defined in the literature on social mobilization as the act of redefining
the aims and purpose of a group (in this case, a group of believers) in order to engage in
contentious action.80 I add to this general proposition the term ‘tradition.’ This formulation thus
points to the pivotal element underpinning such redefinition of aims and purpose. Or to put it
more bluntly: not all political projects (one might even say most!) rely on an ideal tradition that
is to be re-enacted in the present.
The redefinition of aims and purposes entails tilting the Janus-face quality of religious
discourse in favor of social or political commitment. Therefore, religion should not inspire
retreat from this world, a contemplative attitude, or total restrain from social and political life.
The religious community shall instead be also of this world in an effort to adhere more properly
and confirm more adequately to the - presumed - truthful religious message. In this way, religion
as a discourse to account for the mundane in light of the transcendent is made also into an
ideology so that mundane social life conforms with the transcendent.
This move characterizes, as Armstrong argues, any religious ‘fundamentalism.’ For
Salafis, this congruence between here and hereafter (i.e., between mundane and transcendent)
was realized in the early days of the Muslim community: attaining once more that condition is
therefore not only possible because already realized, but also necessary because divinely
mandated.
We can thus understand the socio-political import of religion as a constructed and willing
act on the part of those who propose such redefinition of group’s aims. As I have argued, this
import stems from the inherent socio-political potential of religion, within its discursive reservoir
featuring opportunities as well as constraints for the emergence of different choices, attitudes and
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practices towards the mundane. Therefore, in this way, a religious-based ideology features at the
same time both otherworldly and all-too-worldly (social and political) elements.
The literature on Islamism explored in Chapter 2 tries, basically, to make sense of this
combination: contemporary Salafism is no different from other religiously inspired phenomena
emerging within the context of modernity, and it rests firmly within the galaxy of Islamic-based
social and political movements. From a theological set of propositions about the nature and
attributes of god - the discipline of kalam - Salafism morphed into a social and political
phenomenon81 concerned not only with the proper understanding of the contours of Islam at a
philosophical or metaphysical level, but also with the implications for social and political life
that such contours entailed for the believers in their daily, mundane social existence.
As it is readily apparent, the cherished separation of private and public in western secular
discourse is discarded altogether, not only challenged: once Islamism has brought back religion
into the realm of the mundane, how is that necessarily not also social and political? Or, to put it
otherwise: if the process of secularization is a historical development peculiar to the West (with
all the caveats I highlighted in Chapter 2 notwithstanding), is it not just as possible to imagine
and indeed witness other articulations of the mundane/transcendent pair?
Salafis’ understanding of tradition, in this framework, is pivotal. It is, as I contend, the
chief idiosyncratic feature of Salafism at large - what, for example, distances this current from
other Sunni movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. They offer the possibility, even claim
the necessity, to bring back that hallowed time to steer clear from the misguided path along
which history has seemingly ventured. Lahoud, with Asad, contends that, “the turath82 does not
only imply the history of a tradition that extends to the present; it also conveys the active sense
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of seeking to shape a political present by interpreting its identity in terms of a particular image of
its past.”83 The contention I am putting forward is stronger than Brown’s claim where, “[a]gainst
the Enlightenment […], tradition is not an enemy of change, but the very stuff that is subject to
change.”84 He is right, but what he is missing is that tradition itself can be the template for
change and the reason behind it. It is precisely in this way that a religious tradition is
appropriated to enter the present social and political realm.
We can read the social appropriation of tradition as an attempt by Salafi scholars to
bridge a normative philosophy of religious inspirations with consonant and conforming practices
in the realms of society and politics. It is a war - of position or of movement - for the hearts and
minds, a war to radically reconfigure power relations. It is a counter-hegemonic project carried
out by organic intellectuals together with and for the sake of the subalterns.
Contention and Mechanisms
How does the social appropriation of tradition come about? In the introduction Chapter, I
briefly presented the three mechanisms (diffusion, elaboration and systematization) by which the
intellectuals’ ideological productions result in a specific process of social appropriation. I here
offer a more exhaustive discussion. To begin, I will recall the concept of mechanism and
processes proposed by Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam.
Tarrow and McAdam explained85 that in Dynamics of Contention (DOC)86 they were not
looking for causal explanations along the lines of a positivist or naturalist ontology.87 This move
forgoes the search for grand theories: it does not seek recurrent patterns whereby mobilization
83
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unfolds, but recurrent ways in which the elements highlighted in the PPM88 relate and interact
with one another. They define these ways as mechanisms, “a delimited class of events that alter
relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of
situations.”89 Wight offers a similar and complementary view: “[a] mechanism can be any real
entity - whether an institution, an agent’s psychological or biological condition, or a discourse that is the operative or motive part, process, or factor in a concrete system that produces a
result.”90 In this sense, we ought not to consider causation as constant correlations that we need
to account for by proposing law-like generalizations. Instead, causation can be the activation of
items present within the fabric of social reality, leveraging on the “dispositional properties or
tendencies of elements.”91 Mechanisms compound into processes, that is “regular sequences [and
combinations] of such mechanisms that produce similar [generally more complex and
contingent] transformations of those elements.”92 Mechanisms and processes form a continuum93
rather being discretely separated events.94
88
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I then contend the following: some social actors - (organic) intellectuals - can activate
certain mechanisms, that compound into a process; in doing so they contribute in engendering
social and political outcomes. In this study, Salafi scholars and thinkers are such actors. They
operate within a discourse (namely, a religious discourse) which features some ‘dispositional
properties’ and ‘tendencies:’95 it is their intellectual efforts and consequent ideological
productions that build and articulate an ideology out of such discourse.96 It is, again, a project to
morph religion into a mundane plan of social, political - indeed, contentious - action, and that I
have described above as the process of ‘social appropriation of tradition.’
This focus on discourse and ideology is not tantamount to claim primacy of ‘ideational’
elements over ‘material’ ones. Instead, it merely indicates how cognition is a fundamental aspect
of mobilization97 and how such cognition - of both ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ circumstances - is
filtered and articulated through discourse. Consistent therefore with a critical discourse analysis
perspective (CDA),98 I use the concept of mechanisms to tease out how the ideational and the
material affect and relate to one another. I do intend to stress how reductionist views on either
rebellion may only be a mechanism compounding in even larger processes. See Contentious Politics, Oxford
University Press, 2015 [2007].
95
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ideational or material factors end up being unduly narrow and, ultimately, incomplete and sterile
to understand social processes.
The three mechanisms compounding into the process of social appropriation of tradition
are diffusion, elaboration and systematization. These are the most fundamental ways I submit
intellectuals impact social and political mobilization via their ideological productions. To put it
otherwise, it is what their pronouncements do in order to spur people to act contentiously. Let me
discuss each one of them.
Diffusion
Tilly and his colleagues had long signaled three similar mechanisms to account for the
communication and transmission of ideas, repertoires of contention, and meaning making
practices across different sites. In their work, diffusion is primarily the spread of forms of
contention; brokerage indicates the “production of a new connection between previously
unconnected sites”; and coordinated action is “two or more actors’ engagement in mutual
signaling and parallel making of claims on the same object.”99 As I address more narrowly the
role of intellectuals and thinkers, I feel safe in subsuming these three mechanisms under one
heading, to which I still refer as ‘diffusion’ given its intuitive appeal.
Diffusion is the spreading and dissemination of ideas, concepts, interpretations, debates
and, potentially and ultimately, ideologies. According to Baud and Rutten, diffusion is the
“‘flows of meaning’ between local, national, and global fields,” within which, “it is clear that
popular intellectuals often function as crucial nodes.”100 As Collins argues, intellectual
production thrives and flows through personal contacts:101 the mechanism of diffusion aims
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precisely at capturing this flow and exchange. Diffusion highlights the contribution and
importance of communication via networks in fostering the process of social appropriation.
Brym contends, as he makes explicit reference to communities of intellectuals, that “they are
embedded in social networks whose ties to various classes and other collectivities shift over time
and help account for their ideologies and political allegiances.”102 An intellectual will thus
inhabit more than one network at any given time: diffusion insists on the importance of networks
with his peers and colleagues as well as mentors and teachers. She will learn from, teach to,
discuss with other thinkers and scholars. She will engage in debate, publish rebuttals and
defenses; support or disown specific ideas; proffer accusations and even condemn rival
ideologies. As the intellectual does so, she is - even if unbeknownst to her - spreading and
circulating ideas about a certain understanding of social reality and about ways to change or
preserve it. Or, to put it otherwise: the intellectual’s production functions as a trait d’union
amongst different cognitive approaches to social reality, and offers to a new public what was
previously confined to another locale (broadly defined: another country, region, institution, and
so on).
Elaboration
The networks in which the intellectual is embedded is not only horizontal (her peers or
colleagues) but also vertical, indicating her followers (students, acolytes, potential or real). The
mechanisms of elaboration and systematization pertain more directly than diffusion to this set of
relations. Intellectuals who want to spur a counter hegemonic process face two tasks: one is to
“criticize the fragmentary and contradictory elements of common sense and to give it greater
coherence, transforming it into ‘buon senso’ or ‘good sense.’” The other one is, “to elaborate
Brym, Robert J. "Intellectuals, sociology of." International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences.
Oxford: Elsevier Science (2001): 7631-5, p. 7633.
102
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new worldviews that have to become widely accepted and thus to permeate common sense.”103
Systematization pertains to the first task. I here concentrate on the second, elaboration.
This mechanism addresses the more strictly scholarly and intellectual contribution of the
popular intellectuals. In a sense, it is recalling the more usual understanding of intellectuals as
men and women of letters, akin to the original Bendian conception. Elaboration, just like
diffusion, is ultimately about cognition. It is how the intellectual perceives and ponders over
existing historical circumstances104 by way of addressing pressing philosophical, political, social
or religious issues with the intent to either resist or spur change. Elaboration is a creative
cognitive process: it is thus at the core of social and political mobilization as the effort to
produce new meanings and new knowledge.105
Elaboration is where ideology takes shape. It is not tantamount with invention: the
production of ideas is never quite the manufacturing of completely new ideas. Ideologues and
thinkers have scholar and intellectual backgrounds that shape their thinking and constrain their
capacity to formulate entirely original ideologies.106 Scholars, thinkers and ideologues refer to
other authors at all times, resurrecting, discussing, drawing on or refuting previous works; they
might do so even with entire scholarly and intellectual traditions. The mechanism of diffusion
intends to trace the debt owed by intellectuals to their peers. Elaboration seeks instead to assess
the amount of such debt.
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However, intellectuals elaborate also upon non-scholarly items: they have also a social
background. As I illustrated above, we may think of this background as the popular common
sense, a discursive field that lacks the theoretical sophistication of a full-fledge ideology but that
nonetheless provides some of the building blocks for the ideological construction of the
intellectuals. Again, the concept of organic intellectual represents the bridge between lower and
higher culture (i.e., philosophy and common sense). She thus elaborates (adds on, intervenes)
over these two levels, the scholarly debate and the popular common sense, with her specific,
personal, idiosyncratic contribution. In fact, with a careful inventory of pre-existing elements, we
can point to whatever ideational novelty the intellectual has put forward: “[o]nce one has carried
out this type of reading and has identified all that which is social and historical in a certain
philosophy, there is ‘a residue,’ which is the individual contribution of that specific philosopher
[...] the individual traits of the philosopher influence the specific form taken by the sociohistorical trends in a given philosophy.”107
Elaboration deals with the refining and tuning of ideas to specific historical contexts so to
make, potentially, these ideas relevant for such circumstances. However, the link with the masses
is too thin: the ideological production of the intellectual needs reaching its intended public.
Further sophistication and abstraction - two likely outcomes of ideological elaboration - do not
necessarily lead that way: quite the contrary, they may be harmful for spreading a given
ideology.
Indeed, the subalterns need new ideas to launch successfully into a counter hegemonic
venture (in line with the oppositional character of ideology Gerring pointed out). These new
ideas may congeal into an ideology and offer new worldviews envisioning the necessity,
desirability and opportunity for change. Organic intellectuals are at the hub of this ideological
107
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production. Yet, this production needs also relate more clearly and directly to popular common
sense so to engender social and political mobilization.
Systematization
Systematization refers not to the crafting and manufacturing of ideologies on the basis of
existing ideational constructs. Systematization is the tuning of ideologies and popular common
sense. It indicates what intellectuals’ ideological production does in the attempt to connect to the
scattered, fragmented and often apolitical common sense of the subaltern. This production reorganizes the incoherent worldview of the masses within the coordinates of a social theory. In
other words, it is the philosophy of the intellectuals that seeks to inform the cognition of the
subalterns, offering a more focused and persuasive narrative of social reality.
Systematization is therefore a crucial step in understanding how ideology can unleash the
mobilization potential embedded within popular common sense. The discourse which articulates
the subaltern’s common sense makes sense of reality in a way not immediately conducive to
mobilization. Systematization instead puts beliefs, values, desires, grievances and hopes of
would-be followers within the architecture of a proper political ideology: it explains reasons and
causes; assigns guilt and merit; and calls for restraint or action. It allows for an intelligible
narrative functional to mobilization, capable of reconstructing, while not subverting, the
subalterns’ worldview: it works with, and does not try to do away with, common sense, as I
argued above. In a nutshell, systematization is the re-articulation of pre-existing meanings to
offer sharper cognitive coordinates to understand reality. This is thus a novel reality, but only to
an extent: it is related to the subalterns’ understanding, and it cannot divorce from it completely.
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The literature on framing talked extensively of ‘alignment’ to account for the resonance
of a particular frame. I expressed my dissatisfaction with that approach.108 By proposing this
mechanism, I intend to ground the impact of ideological factors in a larger social theoretical
apparatus. Systematization relies upon the notion of organic and popular intellectuals in the way
Gramsci adumbrated: such connection between ideological production and mobilization
necessitates the intellectual to be connected to a social group as the class-bound approach
suggests - social movements’ leaders skillful and strategic deployment of frames just won’t do.
Learning, socialization, shared life experience and discourses: they all make it possible for the
intellectual to be ‘organic’ to the social group she wants to address. Ideologies and their
acceptance on the part of the subaltern speak of these as not mere consumers of frames, but as
thinkers - philosophers, as Gramsci would have it: “People are viewed as developing belief
systems from a combination of reflecting on and interpreting their own experiences and learning
ideas and idea systems from others. They are thinkers and interpreters.”109 Gillan echoes: “to
begin with an assumption that ideological production is removed from ‘the masses’ must surely
be mistaken in any endeavour that seeks to understand the use of ideas within social
movements.” With the idea of systematization, I want precisely to “identify the development of
the political ideas that motivate movement action yet remain firmly embedded in the praxis of
the grassroots.”110
Systematization, more directly than diffusion and elaboration, speaks of the dialectical
relation between the two heuristic categories - intellectuals and masses - that I have been using
thus far. In a Gramscian framework, they are located on the same continuum, and they differ in
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degree yet not in kind: “[t]he intellectuals-masses dialectic [...] is necessary for groups of
intellectuals to be able to express new developments that the masses live through but are unable
to articulate.”111
The intellectuals-masses dialectic relation mirrors the one between common sense and
philosophy. As Gramsci argues, “[i]n the first use philosophy is a conception of the world and
everyone possesses a conception of the world, even the subaltern classes through their common
sense, since a rudimentary philosophy is contained in language and common sense.”112 Common
sense contains within itself philosophy. In the same way, ideology emerges from and is
contained within discourse, without being properly articulated there. Again Gramsci explains
mobilization in terms of philosophy of praxis:
“in working practically in the making of history one also works in [the making of] ‘implicit’
philosophy, which will be ‘explicit’ in so far as some philosophers [i.e., organic intellectuals] will
elaborate it [into a] coherent [whole], raising questions of knowledge which sooner or later will
find, besides the ‘practical’ form of their solution, also the theoretical form at the hands of
specialists, after having immediately found the disingenuous form of popular common sense at
the hands of the practical agents of historical change.”113

It is precisely such ‘disingenuous form of popular common sense’ that the mechanism of
systematization seeks to systematize. Eyerman, in his work on intellectuals, similarly asserts that,
“the intellectual tends to unite discourses that have been fragmented, expanding roles that have
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been specialized and, in this process, standing as a personal example against the force of the drift
of societal change.”114
Final considerations on mechanisms
Eyerman and Jamison have already stated how social and political movements are,
fundamentally, cognitive efforts to construct reality. 115 Speaking of mechanisms as cognitive
events, I sought to reconcile this view with DOC language and its authors’ ultimate acceptance
of this position: mechanisms are shifts in perceptions, and thus allow configuring a social reality
that actors themselves may change. Again, I urge not to read this as unbridled voluntarism,
where agents (individuals or collectivities) may configure whatever reality they like and thus
transform that as they please. Structural constraints, represented by other actors’ conflicting
plans, material capabilities, and historical legacies, cannot be simply ignored, much less radically
subverted. The old struggle between agency and structure is never resolved in favor of the former
or the latter: rather, it is about how the two interact. In this sense, novel cognition (interpretation,
understanding) of social reality may open up possibilities for contention: by empowering actors’
self-perception, by depicting rivals as sworn enemies, by outlying chances (or even the
inevitability) of victory in face of all odds.116
I offer a few last caveats about the proposed mechanisms. First, in DOC original
formulations, the sequencing is important to establish causality. While I am not aiming to
establish neo-positivist causal connections, I would claim there is a logic in the sequence I
presented here: intellectuals’ works first make ideas available to their own community and to a
114
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certain public (diffusion); upon these ideas, they craft novel insights (elaboration); and then these
ideational constructs affect the target group by reorganizing subaltern’s understanding of social
reality (systematization). These mechanisms congeal in a process of social appropriation where,
in the case of contemporary Salafism, a specific understanding of religious tradition
characterizes these Islamist movements.
Second, nowhere have I claimed there is a perfect, un-mediated and non-filtered
reception process of the intellectuals’ work on the part of their followers. The subalterns always
maintain their agency. The three mechanisms and the process I propose describe how ideological
productions may impact and influence mobilization. They do not comment on how,
subsequently, a specific ideology may be received and applied to ever changing historical
circumstances.117 As it is sometimes said, once a book is written, only its authorship is set, not its
message or reception.
Third, I would reiterate how I consider mechanisms and processes as heuristic devices to
sort out and make intelligible a very messy world. They are not ‘discoveries’ in any positivistic
way - they are not something ‘out there’ that exist independently of our theoretical constructions.
Conclusion
In transitioning to the empirical part of my work, I will deal with momentous historical
events and powerful societal forces. Social movements are part of such forces. They are
prominent actors especially in moments of change, and they can be both consequences and
causes of those moments. In these instances, change may intervene as a profound alteration of
the status quo. Eyerman and Alexander speak of ‘cultural trauma,’ a cognitive displacement and
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dislocation which can be “understood as a meaning struggle, where individual and collective
actors attempt to define a situation by imposing a particular interpretation on it.” What is the
intellectuals’ job in all this? “Intellectuals play a central role in this discursive process, they are
important actors in articulating what happened, who was responsible, who were the victims and
what is to be done .”118 This meaning struggle is a complex episode that evolves during the
course of interactive and dialogic processes among activists, rivals, target audiences, and the
larger context in which they all operate.
In order to map parts of this struggle over meaning, I sought to inscribe my analysis
within Gramscian social theory. It allows inserting the figure of the intellectual within a wider
structure, and pondering over the impact of her actions within such structure. Admittedly, I
outlined Gramsci’s social theory as to serve my needs and purposes. Starting from his conception
of the human being, I quickly transitioned to the ‘philosophy of praxis’ and his theory of the
intellectual. I then discussed these propositions in light of the intellectual’s relation with the
subaltern and the implications for hegemony and counter-hegemony.
As this juncture, I introduced the concepts of ‘ideology’ and ‘discourse’ highlighting the
parallels with the Gramscian terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘common sense.’ This move allowed
inserting the concept of ideology in wider social theory and focus on the role of intellectuals in
its dissemination and production. Indeed, while “rationalist analyses implicitly bracket the
substance of fundamentalist political thought as irrelevant to properly scientific explanations,”119
I deem instead important to delve into such political thought to understand political phenomena,
as in the case of political Islam. Ideology in fact, “functions [...] as both a constraint on and a

118

Eyerman, Ron. “Performing Opposition or How Social Movements Move.” Symbolic Action, Cultural
Pragmatics and Rituals, ed. by Alexander, Jeffrey C., Bernhard Giesen and Jason Mast, Cambridge, 2006, p. 456.
119
Euben, Roxanne L. Enemy in the mirror: Islamic fundamentalism and the limits of modern rationalism: a work of
comparative political theory. Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 23.

103

resource for constructing and making sense of the so-called ‘imaginary’.”120 In the case of
Salafis, the process I labeled as social appropriation of tradition seeks to capture the contours and
fabric of such system of thought; in considering Salafi scholars and thinkers as Gramscian
intellectuals and ideologues, I can gauge their social and political impact in episodes of
mobilization. More specifically, I offered three mechanisms – diffusion, elaboration and
systematization – that compound in the process of social appropriation of tradition.
The relation between Salafis’ understanding of tradition121 and their social, historical and
economic context is a matter of engagement, debate, dispute and discussion. There is nothing
preordained about what Salafi scholars and their followers will do in light of such understanding
of tradition: in fact,
“[i]ntellectual traditions provide models, not recipes for action in concrete historical contexts.
Aspects of these traditions have a transcendent character in that they are grounded in longstanding
ideals, rooted religious and philosophical, as well as political, systems of thoughts. However, even
these ‘transcendent’ aspects must be applied in real contexts, and their reconstruction is
necessarily contextual.”122

The Salafi scholar, as an Islamist intellectual, is “part of an historical process in which
human actors reinvent cultural traditions in different contexts.”123 While we cannot foretell where
such re-invention - rather, such appropriation - of tradition will head to, I have argued we can
tease out which role the scholars’ intellectual production play in the course of social and political
mobilization.
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Chapter 4 - An Introduction to Salafism and the Jordanian Context

Salafism and Jordan: Two Histories
The theoretical claims I advanced in Chapter 3 want to explain in which ways prominent
scholars act as organic, popular intellectuals and impact social and political mobilization. I made
these claims referring primarily to the existing body of theoretical knowledge about
mobilization, intellectuals, and Islamism. But while I hinted at my empirical areas of
investigation, I discussed neither Salafism nor the Jordanian context in any detail. I here intend
to provide the basis for the analysis of ‘Jordanian Salafism’ which I carry out over the next two
chapters.
In the previous chapter, I insisted on how the mechanisms I proposed are fundamentally
cognitive ones. At the same time, I stressed how this contention meant not to discard either
structural (if cognitive suggests ‘agent-centered’) or material (if cognitive suggests ‘ideational’)
considerations, but rather to include them all in a coherent - and hopefully persuasive theoretical account. This chapter serves primarily two purposes. First, it highlights which
structural (both ideational and material) conditions the Salafi groups - Quietist and Jihadi alike were confronted by. Second, it provides the conceptual coordinates to make sense of how they
experienced and understood such conditions - that is to say, the discourse underpinning their
active cognitive effort. In other words, to claim that diffusion, elaboration and systematization
are cognitive mechanisms it only begs the question: cognition of what, and how? The
mechanisms had to deal with a specific social, economic and especially political configuration,1
the Jordanian state. As the ultimate site of power, the Salafi movements had primarily to
1
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confront its presence, practices, ideology - in short, its hegemonic project – to craft in turn their
own. They had to relate to such project, albeit, of course, with much different attitudes,
approaches and strategies. How they did so depended on their specific outlook, congealed into an
ideology, emerging in the context of a vast and complex transnational - even global - Islamic
trend we now label Salafism. In the hub of such process, as I contend, we find Salafi scholars
and thinkers poising as the ideologues of this political project.
With these considerations in mind, the discussion proceeds as follows: first, I will present
Salafism, discussing its intellectual history, its relation to the modern history of the Middle East
and the Muslim world, and then outlying a political geography of its current discourse. There, I
connect Salafism foundational principles to the process of social appropriation of tradition I
outlined in Chapter 3. Subsequently, I shall provide an outline of the historical trajectory of the
Kingdom of Jordan. My narrative will concentrate more specifically on the years after 1989 and
the momentous changes occurring afterwards.2
Salafism: a Philological Note on a Disputed Term
Salafism3 as a noun emerged only relatively recently within Islam, around a hundred
years ago. However, the concept harks back much further in Islamic history. Etymologically, it
stems from the socio-religious paradigm of the ‘pious ancestors,’ or ‘as-salaf as-salih.’ This
expression refers to the early days of the Muslim community, where its members are held as
noble believers displaying particular piety and devotion at both the individual and the
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community level.4 Adherence to the reputed theological beliefs of that era had been customarily
described as ‘madhhab as-salaf,’ which we may render as ‘the doctrine of the ancestors.’5
However, within these loose coordinates, over the course of the XX century the idea
associated with the madhhab as-salaf and later on with Salafism assumed vastly different
meanings, at times at odds with one another. As a consequence, the implications (either at the
theological, legal, social or political level) derived from the religious-historical referent of the
‘pious ancestors’ resulted often at variance with one another. Self-described Salafis and
especially historians of Salafism6 were amongst the culprits for this state of affairs, where the
term Salafism was attributed even to incompatible movements and currents. It is important to
shed light on how we ought to understand ‘Salafism’ since I deal only with one such meaning: in
this study, Salafism stands for a specific modern and contemporary Sunni global religious trend.
This premise is necessary in that the literature on this trend, for the most part, has ignored
historical idiosyncrasies of the term to favor, instead, supposed commonalities, traits d’union
and family resemblances à la Wittgenstein. In other words, the Salafi label has been applied
rather carelessly and unwarrantedly to theological positions, movements, communities and
individuals that had little, if anything, in common. In fact, students and proponents of Salafism
alike have ended up summoning the paradigm of the salaf for whoever made reference to such
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paradigm, caring little about the way it was invoked or if a clearly defined genealogy with the
madhhab as-salaf could be detected.
The problem is twofold. First, in reconstructing the discourse of political Islam at large
and Salafism in particular, the term has been stretched so much that it has become a catch-all
label for intellectual currents and historical phenomena that display profoundly different
features.7 Second, methodologically, there is hardly any utility in retroactively imposing a label
without the backing of a solid genealogical inquiry. This sloppy operation is in fact the product
of a philological fallacy that merely perpetuates a gross misconception about what Salafism has
meant and represented in different phases and locales of Islamic history.
Most significant is the depiction of the late XIX and early XX century reformers Jalal alDin al-Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1948-1905) as Salafis. In order to
distinguish them from current Salafis, they are usually described as ‘modernist’ or ‘reformist’
Salafis, engaged in an attempt to ‘modernize Islam.’8 This expression indicated their attempt to
reconcile western modernity and Islamic principles, without rejecting the former because of its
alien origin. But which traits of the madhahb as-salaf were they espousing? As Lauzière shows
with a careful philological reconstruction, “these reformers believed that the pious ancestors,
however defined, exemplified the full potential of Islam. Yet none of them ever took the
conceptual step of claiming that their brand of balanced reform was called Salafiyah or that the
proponents of this reform were called Salafis.”9
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This misattribution of the term ‘Salafi’ to Muslim reformers who never claimed to be
Salafis is due, according to Lauzière, to the French orientalist scholar Louis Massignon (18831962). As he delved into the work of Afghani, ‘Abduh and subsequently their disciple Rashid
Rida (1865-1935), Massignon noted the reference to the madhhab as-salaf but “failed to make
that distinction and mistook a Sunni theological marker for a general label referring to a reform
movement.”10 This theological marker had existed since the medieval period, and Sunni scholars
applied it quite consistently to indicate traditional Hanbali theology.11 Within the Islamic
discursive space of the XIX century, this was still the case. The problem is that Massignon was
not using the term salaf drawing on this indigenous Islamic tradition. Rather, he re-configured
the term altogether, creating a new category to define a non-Hanbali, non-traditional modernist
intellectual movement. While Afghani and ‘Abduh were scripturalist, suggesting a direct reliance
on the holy texts of Islam to defy a cumbersome and ossified tradition, they shared none of the
other attributes and leanings of contemporary Salafism. They did not adopt a literalist approach
to the holy texts, and stood for the opposite of an anti-modernist stance. As Lauzière
demonstrates, “Massignon’s conclusions were untenable. He never produced any empirical
evidence that an Islamic movement called Salafiyah had existed in the late nineteenth century,
and no one has yet been able to substantiate this assertion. To be sure, al-Afghani and Abduh did
not claim that label for themselves.”12
What did happen however was that Massignon’s misguided description was taken up by
some Muslim scholars and intellectuals, in a blatant case of ‘orientalism in reverse.’13 This move
nonetheless sowed the seeds for the later development of modern day Salafism, as Massignon’s
10
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study assumed an authoritative status on the subject. This process was not linear, as it proceeded
in fits and starts.14
Rashid Rida, a student of Afghani and ‘Abduh and arguably the most prominent Islamic
intellectual of the early XX century, read Massignon, and also on these bases he was eventually
to provide some of the intellectual foundations for what we now know as Salafism. The most
important change Rida contributed to,15 later taken up by his aid and disciple Tariq ad-Din AlHilali (1893-1997), was to add a legal dimension to the paradigm of the pious ancestors. As I
have mentioned above, the paradigm indicated a theological marker referring to Hanbalism, one
of the four main Islamic jurisprudential schools (madhahib al-fiqh, sg. madhhab).16 In this
context, the Salafi paradigm (also ‘al-madhhab as-salafiyy’) stood for what Ahmad Ibn Hanbal
(780-855) believed to be the theological positions of the early Muslim community. Rida instead
began to use it to describe an approach to Islam. As I argue below, this move was pivotal.
Current Salafism will gradually define an epistemological stance grounding ontological
propositions about the essence of Islam.
On the basis of this approach, Rida now added legal dispensations on top of theological
beliefs. Similarly to his teachers Afghani and ‘Abduh in their contestation of tradition (and hence
of the four legal madhahib), Rida subscribed to scripturalism and espoused a nativist bent; unlike
them, however, he did not share the same modernist leanings, or at least he abandoned them over
time:17 Rida transitioned from ‘modernizing Islam’ to ‘Islamizing modernity,’ a major trait
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featuring current political Islam and especially Islamism. We can already notice the uneasy
stance of modern Salafism was developing in relation to the four madhahib: while being rooted,
theologically, in one of them (the Hanbali madhhab), it was prone to reject them all on the basis
of an unmediated scripturalism. A wholehearted and explicit rejection of the Islamic
jurisprudential tradition would only occur over time and with the ideologization of Salafism
which I discuss below. Once again, this operation would differ from Afghani and ‘Abduh’s
rejection of the same tradition, as their effort espoused a modernist spirit and was predicated
upon a different (pluralist) epistemological approach.
At this juncture (in the late 1920s), political Islam was stepping out of elitist intellectual
circles. With the Muslim Brotherhood of Hasan al-Banna (1905-1949), political Islam was
coming onto the stage of mass politics.18 Over the course of the following decades, Salafism
would emerge mostly overshadowed by the Brotherhood, at times also in opposition to the kind
of political Islam it represented. Therefore, the subsequent conceptual developments of Salafism
are rooted both in the internal debates of its emerging discursive field, and in the historical
conditions of the Muslim world at large, especially the issues of colonization, independence and
search for authenticity.19
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The History Behind the Concept: Salafism as an Emerging Category
The modern construction of Salafism consisted basically in taking up a medieval
(Hanbali) theological creed and making it into a new religious orientation, progressively
broadening its reach beyond such original theological confines. This orientation started in fact to
refer “to individuals who dealt with legal matters unencumbered by the canons of the traditional
schools of Islamic jurisprudence.”20 The theology had not fundamentally changed though, and it
still claimed adherence to the Hanbali madhhab. As just mentioned, this move was inherently
problematic - claiming to defy established Islamic tradition on the one hand, yet remaining
rooted in a specific branch of such tradition on the other. This problem, primarily a philosophical
or even intellectual one, was to be compounded by a political conundrum: Hanbalism is the
theological backbone of Wahhabism, the dominating religious discourse of Saudi Arabia.
Salafism and Wahhabism
Understanding the chief coordinates of Wahhabism remains crucial to make sense of the
emergence and trajectory of modern day Salafism, especially but not only in its militant variant.
While the two phenomena appeared at first independently from one another, they eventually
converged: intellectually in the first half of the XX century; and then also politically in the
second, especially from the 1960s. We can consider this later development as a product of both
religious (theological and jurisprudential) affinities as well as political convenience. Salafism
and Wahhabism, to be sure, have never been synonymous; but they stand for kin trends in the
contemporary Islamist universe. Therefore, historically and conceptually it would be hard to
make sense of one without referring to the other. Let us examine their relationship.
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Wahhabism was first a puritan reformist21 movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd alWahhab (1703-1792) in the Najd region of the Arabian Peninsula. It espoused a strict observance
of Hanbali theology and jurisprudence. Al-Wahhab’s alliance with tribal chieftain Muhammad
ibn Saud (1765-1803) eventually led to the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932,22
where Ibn Saud’s heirs would rule as monarchs and Wahhabi ‘ulama would discipline religious
and societal mores.23 Wahhabism has been in this sense a fundamental part of the hegemonic
project of the Saudi dynasty. Wahhabi ‘ulama have granted the ruling family religious legitimacy
as guardians of Islamic holy places and defenders of Islamic principles. In exchange, the ‘ulama
have received state protection, financial rewards, ample leverage in intervening in the Saudi
social sphere.24
The puritan worldview and practice of Wahhabism seemed to mirror the purist approach
to Islam that Salafism started to exemplify. Similarly, Wahhabism called for a return to the
origins of ‘true’ Islam. The Wahhabi call was enforced and sustained by the sword of the AlSaud family, which relied on the puritanical doctrine to further its project of creating a state: the
Wahhabi ‘ulama conferred upon the territories under the Al-Saud family the title of ‘dawlah altawhid,’ or ‘state of monotheistic unity.’ In this emphasis on strict monotheism, and the attendant
exclusivist claim to it, we can detect a fundamental trait that Wahhabism shares with Salafism.
Al-Wahhab’s teachings espoused an accusatory tone towards other (i.e., non-Wahhabi) Muslims,
who apparently were in denial of Islam’s monotheism. Inherent in this discourse is therefore the
21
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possibility of excluding other self-professed Muslims from the abode of the ummah, a practice
known as ‘takfir’ or ‘excommunication:’25 Wahhabism would charge non-Wahhabis of
‘shirkiyat,’ or ‘associationism,’ that is the pairing of god with other objects of worship.26
We can argue then that Wahhabism is in open polemic and confrontation not only with an
intruding western modernization, as one may expect; but also, or even more so, with the beliefs
and practices of other Muslims too, considered either misguided or outright heretical.27 Salafism
would often manifest an identical position on this issue too, the result of a cross-pollination
between the two religious movements.
Yet we can notice that Salafism and Wahhabism, precisely due to these very elements
they have in common, stand in a tense relation. First, Salafism was readier to condemn also
Hanbalism in its rejection of the four traditional madhahib, thus cutting one of Wahhabism
Gordian knots: in other words, Salafism started to outdo Wahhabism in its quest for doctrinal
purity and accepting the logical consequences of such move.28 Second, Wahhabism was wedded
to the fortunes of the Al-Saud family. Religion could then never claim exclusive monopoly of the
state discourse, as non-religious (technocratic, economic, security) issues were undisputedly in
the hands of the Saudi political and bureaucratic apparatus. While in effect separating the
religious domain (in the hands of the ‘ulama) and the political one (in the hands of the Saudi
court), the official rhetoric of Saudi Arabia kept claiming it represented the country of
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monotheism, ‘dawlah at-tawhid:’29 yet how could it heed to and represent god’s tawhid if the
polity itself was split between a mundane and a religious domain?30
Salafism and political power
It is precisely in the relation with political power, understood here as Gramsci’s political
society,31 that Salafism has manifested some of its most peculiar and enduring traits. In the years
of its incubation (from the 1940s till the 1970s), Salafism was developing in a world where some
Islamic thinkers and intellectuals32 were proposing to view Islam as ‘religion and world’ (‘din wa
dunya’), or ‘religion and state’ (‘din wa dawlah’); furthermore, it was confronting a kin
movement it terms of theology, Wahhabism, which had found a solution to the problem of
religion and politics in the framework of the Saudi state. Salafism had thus to face the same
question: what about politics and power?33
This puzzle was all the more pressing as the struggle for independence and the era of
post-colonialism were not dominated by religion-inspired discourses and ideologies: nationalism,
socialism, liberalism, democracy, communism (and combinations thereof, such as the Ba’th
party) shaped the ideological landscape until the early 1970s, often informing a markedly secular
and even anti-religious discourse (as for instance in Iran or Turkey). The progressive demise of
these political projects left room for political Islam to step in and become, in certain contexts,
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Al-Rasheed, 2006, pp. 10-11.
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chapter 6.
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Islamism, a full-fledged ideological project which launched its energies, grievances and hopes in
the political arena.34
In those days, given its still amorphous and ill-defined character, Salafism did not
manifest a clear, and much less a unified, position on the issue of colonization and independence.
It obviously called to end the state of subservience of the Muslim community from Western
powers, but there was no political program comparable to other Islamist movements. Some
Salafis did opt for a more openly political, either nationalist or pan-Islamic, stance; 35 but they
soon lost ground to more politically-savvy movements, be they secular or Islamist.36 Others
maintained and developed instead a suspicious, distant and rejectionist stance vis à vis politics,
insofar, again, as we think of politics as state institutions and attendant practices and
dispositions.
However, even these less politicized Salafis were not willing to concede Islam would not
represent a complete, comprehensive system of thoughts and practice as other Islamic
movements (chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood and its spin-offs) were contending. Their move in
order to bypass politics (unlike other versions of political Islam, which embraced it) and still
claim Islam could be such system was to produce new understandings in the developing Salafi
discourse. Scholars such as Hilali and Mustafa Hilmi (b. 1932) contributed decisively to this
operation.37 However, the refinement and expansion of the term entailed two somewhat
contradictory pulls. The effort to make the template of the pious forefathers into a clearer and
sharper referent limited its reach; while the broadening of the Salafi discursive field, embracing
more and more domains of personal and social life, muddled precisely its theoretical consistency.
34
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At any rate, the aggregate result was the forgoing of the previous merely theological expressions
‘madhhab as-salaf’ and ‘madhhab salafiyy’ and the introduction of the term Salafism38 itself.
Following the steps of the initial intuitions of Rida, legal, social and cultural dispensations could
be inserted together with and on par with theological ones. Salafism, in other words, could
embrace much wider domains. It could then adumbrate, as fellow Islamist trends and
movements, to deal with specific political and social concerns, albeit this possibility remained
only latent until towards the late 1980s. Yet, the inherent tension (even contradictions) of this
move surfaced when Salafism ideals were to confront social reality, ultimately making more
manifest the ambivalence between Salafism and politics.
This was not an immediate concern in entering the political arena. In fact, other Islamic
activists and movements bore most of the brunt of state repression all across the Muslim world.
In this phase of conceptual refining and broadening, the Salafi trend chose not to openly engage
state power and focus instead on what they perceived as issues of doctrinal orthodoxy and
orthopraxis within Islam - topics they accused fellow Islamic activists of disregarding.39 It is in
this sense that Salafism developed marked ‘purist’ features, emphasizing the preeminence of
theological, jurisprudential and behavioral dispositions over political and institutional concerns.
Their hands full with Islamist fierce opposition to their rule, Arab regimes could seemingly
ignore a trend that seemed oriented towards doctrinal orthodoxy and behavioral orthopraxis. In
this way, Salafis initial retreat from open political confrontation with various regimes in the
Muslim world in general and in the Arab world in particular proved to be a far-sighted move to
avoid crackdowns, imprisonment and repression. This state of affairs would last until the
ambivalence of Salafism about politics was to resurface under new historical circumstances:
38

In Arabic, Salafiyyah, a term that was adopted only in the second half of the XX century by Islamic activist, again
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namely, the aftermath of the Soviet-Afghan war and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (as I
discuss below in the case of Jordan). Salafism, up until then dominated by a purist and doctrinal
ethos, produced explicitly political ideologies, one of which we know now as Jihadism.40
Again, as a religious discursive field, Salafism features a multiplicity of elements that can
be conducive to a variety of choices and consequent political manifestations, ranging from
outward political quiescence to violent revolutionary intents.41 In his groundbreaking study on
the subject, Wiktorowicz pointed out how “Salafis are united by a common religious creed,
which provides principles and a method for applying religious beliefs to contemporary issues and
problems;” however, “divisions have emerged as a result of the inherently subjective nature of
applying religion to new issues and problems.”42Wiktorowicz is of course right here. But I want
also to claim that the very fabric of Salafi discourse – and not so much, or not only, the
application of such principles to social reality – enables the articulation of political positions so
different and at variance with one another.
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I do not deal in this study with what Wiktorowicz, in his foundational tri-partition of Salafism, called ‘Politicos,’
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Salafism: the Geography of a Discursive Field
I have introduced above two important developments. First, I noticed the conceptual
refinement of Salafism in its chief creedal coordinates, which was supposed to shield it from the
vagaries and contingencies of politics. Second, I mentioned the broadening of its domains, which
was meant to encompass both the mundane and the religious. As a religious phenomenon,
Salafism has sought to uncover unalterable truths which belong to (or descend from) the
hereafter. In this way, they would be untainted and unhinged by mundane and earthly
dispositions. Yet, such truths configure also a normative template to read and evaluate the
mundane and the earthly.43 Hence, as Wiktorowicz suggested, Salafi core tenets could not but
offer different possibilities for the evaluation of social and political - hence not strictly doctrinal matters.44 Relatedly, the very definition of domains - the political and the religious, the public
and the private, state and society - defies easy boundary setting. Such definition in fact is still
much contested today within Salafi discourse.45 It is a source of heated debates, fierce
oppositions, and at times open hostility amongst Salafis themselves.46 Let us then examine what
are the contours and coordinates informing such disputes.
Salafi epistemology and method
First and foremost, as I stated before, Salafism represents an epistemological claim about
the correct approach to Islam. This claim is an exclusivist one: Salafism does not admit
epistemological pluralism.47 Other forms of Islam as historically concrete ways of belief and
practice are either dismissed as fallacious (the four main jurisprudential schools, as we have
43
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seen)48 or condemned as blatant heresies (for example, Sufism, Shi’ism, and versions of ‘liberal’
Islam).
This epistemological approach shows a kin relation and affinity to Hanbalism (Ibn
Hanbal is indeed one of the very few authors to be counted consistently in Salafis’ references),49
which underpins Salafism as an archeological enterprise to rediscover the Islamic pristine,
uncontaminated creed and attendant praxis, exemplified by the experience of the pious ancestors.
There are no other ways to do this but a strict adherence to the texts. Salafism seeks to rid
interpretation (ijtihad)50 and exegesis (tafsir) of Islamic foundational scriptures - the Qur’an and
the Ahadith - from subjective, personal and therefore contextual readings.51 Truth cannot be
dependent on context.
In this sense, Salafis refer to their approach as ‘’ilmiyy’ or ‘scientific,’52 unhinged, that is,
by context. They claim their scripturalist and literalist method avoids biases, distortions and
misrepresentations. It offers what Islam is really about, its true essence that is, harkening all the
way back to a time where the ummah had received purely and directly the message of god. By
virtue of this epistemological approach, there is an effort, as Roy suggested,53 to conjure up a
reified Islam, objective and unhindered by either history or location.54
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In its search for objectivity and ahistoricity, the Salafi method is scientific in ways that
may resonate with an empiricist and rationalist oriented understanding of the term. The
commonalities are limited to this though. Salafi scientism parts ways decisively with empiricism
and rationalism: whenever a conflict arises between literalism on the one hand and empirics and
rationality on the other, the former trumps the latter. For Salafis, autonomous rationality
represents an effort to infer beyond the literal word of god and venture into unlawful personal
exegesis.55 The consequences of this epistemology are important. As Haykel argues, "[t]he
claims to greater certainty of God's law through a hyper-textual methodology are a trademark of
the Salafis. Implicit in this claim is that to deny Salafi view is to deny the probative value of the
texts of revelation.”56
It was Mustafa Hilmi that in the 1970s elaborated on the Salafi approach with a crucial
lexical innovation. He introduced the idea of a ‘manhaj salafiyy,’ or ‘salafi method.’57 The
adoption of term ‘manhaj’ has two main implications. First, it indicates Salafism specific
epistemological approach which signals its uniquely qualified access to Islam. Second, it will
permit launching Salafism as an ideological project beyond the confines of theology and
doctrine. As a method, as opposed to a series of theological claims, Salafism was not confined
anymore in terms of its potential reach: “Hilmi reframed Salafism as a comprehensive way of
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thinking, a blueprint for action, and an Islamic civilizational worldview.”58 Hilmi sought in this
way to enfranchise the constituting Salafi trend from both secular politics and rival Islamist
movements. He not only saw “Islam as a sociopolitical system (nizam), as Islamists did, but also
sought to identify the method (manhaj) by which Muslim scholars arrived at the truth about this
system and about its implementation.”59 This epistemological methodology revealed then three
core tenets around which the Salafi discourse is centered.
Three core tenets
The first principle is a strict understanding of and adherence to tawhid.60 The second is
the reliance on the Qur’an and Sunnah as the only legitimate religious sources. Third, the
rejection of any unlawful innovation, or bid’a (pl. bida’).61 Most scholars, including
Wiktorowicz and Haykel, consider the principle of tawhid as the prime cornerstone for Salafis.
However, I would also suggest how these three tenets sustain and shore each other up. Taken in
isolation from one another, or outside the Salafi epistemic method, they would not be able to
characterize Salafism as a defined and unique phenomenon within Islam.
Salafis articulate tawhid along three main axis: oneness of lordship (‘tawhid alrububiyyah’); oneness of worship (‘tawhid al-‘ibadah,’ at times indicated also as oneness of
godship, ‘tawhid al-uluhiyyah’); and oneness of names and attributes (‘tawhid al-asma’ wa-lsifat’).62 Trespassing on any of these forms of tawhid may be ground for accusations of unbelief
58
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and exclusion from the Muslim community.63 Tawhid is not in fact only a theological marker. It
translates into social and behavioral dispensations, in line with the attempt to make Salafism into
a comprehensive approach to life (individual as well as collective) similar to other Islamist
formulations.
In Salafism, tawhid becomes a theological and legal principle which makes reference to
the community of the pious ancestors. The paradigm of the salafs portrays a perfectly unified
community, mirroring and heeding to god’s tawhid: Islam is one in the hereafter and then
necessarily in the here and now. That archetypal community represented the oneness of god
through and in its people. Hence, infringing on such unity would be tantamount to infringing on
god’s intent and message for mankind. Insofar as god’s message is a legal one that regulates the
life of the community, tawhid has become in this way a legal principle.
Here lies the stern rejection of epistemic pluralism, conducive to different ‘truths’ – and
thus to different ways to be Muslim. It is an untenable proposition for Salafism: relativism breaks
god mandated tawhid, inevitably causing ‘fitna,’ ‘discord’ within the community. To preserve
unity, reliance on the revelation as articulated in those early days is essential. This proposition
leads to the other two principles underpinning Salafism. Only the Qur’an and Sunnah were
guiding the early Muslim community. Therefore, they represent the only legitimate religious
texts if one desires to reconstruct Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxis. The collections of the
ahadith, in particular, “are unconditionally authoritative when it comes to the elaboration of
teachings and opinions.”64 As an attendant corollary, Salafis maintain that their literal and
scripturalist approach renders Islam simpler, more straightforward and accessible. It does so by
metaphorical investigation of the features and characteristics of god as presented in the Qur’an; see fn. 55 for an
example. Haykel, 2014, pp. 38-9 and fn. 14. Algar, 2002, p. 35.
63
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removing all the unnecessary historical accretions that proliferated out of non-scripturalist, nonliteral (i.e., non-scientific and hence non-Salafi) approaches to Islam. Therefore, Salafis see no
need to venture into other legal methods (such as other common jurisprudential expedients,
namely qiyas or ijma’)65 different from a literal reliance on the Qur’an and Sunnah - a mistake of
which the main Sunni jurisprudential schools are found guilty, let alone Shi’is or Sufis.
In fact, “[w]hile Salafism’s claim to be a methodology is simple and seemingly nonpolemical, it seeks in practice the deconstruction of virtually the totality of this conventional
system of Islamic identification.”66 This deconstruction process results in a wholehearted and
complete rejection of what Salafis regard as innovation: in other words, the principle of bid’a
maintains that whatever has accrued and deposited over the original texts of the revelation, and
consequently over the pristine and pure experience of the pious ancestors, is unlawful and
harmful. Bid'a is defiend as, “an innovated matter not followed by the Companions of the
Followers [i.e., the salaf] and not part of that which a legal proof (dalil shar'i) necessitates.”
Consequently, “upholding the Sunna involves the suppression of bid'a.”67 Once again, the
juxtaposition with Wahhabism, 68 equally adverse to bid’a, is useful. For AlWahhab, bid'a carried, as for the Salafis, a purely negative connotation: it was “whatever
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religious practice or concept had come into being after the third century of the Islamic era.”69 As
a consequence, given also emphasis on direct interpretation of texts, “Salafis enjoy a relatively
shallow and limited hierarchy of scholarly authorities.”70 Only a handful of authors are
considered faithful to the original model of Islam, and thus held as important guardians of the
faith. We have already discussed Ibn Hanbal and Abd al-Wahhab’s impact on modern Salafism.
The medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) shaped profoundly Salafi understanding of
power and authority.71 Few others past personalities are mentioned in the Salafi pantheon.
These principles form the basis of what Salafis usually refer to as ‘’aqidah,’ or ‘creed.’
However, this ‘aqidah is more akin to a discursive field than an coherent and explicitly political
ideology. As I observed in the previous chapter, a discursive field provides elements and
coordinates upon which to found and craft an ideology. Again, this is a two-way street: the
construction of such ideology does not answer only to exogenous and contextual imperatives: it
is not, in other words, a mere epiphenomenon. Nor can ideational items shape context and nondiscursive elements in every way they please. As Wiktorowicz succinctly states,
“[b]ecause Salafis share the same creed, they would likely issue similar fatwas if they
also shared the same interpretation of context. The selected analogy to apply to a
contemporary problem is entirely dependent on how one understands the problem itself.
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Different interpretations make different jurisprudential principles operative. The converse
is also true: similar interpretations make similar jurisprudential principles operative.”72
Salafism as Social Appropriation of Tradition
The Islamic theological, legal and jurisprudential corpus that developed over the
centuries is usually referred to as ‘taqlid.’ To indicate Islamic philosophical, artistic and
scientific legacy, ‘turath’ is more common. Both terms represent that Islamic tradition –
something transmitted from the past – which Salafism dismisses as unlawful bid’a: hence the
condemnation of what commonly is regarded as Islamic legal, devotional and social practices,
and then philosophy, art, literature, architecture, not to mention non-Islamic analogues.73
Salafis’ purist attitude is bent on jettisoning whatever deemed liable to compromise the
reception of the true message of Islam. Their intellectual effort aims, at one time, to deconstruct
the historically diverse manifestations of Islam and (re)constructing the contours of a paradigm
embedded in the Islamic tradition at large too. All Muslims regard the early days of the ummah
as a cherished time. The vast majority, of course, does not draw the same implications from that
experience as Salafism does; much less, they make it into a discourse that may be deployed to
sustain social and political mobilization.74
It is in this sense therefore that Salafism appropriates tradition. Salafis construct a
discourse upon the experience of as-salaf as-salih as a foundational and hallowed narrative to
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ponder over and relate to society and politics. Upon this discourse, they may then establish clear
guidelines for political action – i.e., an ideology.
Does it make sense to ask how valid is their archeological endeavor? How genuine or
truthful is this operation? We should bear in mind that, just like all traditions, also the time of the
pious ancestors is an “invented tradition” the way Hobsbawm puts it.75 He argued: “[i]nsofar as
there is such reference to a historic past, the peculiarity of 'invented' traditions is that the
continuity with it is largely factitious. In short, they are responses to novel situations which take
the form of reference to old situation.”76 Lauzière, in discussing Salafi discourse, echoes
Hobsbwam: “Salafism is a much more complex and multifaceted concept than the doctrine of the
forefathers of the medieval period. The exhaustive and systematic way in which contemporary
purist Salafis now define it—as a comprehensive approach to Islam covering every aspect of the
religious experience—is also characteristic of twentieth-century ideologies.”77
These considerations spell trouble for the Salafi edifice: their own narrative about the
pious ancestors becomes a product of present contingencies (of modernity, we might even say).
It emerges as an invented tradition – or to use Salafi parlance, as bid’a. Not only that: this very
discourse on a tradition so defined and appropriated by Salafis would rest on par with the three
pillars of Salafism as another of its essential core elements. And like any discourse, it is
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everything but pure, pristine, and unsoiled by contemporary contextual elements.78 Rather, as a
dialogical approach suggests, it relates and is inscribed in those elements.79
The process whereby this discourse has come to affect society and politics is the result of
complex interactions. Historical context, individuals and communities operating in that context,
the fabric of the discourse itself: all has contributed to the ideologization of Salafism, a process
“whereby Muslim scholars recast purist Salafism as a totalizing system […]. From being a
theological doctrine and an approach to Islamic law, Salafism became a worldview that
encompassed the whole of existence, from knowledge to practice, from morality to etiquette, and
even from religion to politics.”80
The challenge is for us to explain how this occurred; and in particular, to see the role of
Salafi scholars in it. Before doing that, we need to outline the contours of the specific context in
which Salafi discourse manifested. The rest of the chapter is devoted to this goal.
Jordan, a Country that Should Not Be
Salafism is a global religious trend: it varies in its specific manifestations - the ways
individuals and communities act upon its founding principles. Examining these manifestations by
considering only Salafism ideational coordinates is a rather useless enterprise. It would result in
an essentialist picture of Salafism, explaining its politics via a direct reference to its tenets.81
Instead, Salafism interacts, in its various ideological articulations, with an environment
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characterized by possibilities and constraints, both ideational and material.82 It is in this sense
that we need to draw the contours of the Jordanian context. In this environment, different
incarnations of Salafism grew and developed, and their features cannot be understood in isolation
from such context.
What kind of landscape has Jordan presented to Salafism? Jordan is usually portrayed as
an island of stability, especially looking at the troubled vicissitudes of virtually all its neighbors.
Yet this may be deceiving. More appropriately, as Mansfield poignantly remarks, Jordan is a
mystery: given that it is a small, poor, weak country; created by the British, with no historical
precedents, with no natural resources; ridden with national identity issues, surrounded by bigger
and threatening states; bordering with Israel, hosting a multitude of refugees; and governed by a
foreign83 and largely pro-western dynasty - then the surprise is not so much its stability, but
rather its very survival and existence!84 With a hint of sarcasm, these points sum up the
challenges that have confronted Jordan throughout its history.
The Creation of Jordan
To the east, Jordan85 sits at the edges of Syrian Desert, bordering Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
The river Jordan, the Dead Sea and Wadi ‘Araba mark its western borders with Palestine.86 In the
south, a short coastline of some 20 miles provides its only access to open sea through the Gulf of
Aqaba. To the north sits the long border with Syria. The creation of Jordan was almost an
afterthought in the scrambling of Arab lands following World War I.87 Crossed by nomadic
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tribes, with few permanent settlements,88 with no natural resources and dominated by vast
expanses of desert, it is no surprise that Great Britain and France focused their attention on
places such as Palestine, Syria and Iraq.89
The Great Arab Revolt, sponsored by Britain against the Ottomans and led by the
Hashemites of Mecca,90 was not enough in the eyes of the European powers to let the Arab
dynasty establish its coveted Arab kingdom. The French expelled Sharif Hussein’s son Faysal
from Damascus in 1920 after he had tried to be recognized as king of Syria. His elder brother
Abdallah, fearing the family’s ambitions under threat, marched northwards from the Hijaz to
lend support to his brother Faysal’s loyalists. As he stopped short of the Syrian border, the
French pressed the British to rein in the Hashemites’ claims to Syria (and their opposition to the
overall Sykes-Picot agreement).
London thus put Faysal on the newly created Iraqi throne, and Abdallah’s presence in the
territory south of Syria was then taken as a fait accompli, and then named ‘Transjordan.’ Both
Iraq and Transjordan (together with Palestine, Lebanon and Syria) were set during the San Remo
Conference of 1920 as mandates under the auspices of the newly established League of Nations.
This arrangement could do little to quell the ambitions of Abdallah. He felt the tiny and

Minister, then Minister of War, would be drawing the new borders of former Ottoman lands on a small paper towel
as a hiccup shook his hand, resulting in the irregular border demarcation. The episode is probably false, but its
significance remains exactly because it is widely believed to be true, insisting on Jordan territorial configuration
utter artificiality. Conversation with Dr. Elena Corbett, Amman, 9/10/2014.
88
After Aqaba and Ma’an were taken by Abdallah in 1925, the population may have reached 300,000. MiltonEdwards et al, 2009, p. 20.
89
The Ottomans tended to disregard this region too, see ibid, p. 14 and Lawless, Robert. “History of Jordan,” in The
Middle East and North Africa 1998. Europa’s Regional Surveys of the World, Europa Publications, 1998, p. 629.
The only important infrastructure was the Damascus-Mecca railroad, built to take pilgrims down to the Hijaz region
in western Arabia. The railroad crosses Jordan north-south, although only a few sections are still in use and only for
freight trains.
90
The Great Arab Revolt was agreed upon by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, the Hashemite guardian of the holy places
before the Saudi conquest, and Sir McMahon, British vice-regent in Egypt. The revolt was going to represent one of
the major narratives to shore up the pan-Arab claims of the family. See Milton-Edwards et al., 2009, pp. 17-18.

130

unpopulated land the British had granted him could not support his plans of a greater Arab
kingdom centered around Syria and Palestine.
In May 1923 Britain formalized the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan, as “an
‘independent constitutional state’ under the rule of Amir (Prince) Abdullah with British
tutelage.”91 British sponsorship would entail White Hall providing up to a third of the annual
budget of the Emirate (some 150,000£ in the mid-thirties); and, importantly, the staffing of the
Arab Legion, an elite military corps led by British officials.92
A constant in the history of Jordan, regional events were to shake the country at its very
foundations. The Zionist movement, the Balfour Declaration and the struggle over the future of
the mandate of Palestine between Arabs and Jews were to have major repercussions virtually on
every aspect of the country. In March 1946 Great Britain formally granted independence to
Abdallah’s possession, who upgraded it from emirate to kingdom and changed its name into
Jordan. Soon afterwards, in November 1947, the UN voted for a partition of Palestine between
Arabs and Jews. The Arabs refusal to comply with the resolution sparked the first Arab-Jewish
(later Arab-Israeli) war. The events that followed brought to the establishment, in May 1948, of
the state of Israel; the exodus of some 750,000 Arab Palestinians from what is now referred as
‘Israel proper;’ and the Jordanian conquest of the Palestinian West Bank, including East
Jerusalem and its holy sites.93
The annexation (made official in 1950) of such large portion of territory on the part of
Abdallah’s troops (thanks in particular his Arab Legion) contravened explicitly the Arab
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League’s94 provision which called for a Palestinian state all over the mandate land, and certainly
not a Jordanian rule over parts of such territory. But again, Abdallah’s ambitions had led him, on
the one hand, to assume the role of protector of the Palestinians;95 and on the other, to strike
deals with the Jewish Agency even before the establishment of the state of Israel,96 thus breaking
from the ranks of Arab solidarity. This choice cost him his life as he was killed by a young
Palestinian in 1951 in front of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.
Nation Building and State Building
Abdallah’s grandson Hussein was injured too in that attack. After the brief reign of
Abdallah’s son Talal,97 in 1952 the seventeen year old ascended to the throne. Abdallah’s sudden
death left his young heir dealing with momentous challenges of nation building and state
building.
Nation building and the issue of identity
Abdallah’s emirate lacked any historical precedent. Its lands did not overlap with
Ottoman administrative boundaries, defined clusters of social and economic relations, even less
with clear and specific local identities. Yet, the soon-to-be nation-state configuration begged the
question: Who is a Jordanian? Commanding the loyalty of citizens required crafting a viable
national identity on the part of the Hashemite dynasty. Two were the main problems. First, the
Hashemites themselves were foreign to Jordan. It was no surprise therefore that they espoused
strong pan-Arab leanings, in line as well with the ambitions of the family and the general mood
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prevailing in the Arab world in the wake of World War II.98 Second, the influx of Palestinian
refugees after the ‘Nakbah’99 of 1948-9 and the annexation of the West Bank meant that the
regime had to accommodate another, emerging and thus rival identity - the Palestinian one.
The relevance of this challenge is readily visible by the numbers. Between 1948 and
1949, some 360,000 refugees entered the West Bank, and 110,000 refugees entered Jordan
proper, soon to be referred to as the East Bank. Prior to the exodus, the West Bank had some
425,000 people, and Jordan’s population was 375,000. This meant that the population of the
West Bank increased to 785,000 and in the East Bank to 485,000. The population of Jordan, in
total, rose to 1,270,000, an almost 300% basically overnight increase.100 As a result, close to
65% of the Jordanian population was actually Palestinian.101
Over time, this situation will not change: rather, two subsequent mass migrations of
Palestinians into Jordan (after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war102 and the Kuwait war of 1990-1991103)
only strengthened the Palestinian character of Jordan, especially in the urban areas.104 How to
accommodate the challenges posed by such demography and attendant identity issues in an
overall national framework? The Hashemites could never permit the emergence of an alternative
Palestinian identity independent from a (trans)Jordanian one. The main drive was thus to
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subsume, under the banner of Arabism, Palestinian identity within the Jordanian one, so to make
it politically irrelevant. As Massad notes,
“[w]hereas Arab nationalism is the discourse deployed to “unify” Jordan and Palestine, it is
Transjordanian nationalism, not Arab nationalism, that must define the new “unified” and
expanded entity [including, that is, also the Palestinian element] … [t]his was not an unintended
outcome of the absorption of a stateless territory and people by an existing state, but rather an
intended policy of Jordanization and de-Palestinization.”105

In other words, an exclusivist definition of nationality (not coterminous, it must be noted,
with citizenship, granted to the majority of the Palestinian refugees) was to define the relation
between the East Bank, Transjordanian element - now fully backing the Hijazi Hashemite
dynasty - and the Palestinian one. For King Hussein any claim to a non-Jordanian Palestinian
identity was an anathema. It represented a direct threat to its regime legitimacy and viability,
predicated on a Hashemite, Arab and (trans)Jordanian nationalist discourse. Some of the
contradictory features of state discourse were then coming to the fore, as we shall discuss below.
The greatest threat to the regime survival came in fact from the attempt of the
Palestinians to enfranchise themselves from Jordan’s master narratives of nationalism and
attendant political dominance. The formation of the PLO in 1964, followed by the formation of
various guerrilla groups,106 represented the embodiment of a distinct - that is, non-Jordanian Palestinian identity. The PLO and affiliated militant formations started carrying out operations
against Israel from Jordanian territory, developing into a ‘state within a state.’ It was then only a
matter of time before the regime took action. King Hussein’s army erased an autonomous
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Palestinian political presence in the country in the course of a civil war known as ‘Black
September’107 in 1970.
The regime won the military confrontation. However, it could not claim any more to be
the main - let alone the sole - legitimate representative of the Palestinians as it had been doing
via its discourse of unity between East and West Bank, Jordanians and Palestinians. In 1974, the
Arab League recognized that role belonged to Yasser Arafat’s PLO. That eventually led King
Hussein to severe the links with the Israeli occupied West Bank108 in July 1988. He
acknowledged how decades of occupation and the Palestinian ‘Intifadah’109 had fundamentally
compromised any possibility of recovery of what up until then he had claimed as Jordanian
territory.
State building
The threat of the Palestinian question to regime viability and stability was most serious
yet by no means the only one. During the 1950s, domestically, radical progressive groups, such
as Nasserists, Ba’thists and Communists, conspired against the regime. The failed coup of 1957
prompted King Hussein to suspend the brief parliamentary interlude under liberal Prime Minister
Suleiman Nabulsi110 and to establish a de facto monarchical autocracy: elections would not be
held until 1989; political parties were banned;111 the security apparatus, the notorious
mukhabarat (GID, General Intelligence Directorate), strengthened; last, martial law was
proclaimed after the catastrophic 1967 war against Israel. These developments made, in a way,
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the regime similar to its neighbors. However, at no point in time was Jordan a police state like
Syria or Iraq.112 Repression of dissent has never been that fierce, criticism was tolerated (except
for the most sensitive issues, such as the legitimacy of the monarchy or the Palestinian question),
a relatively independent press and associations continued to exist.
What have been the pillars of regime survival? Strategies adopted in the early days of the
kingdom shaped its political structure and relations with society. We can list three in particular,
before analyzing the overarching state discourse in the next section.
First, the monarchy was able to leverage on societal and national cleavages to its
advantage. The Arab Legion and the army more in general became a bulwark of the regime. In
these institutions, East Bank Jordanians - i.e., non-Palestinians - were overrepresented, especially
in the upper echelons. Hailing primarily from a rural and tribal background, the regime secured
Transjordanians’ allegiance by two other means: preferential channels in accessing state
bureaucracy as civil servants or attain state employment as teachers, doctors, managers;113 and
allocations of public lands to tribal leaders and prominent East Banker families, creating a
landowning class thus tied to the regime.114
The exclusivist nationalist project described above served as the ideological bedrock
upon which the Hashemites built such societal alliances. This did not imply that Jordanian of
Palestinian origins (also from the West Bank) could not access high governmental posts,
economic prestige or undertake a successful career in the army. However, their representation in
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these sectors has not been in par with their demographic or economic clout, nor could they
leverage on their descent and affiliation to obtain such posts more easily.115
Second, the authoritarian turn after 1957 emptied formal political institutions of much of
their power. As in other cases in the Arab and postcolonial world at large, state centralization and
expansion led to illiberal systems of governance. The 1952 constitution defines a constitutional
monarchy with a bicameral legislature (‘majlis an-nawab’).116 The lower chamber of deputies is
to be elected by broad male suffrage (women will be excluded until 1989); the upper house or
Senate is appointed by the king.117 The chambers may force the resignation of individual
ministers or entire cabinets with a vote of no-confidence; their assent is necessary for passing
bills; they both can amend laws. However, such liberal features are countered by the powers of
the king, which may trump the prerogatives of the legislature. He chooses the prime minister, the
head of the security services, and he is commander in chief of the armed forces. He may dismiss
the government as well as the parliament. Indeed, even after the liberalization starting in 1989118
the parliament was still considered by many a mere rubber stamp of the executive.
As a result, the most important locus of power in the kingdom has been the royal court or
diwan. Royal family members, representatives of the most important tribes, top ranking officers
of the army, notables: they came to constitute a coterie that enjoys disproportionate influence in
running the affairs of the country. Its efficacy resides also in the diwan capacity to function as a
115
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conduit between the site of power (the king and his more immediate aides) and the population at
large. The relative limited size of Jordan’s population and the widespread system of personal
patronage and links (often relying on tribal affiliation), known as wastah, permits to bring
popular grievances, requests and complains up to the rooms of the royal palace, bypassing, that
is, the emasculated formal political institutions.119 This state of affairs is both cause and result of
the stultified development of political parties in the kingdom, even after 1989. This solution,
predicated on informal political institutions, granted Hussein immense popularity amongst
Jordanians at large, also in light of his personal charisma.120
Third, Jordan was able to secure western support, namely the UK and then US
patronage. This trend witnessed ebb and flow: as a small country, Jordan could not ignore the
anti-Western sentiments that cyclically would invest the region.121Yet, the country never truly
experienced a volte face in its international relations, securing western diplomatic, military and
financial backing.122 Many commentators (FN - Russell, Moaddel 2002b, Robins 2004) describe
in fact Jordan as a rentier state: its historical role as a western ally, reliable much more than
other, more volatile countries, and its pivotal role in the Israeli-Palestinian issue granted such
steady - and vital - flow of external funds.
State discourse, civil society, religion
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What is then the overarching discursive framework of the regime? Moaddel speaks of
Jordan as a case of “authoritarian pluralism.”123 Jordan has always been relatively liberal by
regional standards: in this sense, the regime espoused a number of different, malleable and at
times contradictory discourses “connected to different apparatuses of the state.” What united
these discourses is the “institution of the monarchy. The state ideology reflected elements of
Arab nationalism, Islamic conservatism, tribalism, pre-Islamic glorification, and Western
modernism. Because of this very diversity, the state appeared differently to different segments of
the Jordanian population.”124 These discourses undergirded the Hashemites’ bid to hegemony (or
at least to recognized authority and legitimacy). Mere exercise of force through the apparatuses
of the political society is no ground for such bid. The regime sought via these discourses to
establish a relation with the Jordanian civil society at large for securing its allegiance and if not
consent. Under the Hashemites we can then speak of a specific set of relations between societal
groups tied within practices, norms and values congealing into a ‘historical bloc.’ This only
seemingly precarious arrangement of forces has granted, thus far, Jordan’s survival and relative
stability.
In this context, the pluralism of state discourses is puzzling if we consider the cases of
neighboring countries such as Egypt, Syria or Iraq. A comparison with Jordan is illustrative. In
those regimes, ruling elites (Nasserists and their heirs, the Ba’th party) put forth an exclusivist
political discourse. Moaddel proposes the concept of “ideological state,” where “its discourses,
symbolic order, and rituals permeate the administrative structure of the government. [...] To
support the regime would mean support its entire body, and criticizing the regime implies
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questioning its very essence and identity.”125 This monolithic ideological and discursive
apparatus was then mirrored by a set of practices of extreme political repression, rejection of
dissent, and further state intrusion into the sphere of civil society.126
Importantly, all these regimes, reflecting a common trend in the postcolonial Muslim
world, “attempted to undermine the influence of the religious institutions in their societies.”127
Religious elites represented a traditional128 social group generally opposed to the rise of fiercely
modernists and secular elites. Such elites “promoted their own discourses as substitutes for
religion.” As a consequence, “[r]eligion thus became politicized as the conservative Islamic
establishment resisted the loss of their traditional social functions and the modern intellectuals
sought in the religious institutional field a cultural resource to formulate their discourse in
oppositional relations to the ideology of the state.”129 The compounded result was thus twofold.
First is the creation of rigid and exclusivist autocracies which could not accommodate political
pluralism in any form. Second is the rise of militant Islamism as one of the discursive fields for
opposition in relation specifically to aggressive secularization policies.130
The ruling elite in Jordan undertook instead a different strategy. The regime remained
(and remains) authoritarian; yet, it is not tied to an exclusivist and all-encompassing ideology.
State discourse never produced an ‘ideological state,’ nor was it monolithic in defining the
contours of the polity. Different sectors of civil society could find a niche within state discourse,
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express accordingly their interests, and permeate several state apparatuses.131 This power
arrangement has guaranteed less confrontational and relatively more open dealings between
political and civil society, in that the latter, in its various components and groups, could find
different channels to articulate its demands. The red lines within this discursive system, as we
have seen, have been the Palestinian issue and the institution of the monarchy. However, even
here accommodation - and not outright rejection - was the first option. The Palestinians, for
example, were granted citizenship and included in the body politic as long as they did not
question the power arrangements under the monarchy and the credibility of its unification project
– as when they did, in 1970, the state response was indeed coercive and uncompromising. The
king, on his part, paid lip service to popular pressure by firing unpopular ministers, shared the
street - literally - with his subjects in times of turmoil to talk to them personally,132 and in general
resorted more to paternalism as opposed to iron fist.133
In this context, amongst the claims put forth by the Hashemites to shore up their
legitimacy, was the articulation of a religious discourse. This claim is rooted into the family’s
lineage - believed to be descending directly from the Prophet - and its historic role as guardian of
the holy places.134 Therefore, no comparable attempt at secularization of the country, or attendant
relentless attacks and incorporations of religious institutions, could be carried out in Jordan as in
Iraq, Egypt, Syria, or even Iran under the Shah.135 This strategy played into the hands of the
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widespread sense of religiosity espoused by groups (especially the tribes and the Bedouins) who
form the social bedrock of the regime.136 Therefore, “[t]he state's non-secularist orientation, its
accommodationist approach toward religion, and favorable policies towards diverse groups and
classes - notably merchants and landowners - also strengthened the Hashemite-religion
alliance.”137
The state and the Muslim Brotherhood
Nothing epitomizes this alliance more clearly than the vicissitudes of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the country. The ban of political parties from 1957 to 1989 did shut down the
political arm of the Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front; yet, under the martial law the
Brotherhood was allowed to continue operating as a charitable entity, evolving into a powerful
civil society organization and enjoying widespread social popularity. Not espousing an
aggressive secularist policy, on the contrary inserting religious elements in the very state
discourse, the regime did not offer an easy ideational target for the Brotherhood to fight
against.138 Nor did the regime engage in episodes of wanton repression, strategies often
associated with radicalization of the opposition.139 It must be remembered that the Jordan
Brotherhood was a direct and contiguous emanation of the Egyptian motherboard, which did
engage in more open and militant confrontations with Egyptian regime, over the course of time
producing violent and radical spin offs.140
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If that was not the case in Jordan we must conclude that state discourse and its attendant
practices shaped a different social and political landscape for the Jordanian branch of the
Brotherhood.141 The different behavior of the MB in Jordan does not teach us much about the
democratic leanings and possibilities - or lack thereof - of the ideological apparatus of the
movement; rather, it teaches us how this apparatus must be considered at all times in relation to
its historical referents – according to a dialogical model as I have been arguing thus far.
In fact, the Brotherhood was certainly not in favor of Jordan’s close relations with the
West, or the conciliatory attitude towards Israel. However, the regime left little further rationale
for any kind of uncompromising opposition. Social classes that historically in the Middle East
backed religious institutions, namely landowners and the merchants, were a relatively late
development in Jordan and, as we noticed, depending on the regime for their social status and
relative affluence. Last, in the formative years right after independence, a common threat - both
to the monarchy and to religious actors - came from the same quarters of radical, secular, leftist
groups. This situation laid the foundations for a marriage of convenience perhaps, but a
successful one nonetheless for both parties.142
Realignment: Political and Economic Shifts at the End of the Century
This configuration of power relations underpinned Jordan’s vaunted stability all the way
to the period under examination in this study. However, while Jordan did not undergo any true
societal or political revolution, from 1989 and through the mid-1990s a number of important
developments occurred in the country, shaking some of its very foundations. The aggregate
outcome of such developments resulted also in the opening of new discursive spaces and
141
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practices, including the rise to prominence of Salafism in the life of the country. We may
consider these developments under three intersecting domains: economy, international politics,
and domestic politics.
Economy: from oil bonanza to Structural Adjustment Programs
Jordan is almost completely bereft of oil. However, oil has made its way into Jordan’s
economy via expatriates’ remittances and discounted oil supply agreements with states in the
Gulf. Via these two ways, the oil bonanza of the 1970s directly impacted the politics of the
country, as it “generated aid flows from the oil-exporting countries and large earnings from
expatriate workers in the Gulf. It led to economic prosperity for the country and served to
attenuate political discontent.”143
The effects of the oil boom were vast. A rapid process resembling similar paths of
modernization invested Jordan. The GNP increased six fold between 1973 and 1983 and
economic growth spotted Chinese-like rates in double figures.144 Life quickly changed for many
Jordanians as healthcare and education spread, infrastructures improved and expanded, job
opportunities emerged. The population doubled between 1970 and 1990, and tripled by 2000.145
Urbanization followed suit146 together with social differentiation, higher literacy rates, and the
formation of a sizeable middle class.147
However, this transformation hid basic structural issues. In fact, it is not erroneous to
speak of Jordan as a rentier state. Its lifeline has been tied to external rents of various nature and
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not quite to domestic economic development.148 Rentierism engenders an ephemeral and uneven
modernization process. The expatriates’ remittances sustained the rise in government revenues at
the core of such process. By 1983 some 350,000 Jordanians, or over 40% of the workforce, was
working abroad - almost entirely in the oil rich Gulf states - contributing to an increase in
remittances from 15 million USD in 1973 to nearly 1 billion a decade after. Furthermore, Arab
oil producing countries - in the 1970s and 1980s, especially Iraq; nowadays, Saudi Arabia - have
provided fuel below market prices for decades. Last, geography too undergirded another venue
for rent: fellow Arab states held Jordan as one of the ‘frontier states’ in the fight against Israel,
granting in 1978 a yearly net payment of 1.25 billion to Amman’s treasury.149
Rentierism permitted public expenditures and provisions to burgeon, leading to the
hypertrophic state apparatus typical of the region.150 State expenditures increased from 140
million USD in 1973 to over 700 in 1985.151 Key industries were nationalized (especially in the
phosphate and potassium industries, the only relatively abundant natural resources of Jordan),
and the state financed the expansion of education and health systems mentioned above, paid for
food subsidies and agricultural investments; state employment mushroomed, hiring thousands in
a swelling bureaucracy and an ever larger military, security and police apparatuses.152
This process could be sustained only insofar as oil prices remained high and allowed
financing public debt. There was no comparable, sustained economic development behind the
veneer of rentier economy: the domestic market remained small, the industrial base extremely
limited, agriculture constrained by geography (in particular water scarcity), and taxation of the
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population limited and ineffective. With the crisis of oil markets of the mid-1980s, debt
financing became increasingly difficult.
The bubble was to burst: the external flow of rent dwindled significantly as remittances
from expatriates fell from 2.3 in 1981 to 1.5 billion in 1987. Many started to go back to Jordan as
job opportunities in the Gulf became scarcer. The ‘frontier states’ saw Arab commitments
subjected too to the vagaries of the oil markets: grants started falling short of the promised
amount, when at all. Official unemployment thus reached 12%, probably climbing even higher in
reality. The GDP decreased by 3.5% between 1987 and spotted a 0% growth rate the following
year. The Jordanian Dinar (JD) lost 45% of its value against the Dollar.
Yet the regime was reluctant to cut down significantly public expenditures. They had
secured at least the acquiescence of the more disgruntled groups within the country (especially
poor, recently urbanized Palestinians). Furthermore, they had cemented the corporatist pact
between the regime and its traditional allies (the East Bank tribes, the army, and the landowning
class). Hence, cutting social expenditures likely meant ominous consequences for the regime.
But by the late 1980s the public debt-to-GDP ratio was 2:1, the amount of debt itself at
8.4 USD billion:153 a clearly untenable situation, compounded by the long war that Iraq, Jordan’s
first economic partner, waged against Iran which further crippled the economy of the region.
King Hussein saw no other option but to ask for the intervention of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to access public debt relief via international loans. In a standard procedure applied to
similar situations in Third World countries since the at least the early 1980s,154 the IMF
demanded Jordan to implement thorough economic reforms in exchange for financial help.
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These reforms, known as “Structural Adjustment Programs” or SAP, called essentially
for three macro-economic measures. First, reining in state budget and proceed to cut public
expenditures in order to control inflation and currency fluctuation. Second, removing obstacles to
capital flows, international trade and foreign investments so to acquire hard currency to pay off
the debt and access international credit anew. Third, initiating a sweeping privatization of
industries, financial assets and public services. This last policy aimed at increasing the overall
efficiency of the economic system by letting the “free market” operate unburned and untamed by
state intervention, deemed inherently harmful and contributing, precisely, to budgetary issues. 155
The implementation of IMF measures in April 1989 brought an immediate spike in fuel
and food prices, ranging from 10 to 30%, as subsidies were cut. The price of other goods, such as
soda beverages and cigarettes, widely consumed in the kingdom especially by the poor, doubled.
The government then restricted access to public employment, freezing scheduled hirings; major
development projects were cancelled. The austerity policies of the SAP, as the regime feared,
sparked violent protests.
Political liberalization or stultified democratization?
What the regime had not foreseen was that such protests emerged first and most
virulently in southern cities considered its strongholds. In the impoverished centers of Tafileh,
Karak and Ma’an, populated mostly by East Bankers, the welfare of the population was tied
more closely than elsewhere to government provisions and subsidies. The protests turned violent,
with clashes between police forces and demonstrators that left 8 people dead, over 50 injured,
and a four day curfew in Karak. These riots were much more alarming for the regime in that they
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signaled that its very core constituencies were ready to defect from the pact that had ensured
regime survival and social and political stability up to that point.156
It is in this context that the regime embarked on a liberalization process which ended the
ban on parties, called off the martial law and announced new elections, the first since the mid1950s. Much has been written about the reasons behind King Hussein’s move, as well as the
significance for the perspectives of true democratization both in Jordan and in the Middle East of
Arab world more in general.157 Most commentators have now abandoned the more optimistic
assessments of the early 1990s, when Jordan seemed poised to join Huntington’s “Third
Wave.”158 Instead, Jordan became a textbook case of ‘defensive democratization:’ the
resumption of parliamentary life, the liberalization of party politics, the more liberal climate for
newspapers and the press in general represented, “a series of pre-emptive measures designed to
maintain elite privilege in Jordan while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political
change.”159 In this sense, “defensive democratization, even in the absence of democratizing
social pressure, is a state strategy to maintain the dominant political order in the face of severe
state fiscal crisis.”160
The regime did in fact survive, while the true intent, extent and direction of such policies
became clearer during the 1990s and in the early 2000s. Democratization and opening of the
system could go as far as they did not dent the fundamental power structure holding the country
together and the elites’ interests behind them. Yet the vagaries of international politics were to
156
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shock Jordan as it was right in the midst of these domestic upheavals, economic reforms and
political changes.
International and regional developments
Three major regional developments occurred in a span of merely five years within the
context of the end of the Cold War. Such sweeping transition to a new phase of world politics
earmarked the end of the Afghan war (1989), the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (1990-91), and the
peace process between Israel and the Arabs (1991-94). Connected while not directly related to
one another, all these events had in different ways deep and multifaceted repercussions on the
Jordanian domestic scenario.
The Afghan war had attracted thousands of young, disgruntled and restless Arabs to the
ranks of the resistance against the Soviet invasion, including people in Jordan. In the
downtrodden refugee camps and surrounding impoverished areas the lack of jobs and ensuing
social exclusion bred feelings of marginalization.161 These conditions were contributing factors
pushing many to join the jihad in Afghanistan against godless Communism, a decision that the
government at the time did not discourage - an easy way to empty the reservoir of unemployed,
troublesome individuals (while contributing, however marginally, to the fight against the
communists, a policy the US looked upon with favor). Exact numbers are not readily available,
but perhaps as many as 50,000 Arab nationals fought in Afghanistan, amongst whom a few
thousands Jordanians.
With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in February 1989, most so-called mujahiddin
returned home. They brought back with them years of hardening battlefield experiences, often
times informed, worryingly for the regime, by the precepts of Jihadi Salafism. Their alienation
from the mainstream Jordanian social and cultural environment had widened during such stint
161

Interview with Hassan Abu Hanieh, Amman, 11/26/2015.

149

abroad; some felt reluctant resuming their past meager existences after the exhilarating
experience in Afghanistan.162 Furthermore, these jihadi inspired cohorts moved back into the
kingdom right at the time of both economic hardship and political reform. It could prove an
explosive mix.163
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. King Hussein witnessed the widespread popular
support for Saddam Hussein’s action, perceived by many Jordanians (and Arabs at large too) as a
defiant anti-imperialist and proud Arab move. Also mindful of the importance of the economic
and diplomatic ties with Iraq, he chose not to join the international coalition which for the first
time featured the US and the USSR fighting together, epitomizing the “New World Order”
announced by George H. W. Bush. All major Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and
Syria, partook in the effort against Saddam - either militarily, logistically or diplomatically.
Jordan’s declared neutrality did not condone the invasion, but it fell short of outright
condemnation, leaving traditional allies dumbfounded.164 King Hussein called for an improbable
- or rather utterly unrealistic - solution to the crisis via the Arab League. The Arab states
response was to cut substantially financial aid to Jordan, further crippling its economy.
In substance, King Hussein opted for appeasing an already rattled Jordanian population,
reeling from the SAP measures and who had just been offered larger venues for expressing
claims and grievances: if that was to upset traditional partners, in primis the US, so be it. Foreign
policy making was thus deeply connected with domestic considerations: “if the king had adopted
a pro-Western position during the Gulf crisis, this could seriously have challenged the process of
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democratization. A pro-Western stance would have contrasted sharply with popular attitudes and
would have created friction between the leadership and the people.”165
The gamble paid off in terms of dodging new, massive protests, instead boosting the
king’s popularity. This move appeared all the more necessary considering another, related
development concerning the Kuwait war. Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, was the only
Arab leader to stand openly with Saddam. When the fighting ended in March 1991, Kuwait
retaliated by expelling some 300,000 Palestinians residing in the emirate.166 Most of these people
made their way to Jordan, as holders of the kingdom passport, and in any case unwelcomed in
other Arab states. This migration was the third major wave hitting the country since its
foundation, after 1948-9 and 1967.
The reconciliation with the US and the Arab world - only a matter of time - had a steep
price tag to it. From an economic standpoint, first the war destruction and then the draconian
sanctions imposed on Iraq all but deprived Jordan of one of its major trading partners167 right at
the time of the IMF measures largely predicated precisely on trade and export. Thus the need for
western support became all the more pressing. Yet this support was made conditional on Jordan
joining the US sponsored peace process between Israel and the Arabs. Up until then, only Egypt
had formally recognized the state of Israel, in 1978. Now, the unbaiting Palestinian Intifadah and
the new post-Cold War order were poised to provide the right juncture to open up multilateral
negotiations. In October 1991, the Madrid Conference seemed to herald the beginning of a new
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era in the international relations of the Middle East via addressing the Gordian knot of the
Palestinian question.168
King Hussein, according to some sources, had already begun entertaining the idea of a
settlement with Israel in 1985.169 Relinquishing Jordan’s claim on the West Bank in July 1988
lends support to this thesis. But the acceptance of a limited Palestinian state in the West Bank
and Gaza only hinted at a comprehensive settlement with Israel, a much bolder step King
Hussein could not quite make yet. The opportunity for such step arose when the peace process
stalled in Madrid. The PLO leadership exiled in Tunis started secret dealings with the Israelis,
resulting in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the Oslo Accords of 1993.
This move finally permitted King Hussein to make his bid for a separate peace with
Israel. He could do so without incurring in the wrath of fellow Arab states as the Palestinians
themselves first had struck a deal.170 The domestic front was a different story though. As we
have discussed earlier, the national composition of Jordan makes a peace treaty with Israel
extremely complex. Basically, most of the population of the kingdom resides there precisely due
to the establishment of Israel and then the 1967 war. Popular feelings were dead set against the
deal.171
Yet, King Hussein’s maneuvering proved once more deft in walking that fine line
between domestic and foreign pressures. Having secured popular consensus via the liberalization
process and the stand in the Kuwaiti war, he needed to think about the economic recovery, which
pivoted on the peace with Israel: “[b]alanced against the loss of the Iraqi market, the knock-on
effect of sanctions and the decline in aid from the Gulf states, the anticipated economic spin-off
168
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from peace with Israel must have been very alluring.”172 In October 1994, Jordan and Israel
signed the Wadi Araba treaty.
After the DOP, and with multilateral talks still proceeding between Israel and the Arab
states, the popular reaction to the treaty was of displeasure and opposition - vented especially by
the Muslim Brothers in the parliamentary circles - but it did not endanger widespread and large
protests. The regime much vaunted economic benefits as well as the perspective of an imminent
creation of a Palestinian state seemed to have offset deeply rooted feelings of resentment and
hostility towards the idea of the peace with Israel.
Conclusion - a New Stage
With a new budgetary and fiscal crisis in 1996 new popular protests swept the country.
As Ryan observes, “[t]he regime and its opposition clearly have different views of Jordan's
needs. But the 1996 riots were symptomatic of anger and resentment over far more than the price
of bread. It is difficult, in fact, to overestimate the depth of disillusionment within Jordan
regarding the economy, the political liberalization process, and peace with Israel.”173 However,
by this time the process of ‘defensive democratization’ allowed the regime to contain and repress
malcontent without further overtures. The democratization process, according to many scholars,
has stalled despite regular elections, the ascension to the throne of then young and ‘moderate’
Abdallah II, and the continuous pledges on the regime to further ‘reform’ and ‘democratize’ the
country.174
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In this context, after that is the 1989 realignment I have outlined thus far, I should like to
put forth two considerations to better understand and locate the specific manifestations and
activities of Salafism within the country and then beyond.
First, political sociologists attribute to ‘change’ a pivotal role in engendering social and
political movements. This proposition may at times suggest an endogenous logic and does not
clearly specify what ‘change’ actually should consist of. However, as I have maintained in
stressing the importance of cognition, ‘change’ is what people make of it. Hence the importance
of ideologues and thinkers as they engage in shaping and crafting cognition and understandings.
At the same time, from a less theoretical and more historical standpoint, I hope I showed how the
years after 1989 were indeed tumultuous ones on economic, political and demographic grounds.
Change, in layman’s terms, did occur and was significant.
Second, such events pushed the regime to adapt and modify. Much could be said in the
way of ‘everything needs to change so that everything remains the same’ à la The Leopard. Yet
the regime’s tactical opening to - and then forestalling of - democratization and liberalization
could not be simply micromanaged. As political society and civil society are always arenas for
struggle, strategies to impose specific political projects are bound to elicit contestation and
resistance, whose particular modality will depend on a host of different factors. In the context of
the 1990s and early 2000s Jordan, Salafism at large, in its different incarnations, will emerge and
stand for such an oppositional and alternative political project to the regime.
The following two chapters explore what role Salafi preachers, ideologues and thinkers
played in crafting this project, acting as Gramscian popular and organic intellectuals.
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Chapter 5 - Leaving Politics is Political: Quietist Salafism and Al-Albani’s
‘Purification and Education’ Project

Introduction
During a conversation with Hassan Abu Hanieh,1 I pointed out to him: “You haven’t
written as much about the Quietist Salafis as opposed to the Jihadis.” “Of course,” he quipped,
“they are not as interesting...they don’t do much.”2 Addressing the politics of an avowedly
‘apolitical’ movement may in fact sound a contradictory proposition - even an oxymoron.
Indeed, Quietist Salafis earn their label because they vacate the typical loci of political action:
organizing pressure groups, parties, lobbies and other formal associations; participating in
electoral competition; manifesting explicitly oppositional or favorable attitudes towards the
incumbent regime; taking part in public demonstrations, campaigns, protests, or other recognized
repertoires of contention; and last but not least, engaging in violence.
Yet again, their ‘apolitical’ stance may be so only if one takes their claims at face value.
Implications for power relations may be less overt and visible, yet still present, significant, and
consequential. By adopting an understanding of politics predicated on Gramsci’s social theory3
we can make sense of Quietist Salafis’ ‘apolitical politics.’ Their alleged avoidance of politics is
only a temporary and tactical abeyance from what they consider ‘modern’ political society, 4
prioritizing instead engagement within civil society: their hegemonic bid is spelled out in the
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latter domain rather than the former. In such realm of politics, power is contested and
transformed according to practices different from the overt and direct confrontation typical of
political society, which is instead the favorite domain of Jihadi Salafism. In other words, by
priming civil society, what Quietist Salafis do is hardly apolitical. Moreover, as Tarrow
suggested, “[s]ome movements are profoundly apolitical, and focus on their internal lives or
those of their members. But even such movements...encounter authorities in conflictual ways,
because it is these authorities who are responsible for law and order and for setting the norms for
society.”5
There is no way to circumvent the fact that the norms, rules and practices the modern
state upholds are at odds with Salafism: in confronting and relating to this institution, Quietist
Salafis espouse an ideology whose chief coordinates are similar to - at times hardly
distinguishable at all from - Jihadi Salafism. We ought not to juxtapose these two branches as
political versus apolitical, even less so as radical versus moderate: Salafism, as the foundational
discourse I outlined in Chapter 4, is never moderate in its approach to Islam. Neither are the
implications it draws from and builds upon the Islamic discursive field.
Experts on Salafism with whom I talked differed in many regards over the assessments of
this phenomenon. However, they all agreed that the main difference between Quietist and Jihadi
Salafis lies not in creed, values or ideology: it lies in a strategic choice pertaining to the most
appropriate means to establish an Islamic polity (however blurry its contours).6 The choice lies
between clashing headlong with state power or avoiding direct confrontation with it: as Gramsci
would put it, whether to wage a war of movement or a war of position.
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Muhammad Nasir ad-Din Al-Albani (1914-1999) chose a war of position. His impact on
the definition and development of current Salafism is widely recognized and immediately
apparent: author of hundreds of publications, his sermons and lectures recorded in countless
tapes and now podcasts, he groomed dozens of disciples, and attracted thousands of followers.
Research centers have been named after him, and his name is still widely cited and referred in
online fora almost twenty years after his death. ‘Albanism’ is sometimes used to indicate his
school of thought and the intellectual legacy his pupils have been fighting over. In light of these
considerations, we can understand his influence and role as an intellectual by looking at how he
utilized the latent political elements inscribed into the Salafi discourse for spurring social and
political mobilization: a social appropriation of tradition, articulated along the mechanisms of
diffusion, elaboration and systematization.
Life of Al-Albani
The life of Al-Albani is fairly well documented, including a variety of hagiographies
available online.7 Born in Albania (as his name reveals) right after the independence of the
country from the Ottoman Empire in 1912, he hailed from a poor family of watchmakers.8
Shortly afterwards his father, a conservative and devout Muslim, chose to move the family to
Syria, resenting the marked westernization and secularization of his native country. They
resettled in Damascus, soon to be ruled by the French in the framework of the mandate from the
League of Nations.
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Al-Albani displayed from a very young age a keen interest in religious studies, influenced
by his pious family and later on, as a teenager, by the intellectual climate of the Syrian capital.9 It
seems in fact that his interest in the study of the ahadith, for which he will become a recognized
authority in the Muslim world at large, developed so early, and so rigorously, that his father tried
to dissuade him to spend so much time, as a child, in such occupation. Allegedly, his father
feared also his son slowly drifting away from the family hanafi madhhab,10 a cause of distress
and tension between the two.11
Al-Albani was first under the tutelage of Sheikh Sayyed al-Burhani, a local hanafi scholar
specialized in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Soon enough, he came into contact with Rashid
Rida’s Al-Manar publication, possibly the most influential Islamist newsletter of the day,
containing in nuce some of the elements that will contribute to the emergence of Salafism in the
second half of the century.12
In the Syrian capital, Al-Albani would spend his spare time in Al-Maktabah AlDhahiriyyah, a library containing thousands of religious texts and manuscripts, to the extent that
he was provided a private study room by the library administration.13 His work and research on
ahadith gained him already a certain fame and following. He was never to attain any formal
degree in Islamic studies or related subjects. However, this would not represent an impediment
for him in that authority in Salafi circles is based mostly on peer recognition as opposed to
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World, Analysis Paper No. 18, February 2015, p. 8.
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For a discussion on Rida see Chapter 4, section “Salafism: a philological note on a disputed term.”
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Haadi, 2011, p. 5.
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formal titles.14 Al-Albani’s encyclopedic knowledge and the rigorous methodology he was
developing (configuring the Salafi manhaj described in the previous chapter) indeed sufficed to
build his reputation as one of the most prominent young scholars of the day.
Around 1945, alongside his work as watchmaker and his own passion for studying and
research, he was asked to deliver lectures on a variety of topics concerning his approach to
Islam,15 in particular in relation to the life of the Prophet, the Sunnah, the collections of ahadith,
and the works of classic thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Abdul-Wahhab. While these
meetings were never official and always held in private houses, established ‘ulama, sufis and
hanafi scholars became increasingly suspicious over Al-Albani’s positions, accusing him of
Wahhabi leanings.16 Other prominent sheikhs (such as Abd Al-Fateh al-Imam, head of the
Young Muslims Society in Syria) defended him, eventually making it possible for Al-Albani to
be hired at the Department of Religious Studies and Shari’ah at the University of Damascus in
1955.
By that time, Al-Albani started travelling regularly across Syria; soon afterwards, he was
invited to lecture in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. His fame then spread outside the Arab
world, and Indian ‘ulama in Benares offered him the direction of the Ahadith Department at the
local Islamic university. This event is of particular significance, since, as we are going to see
below, these scholars represented the neo-Ahl al-Hadith movement, a revivalist Islamic current
which would largely shape Al-Albani’s approach to Islam and consequent ideological outlook.
14

The case of Ali Al-Halabi is similar. Reputedly one of the most prominent Salafi scholars in Jordan, yet he holds
no degree, unlike some of his fellow preachers. See Abu Rumman, Muhammad and Hassan Abu Hanieh. The
‘Islamic Solution’ in Jordan: Islamists, the State and the Venture of Democracy and Security. Friedrich-EbertStiftung, 2013, p. 317, for a list of prominent Salafi sheikhs in Jordan. Younger generations seem however to be
drifting away from this system, as titles and degrees feature more and more prominently amongst important
credentials for scholars.
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Olidort, 2015, p. 9
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Haadi, 2011, p. 9. See also Nubdah Mukhtasirah, where it specifically mentions Al-Albani was accused
of ‘wahhabi dal’ [wahhabi stray]. As noticed in Chapter 4, ‘Wahhabi’ may indeed be used by Wahhabi opponents as
a derogatory label.
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The break out of hostilities between Pakistan and India will force Al-Albani to turn down the
offer.
In Syria matters were not easier. At the height of Pan-Arabism, a radical wing of the
Ba’th party pushed for the unification of the country with Egypt.17 In such climate, the position
of Islamic scholars such as Al-Albani was becoming increasingly precarious. Saudi Arabia, in its
confrontation with Nasserism and its regional allies, represented a safe haven for all sorts of
persecuted Islamists.18 Al-Albani was thus offered a post at the newly established University of
Medina in 1960, thanks to the good offices of Abdul Aziz bin Baz, then vice-dean of the institute
and future great mufti of the kingdom between 1993 and 1999. However, his stint in Medina will
end soon, in 1963: Al-Albani, notwithstanding his powerful sponsor, clashed with both the
increasingly influential Muslim Brotherhood community hosted in the kingdom 19 as well as the
Wahhabi establishment. Of particular theoretical significance is this last confrontation: AlAlbani’s rigorous manhaj was exposing the inherent contradictions of Wahhabism, whereby an
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The ill-fated union which took the name of United Arab Republic was arguably both the apotheosis and the most
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Jordan, the Gulf). See Kerr, Malcolm H. The Arab cold war, 1958-1964: a study of ideology in politics. Oxford
University Press, 1965.
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Lacroix, Stephan. “Between revolution and apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the
Shaping of Contemporary Salafism,” in Roel Meijer, ed., Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement. Hurst &
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Amman, 6/16/2015 (name not recorded upon request); Salafi scholar at Al-Albani Center for Methodology and
Research, 6/28/2016 (name not recorded upon request); Ibrahim al-Sukkari, Muslim Brotherhood leader, Amman,
7/15/2015.

160

avowedly claim to the return at the origins as Islam was in reality configuring a prone imitation
(‘taqlid’) and reliance of the Hanbali madhhab.20
Upon his return to Syria, he was put again under government surveillance. He was in fact
arrested twice, in 1967 after the Six Day War and then again in 1969, when he was detained for 8
months. He was accused to be the head of a subversive group, although this was never proved. It
is more likely that, during the 1970s, with the decline of Pan-Arabism and the rise of Islamism,
the Ba’thist regime in Syria would look upon Islamists of any kind with much concern,21
especially if popular like Al-Albani. Put under house arrest in the late 1970s, he then resolved to
leave the country for good. After a short stint in war-ravaged Lebanon, he settled in Jordan in
1981, where he will spend the rest of his days until 1999.
Al-Albani enjoyed somewhat better circumstances under the Hashemites as opposed to
the Ba’th, since the Jordanian regime was more lenient in letting him articulate his religious
message, albeit within certain limits:22 he had to give lessons in private locations, as he was
forbidden to preach publicly or offer Friday sermons. These prohibitions notwithstanding, “his
followers and students progressively and continuously grew in number. By the 1990s, his
followers had grown to such a point that they actually competed in size, number and influence
with the largest Islamist movement in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood.”23 Once again, in light of
this fact, the ‘apolitical stance’ of Al-Albani and his adepts needs to be investigated and
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For a discussion on this point, see Chapter 4, section “The history behind the concept: Salafism as an emerging
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explained rather than taken at face value. In Jordan, Al-Albani will finally elaborate his approach
to Islam, becoming the most influential representative of the Quietist Salafi current.24
At-Tafsiyah wa at-Tarbiyah: Purification and Education as the Cornerstones of a
Political Regeneration
“My entire purpose in this life, following obedience to God’s commands and laws, is
familiarizing Muslims through lessons, lectures and books about the correct [understanding of]
the life of the Prophet, from all perspectives and to the best of my abilities.”25 As these lines
make clear, Al-Albani considered himself first and foremost a scholar and a preacher.
Nevertheless, a program with evident political implications emerges from his writings and
lecturing. As Al-Albani pondered over his goals, the ways to achieve them, and his role in
society, he outlined an “ideological vision”26 which became more consistent and articulated
during the latter part of his life in Jordan.
This vision is consistent with the definition of ideology I proposed in Chapter 3.27 AlAlbani conjures up a normative social theory that is relatively stable and coherent; it is opposed
to other ideological constructs (in his case, state secularism and other rival Islamist projects, such
as the Muslim Brotherhood or Jihadi Salafism); and last, this construct delineates criteria for
membership in a proposed polity.28 I refer to this project as ‘At-Tafsiyyah wa at-Tarbiyyah,’
‘Purification and Education,’ by the title of one of Al-Albani’s most well-known and important
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As I have discussed, in the literature other recurring labels for this movement are ‘Traditionalist’ or ‘Scientific’
Salafism. See chapter 4, “Salafism: the geography of a discursive field.”
25
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Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge, 2010, p. xix.
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essays.29 Prominent Salafi scholars who studied under Al-Albani, such as ‘Ali al-Halabi,
consider at-Tafsiyyah wa at-Tarbiyyah the core of his message and use the same expression to
refer to it.30
Where does this project stem from? Al-Albani’s subscribed early in his formative years
to the Ahl al-Hadith perspective,31 a jurisprudential approach that emerged between the second
and third century of the Islamic era. This perspective would undergo a revival in the Indian
subcontinent starting from the mid-XIX century, precisely the neo-Ahl al-Hadith movement that
offered Al-Albani a post in Benares.32 For Al-Albani, the (neo-) Ahl al-Hadith correctly
recognized the importance of the ahadith, which provide “answers to problems with no solutions
in the Qur'an without calling on human reason.”33 Hence, beyond the indisputable word of the
Qur’an, the Ahl al-Hadith approach sets the ahadith and their study (‘’ilm al-hadith’) as the
cornerstone of religious disciplines. As Lacroix argues, this move makes fiqh a mere appendix to
the study of the ahadith (‘fiqh al-hadith’): the sheltering of ‘ilm al-hadith from human reason
must be total, so that “the critique of the matn (content) must be strictly formal, i.e. linguistic or
grammatical. Only the sanad (chain of transmission of hadith) may be truly called into question,
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Al-Albani, Muhammad Nasir ad-Din. At-tafsiyyah wa at-tarbiyyah wa hajjah al-muslimin ilahima [Purification
and Education and the need of those for the Muslims] Al-Maktabah al-Islamiyyah, Amman, 2000.
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and it is therefore by studying the sanad that the authenticity of a hadith can be determined.”34 It
is precisely by engaging in this careful philological reconstruction of the sanad that Al-Albani
gained his fame. He relegated reason and human interpretation to a subsidiary role, at best, in the
quest for reaching an unadulterated understanding of Islam.35
At this juncture we may locate the uncompromising rejection of any innovation - bid’a –
characterizing Salafism, since it would make the recovery of such pristine Islam impossible. Bar
the removal of any unlawful and harming bid’a, true, proper Islam is not within reach: “since we
all know that our religion [din] has been wounded by many attempts to change its truths
[muhawalat kathirah li-taghrir haqa’iq], and some of those attempts managed to attain such
change and falsification [at-taghrir wa at-tahrif], known to many people, but other are not aware
of it, while they think to be still within the religion.”36 As this passage shows, Al-Albani did not
see these changes and falsifications as a mere scholarly issue: Muslims were not aware of
practicing a deviant cult. Insofar as Islam is a comprehensive way of life, it followed that
socially, morally and spiritually the very survival of the ummah is at stake: “[w]e need to
investigate the reasons which led the Muslims to this state of terrible disgrace [al-halah almuzriyah al-siy’iah], and a situation of humiliating disgrace [al-wad’a al-mahin al-muzriy], and
the secret lies in their arrival in this decadent humiliation as we have to investigate the treatments
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and the medicaments [al-’alaj wa al-duwa’], so that we may survive [li-natamakkan min alnajah] from this misery and decadence.”37
‘Purification and Education’ was thus the remedy Al-Albani proposed to cure the ills of
the Islamic community. In his view, it is an all-encompassing instrument, capable of subsuming
the entirety of Islam: creed (‘aqida), jurisprudence (fiqh), exegesis (tafsir), historiography
(tarikh) and norms of behaviour (or ‘enjoy the good and forbid the evil,’ al-ʿamr bi-l-maʿruf wan-nahy ʿan al- munkar).38 Purification would entail the purging of beliefs and practices that are
not explicitly indicated in the Qur’an and in the Sunnah: “we want to advise [nasahu] all
Muslims, especially those dealing with fiqh, for them to understand what lies in the deviation
[‘ala fahm ma waq’a fihi al-inhiraf]...and for returning to the rulings [bi-l-rujwu’ al-tahkim] of
the ayah of the Qur'an.”39 The implication ensuing from a rigorous adherence to these
propositions in terms of madhhab is the cutting of the Gordian knot: “if there is a sound hadith,
then that is my madhhab [idha sahh hadith fahuwa madhhabiy].”40 It is in this way that AlAlbani takes both the (neo-) Ahl al-Hadith and Wahhabism to their logical and most radical
conclusion: the rejection of the Islamic tradition as passed on through the centuries, and the
attempt to re-configure in its stead a supposedly unadulterated and ahistorical one. As Lauzière
argues, “Al-Albani set the bar higher than other scholars: not everyone who claimed to be a
Salafi or abided by the main tenets of the Salafi creed was worthy of that name.”41
We may think of ‘Purification and Education’ as articulated along four main points. First,
it is a philosophy which acts upon the epistemological move I described in chapter 4, going back
37
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to the “methodology of the pious ancestors.”42 Second, on this basis it then advances a call
(da’wah) for living in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah as outlined according to such
methodology (the Salafi manhaj). This call is direct and active form of civil engagement
predicated on educating those unaware or unfamiliar with ‘true’ Islam. In this sense, Al-Albani’s
da’wa fits neatly Gramsci’s idea of a ‘war of position,’ an educational and ideological battle
fought for the moral and intellectual regeneration of society.
Third, it is a warning not to associate with - and in case, to purify oneself from - any
modern practice and ideology (the much resented bid’a). The reach of this proposition is indeed
vast, as it disqualifies not only what Salafis hold as western modern ideas (liberalism, capitalism,
socialism, democracy, feminism, and the likes), but also any perilous and destructive
contamination with western modern political institutions such as state bureaucracies and
agencies, parties, syndicates, lobbies, or any such form of political association.43 The aversion to
the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, is articulated precisely on their lack of ‘education’ in
religious matters and their adoption of foreign, modern instrument of political association.44
Here, ‘Purification and Education’ manifests its rejectionist and rival bent towards other
ideology, as suggested above. Relatedly, it seeks to re-configure politics according to AlAlbani’s famous fatwa where he says, “leaving politics is political [min al-siyasa tark alsiyasa]”:45 “[p]olitics, according to Al-Albani, is already embedded in the Islam, and decreed as
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Haadi, 2010, p. 31. I use here the term ‘philosophy’ in the Gramscian sense, a more coherent and reasoned
construction of one’s own worldview connected to her life experience and built out of the ‘common sense.’ See
Chapter 3, section “Gramscian Intellectuals: a Philosophy of Praxis, Subalterns and Hegemony.”
43
Olidort, 2015, p. 16. See also Shaqra, Mohammad Ibrahim. “La Difa‘aan ‘an al Salafiya, bal Difa‘aan ‘Anha”
[Not in Defense of the Salafiya but Rather Defending It], without a publisher, 2002, p. 3.
44
The Muslim Brotherhood not only founded parties which run for elections, but it is also conspicuously present in
professional trade unions and syndicates. See Zahid, Mohammed, and Michael Medley. "Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt & Sudan." Review of African political economy 33.110 (2006): 693-708.
45
Lacroix, 2013, p. 69.

166

such by Islamic Sharia.”46 Again, the alleged ‘apolitical’ stance of Quietist Salafis is such only
insofar as we consider the political as the realm of modern (mostly formal and official) political
institutions. The moment we adumbrate a larger field of politics, then also this branch of
Salafism is indisputably involved in the game for altering existing power relations. Taking
‘Purification and Education’ as a philosophy in the Gramscian sense47 entails pondering over the
unity of thought and action, where life is inescapably imbued in politics.
This point is epitomized by ‘Purification and Education’ fourth and last point: ultimately,
it is “[s]triving to revive an Islamic way of life, establishing an Islamic society implementing the
law of Allah on earth.”48 It is a political project where,
“there is only ‘one path’ to bringing about a revival and renaissance in the Muslim world, in its
modern reality; and, only ‘one path’ to the resumption of the Islamic way of life; and, only ‘one
path’ to achieving the ultimate aim of establishing the Islamic state (the Caliphate). Therefore, the
manhaj of ‘purification and education’ soon became the cornerstone for the ideological construct
and framework upon which Jordanian Conservative Salafism was founded.”49

Hence, the Islamic state is not something that will emerge out of the voluntarist and direct
effort toward that goal: there is no ‘war of movement’ in this project. Instead, it will be a
necessary and inevitable outcome of the purification and education the ummah shall go through.
As Al-Albani himself stated in endearing terms, “[b]uild an Islamic state in your hearts, and it
shall be built for you on your land.”50 Indeed, “[r]ather than a submissive call to political
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restraint, ‘purification and education’ was in fact intended as the foundation for building an
Islamic state and society.”51
The Need for an Architect: the Role of Al-Albani as Organic Intellectual
“If you want to build a house, you need an architect:”52 this quote epitomizes the most
common attitude I gathered during various conversations with Muslims attending seminars run
by Salafi sheikhs or around Friday prayers. They all made explicit reference at the knowledge,
expertise and wisdom these Islamic scholars embodied for them. Seminar attendees would refer
to Islamic tenets themselves, and had no qualms in articulating their views on the correct
approach to Islam and its practice. However, they tended often times to defer to the sheikh’s
knowledge when I prodded them to clarify or elaborate on their stance. I perceived what seemed
to be genuine respect, deference and admiration towards the preacher. A prominent sheikh at the
Al-Albani Center confirmed these views: “The majority people have an understanding [of Islam]
that is popular and general [sha’abiyy wa ‘amm]. Salafis’ understanding is scientific ['ilmiyy].
Unfortunately, sermons in popular religion are not scientific but emotional and passionate.
Salafism is more systematic, organized, and grounds everything in sources of Islam: this is what
appeals to people, they see proofs [dalil].”53
Direct engagement in politics does not seem to feature as a motive for adhering to
Traditional or Quietist Salafism. Rather, the certainty provided by an avowedly non-partisan
(i.e., non-politically affiliated with groups or parties) approach steeped into a rigorous study of
Islam confers the devotee a sense of safety and certainty (“Salafism is a trustworthy [amin]
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ideology.”)54 The three mechanisms I proposed55 configure the specific role Salafi scholars’
intellectual effort plays in this dynamic eventually leading to the emergence of a social
movement.
Diffusion
“No, Sheikh Al-Albani did not found Salafism in Jordan. Salafism was here, already.”56
The sheikh at the Islamic research center named after Al-Albani himself left me quite
dumbfounded: in fact, according to any other source I consulted, as well as during interviews
with local experts,57 Al-Albani is regarded as the founder of Salafism in Jordan. My interviewee
conceded however that, “Sheikh Al-Albani deepened and spread”58 Salafism in the country:
possibly an attempt to square the circle by downplaying the ‘alien’ nature of Salafism in the
Jordanian context and acknowledging at one time the reputation of Al-Albani as the father of this
Islamic current in the country.
In fact, before he settled in Amman in 1980, the country had had only limited, if at all,
exposure to Salafi precepts and tenets: there was no Salafi trend, let alone movement, worthy of
the name. It is precisely in this situation that we notice Al-Albani’s pivotal role, as an
intellectual, in introducing and spreading in Jordan new sets of ideas, concepts and
interpretations - what I have referred to as Salafi manhaj. The mechanism diffusion59 captures
and describes how Al-Albani’s scholarly effort and production contributed to the birth of
Salafism in Jordan.
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Al-Albani represented in fact the main conduit for the introduction of Salafi precepts in
an era when other means to get exposure to Salafism were much more limited than today’s: no
internet or social media, mass communication under tight government control (and no pan-Arab
channels of the likes of Al-’Arabiyyah or Al-Jazeerah yet on the horizon), limited, if any,
distribution of Salafi texts.
As an intellectual, Al-Albani operated within a network of peers, religious scholars and
preachers, to whom he had access precisely by virtue of belonging to such ‘critical
community.’60 As a hub in a network he could then introduce the Jordanian public to Salafism.
His formation prior to coming to Jordan featured interactions and contacts with different milieus,
scholarly circles, and religious leaders. In Damascus, he was first exposed to Rida’s Al-Manar
and the anti-French and anti-colonial climate of mandate Syria; he engaged in his early studies
the Hanafi madhhab, debating and confronting the damascene ‘ulama, eventually parting ways
with them as we have seen. In his correspondence with the Islamic University at Benares, he
gained a more subtle and sophisticated appreciation of the neo-Ahl al-Hadith movement, whose
rigorous, if rigid, revivalist spirit was to have such a profound impact on his understanding of
fiqh and development of a proper Salafi manhaj. In Medina, under the sponsorship of Sheikh Bin
Baz and acquainted with the upper echelons of Wahhabi scholars, he further refined his manhaj
by taking in the contributions - as well as what he perceived as the misgivings - of Wahhabism
and its relation to Hanbalism.
These experiences enabled Al-Albani and his scholarship to represent a major venue for
the transmission - however filtered by its own sensibilities and proclivities - of ideas and
concepts formulated in locales (intellectually and geographically) other than Jordan, whose
cultural and religious scene had yet to be exposed to or contaminated by Salafism. The
60
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possibility of deploying within the Jordanian context the cognitive lenses of a specific Islamic
manhaj thus represents an important legacy of Al-Albani’s work, which made available such
ideas within a discursive field that, while Islamic, was not acquainted with Salafism unique
traits.
Elaboration
As I suggested in Chapter 3, diffusion helps us assessing to whom the intellectual is in
debt when it comes to his scholarship and intellectual production. For Al-Albani, the neo-Ahl alHadith approach and Saudi Wahhabism represent his main references. Elaboration tells us the
extent of the debt. Elaboration is the creative effort representing the intellectual’s own
contribution to an existing or emerging discursive field.
In this sense, Al-Albani did not create or invent Salafism: as I have shown, its gestation
cannot be attributed to any one individual, being instead the product of an idiosyncratic and
complex intellectual history.61 Yet, Al-Albani decisively participated in such history. He built
upon some of the elements he saw inscribed within the emerging ‘scientific’ - ‘ilmiyy discursive space of Salafism. He then further developed such discourse by both specifying its
methodology (rejecting any exercise of unwarranted tafsir and taqlid) and then extending its
reach (venturing outside the domain of jurisprudence).62
Al-Albani’s contribution occurred first on the basis of his acquaintance with the neo-Ahl
al-Hadith school. I have mentioned how the reliance on the ahadith to cover any matter not
directly and explicitly dealt with by the Qur’an intended to bypass the interference of human
reason, sentiments, preferences: “the ahl-hadith-based Qur’anic exegesis/manhaj (tafsir) is
characterized by an unflinching epistemological addiction to hadith-based and hadith constrained
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bodies of knowledge and is known as tafsir bi-l-ma’thur or the traditionalist, hadith-based
exegesis.”63 Duderija contends this approach has profound implications in terms of
understanding of the Sunnah: “[t]he concept of Sunna according to the NTS school of thought is
that defined by the muhaddithun (i.e. people who were involved in compilation, recording,
transmission and criticism of hadith, and some of the jurists, the fuqaha) as those statements
(qawl), actions (fi’l) and tacit approvals (taqrir) found in the authentic hadith collections.”64
Given these developments, Al-Albani’s focus and expertise on the ahadith made his
reflections and pronouncements a reconfiguration of the Sunnah itself. Al-Albani’s careful study
of the sanad resulted in ahadith-based Sunnah,65 probably his most enduring scholarly legacy.
The Salafi method - manhaj - whereby he compiled his ahadith collections may very well be
rigid; yet perhaps precisely because of this it was perceived at the same time as firm, stable and
reliable (“amin” as I was often told in various conversations with Salafis), accounting to a degree
for the fame Al-Albani’s work would acquire even beyond Salafi circles.
His distinctive manhaj and the collections of the ahadith he so compiled are the basis
upon which he established and then elaborated his social-religious project I discussed. While it
signals the debts contracted by Al-Albani in his intellectual journey,66 this work remains firmly
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his own distinct and direct contribution to the Salafist discursive field. Salafism is clearly a purist
and puritanical discourse, bent essentially to spur a revival of Islam via the rediscovery and true
adoption, on the part of the Muslim community, of the unsurpassed example of the pious
ancestor. Yet, there is no comparable previous effort to instruct actual and potential followers of
the Salafi manhaj which displays the relative coherence, cogency, and rival attitude of AlAlbani’s manifesto:
“Thus, after cleansing [tafsiyah] the religion of these issues and after clarifying [idah] what it is
that need be initiated and what it is that must be sustained, we must educate and cultivate a new
generation [la budda min al-tarbiyah al-nash’ al-jadid] based on this proper and sound
knowledge [al-’ilm al-sahih]. This education and cultivation is what shall reap, for us, an
uncontaminated Islamic society [al-mujtama’ al-islamiy al-safiy]; and, consequently, establish, for
us, the state of Islam [wa bi-at-taliy taqimu lana dawlah al-Islam]. Without these two conditions
[muqaddimat, also ‘introductions’ or ‘premises’], ‘sound knowledge’ and ‘proper education’
based on this sound knowledge, it is my belief that it will be impossible for the Islamic project to
succeed [yastahil an yaqumu qa’imah al-Islam], or for Islamic rule [hukm] or the Islamic state to
come about.”67

Wahhabi scholars remained anchored to the Hanbali madhhab and the attendant
subservience to the Saudi authority, already therefore considered a proper Islamic state.68 The
neo-Ahl al-Hadith did not build upon the methodological stance they shared with Al-Albani
something akin - in its social and political reach - to the idea of ‘Purification and Education.’

Islamic rebirth for the country. Mao-Tse Tung and the Chinese Communist Party framed the ‘Long March’ in
similar terms (albeit, of course, with different references). See also Della Porta, Donatella. Social movements,
political violence, and the state: A comparative analysis of Italy and Germany. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
67
Al-Albani, 2000, p. 30.
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See chapter 4, section “The history behind the concept: Salafism as an emerging category.”
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In this effort to conjure up guidelines for the revival of the proper Muslim, it is inevitable
to transcend the confines of the personal and individual and venture into the social - given, as
shown above, the abysmal conditions of the state of the ummah: “there is no way for salvation
for the Muslims from the colonization, humiliation and ignominy that has afflicted them, there is
no benefit in the Islamic groups and political sects – except by clinging to the authentic Sunnah
upon the methodology of the Pious Predecessors, may Allaah [sic] be pleased with them all.”69
Again, despite the avowedly ‘apolitical’ posturing, Al-Albani produces a call to social action that
already contains in nuce the elements and traits for direct political engagement - as we are going
to see shortly and in the next chapter. All things considered, ‘Purification and Education’ is AlAlbani’s most enduring and original contribution, enabling the transition from theological and
jurisprudential dispositions into social and (possibly) political ones.
Systematization
The intellectuals’ ideological production comes to bear over the scattered and fragmented
common sense of the subaltern: systematization rearranges such inchoate discursive formation
and endows it with more coherence.70 The subalterns engage in a cognitive re-assessment of
(social) reality in light of the insights and orientation the ideology provides. This is not
tantamount to claiming ideology shapes totally and inescapably the subaltern’s cognition. Rather,
systematization works with and rearranges some of the elements embedded in the subaltern’s
common sense.
Put otherwise, systematization accounts for how Al-Albani’s intellectual effort has not
remained confined in the pages of his writings. Such effort could articulate in a meaningful and
compelling way some of the scattered and unrelated elements making up a specific subaltern
69
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discursive formation. With ‘Purification and Education,’ Al-Albani’s work ultimately provided a
narrative for potential and actual followers: within this narrative, they could find cues, reasons
and explanations to make sense of their own experience and perception of social and political
reality.
The ‘organicity’ of Al-Albani’s production - as an intellectual capable to relate to a
certain social and cultural milieu - is manifest as ‘Purification and Education’ depicts a world
where Islam itself is in peril. This danger does not spell ominous only at the individual and
spiritual level, but also at the communal and social one. The corruption of Islam is due to the
forsaking of tawhid, the introduction of bid’a, the adoption of references different from and rival
to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Al-Albani does not contemplate any explicit reference to specific
political and historical events, or to concrete social and economic conditions; however, the
heyday of his popularity in Jordan came not surprisingly during the 1990s, the last part of his life
coinciding with the tumultuous events that shook the country.71 Al-Albani’s pessimistic views
over the fortunes of the Muslim world were already established (as Lacroix shows reporting on a
lecture Al-Albani gave in Saudi Arabia in 1977);72 yet in Jordan they could then feed into the
despair and discomfort so widespread in sections of society more directly hit by the harsh
economic realities of the late 1980s,73 the consequences of the aftermath of the Kuwaiti war, and
the peace with Israel. While especially the latter two episodes are more immediately connected
to the emergence of Jihadi Salafism, it is the case the Al-Albani laid the foundations for Salafism
in Jordan, regardless of the specific branch.
71

See Chapter 4, section “Realignment: political and economic shifts at the end of the century.”
Al-Albani lecture reported in Lacroix, 2013, p. 69: “By tafsiyah I mean the purification of Islam of everything that
is foreign to it and corrupts it. To that end the Sunnah must be purged from all the forged (mawdu') and weak (da'if)
hadith that it contains, so that the Qur'an may be interpreted in light of this authenticated Sunna and the notions and
concepts passed down from our pious ancestors. Tarbiyah consists in instilling into our youth this authentic Islamic
creed ('aqida) drawn from the Qur'an and the Sunna.”
73
See fn. 71.
72

175

In his ideological production, Al-Albani rearranges a discursive field - a formation of
popular common sense - whereby the intended audience makes sense of such events and
dynamics. The specific coordinates of ‘Purification and Education,’ insisting on spiritual
renovation, acceptance and deepening of (Salafi) Islam, separation from alien and corrupting
practices, sounded appealing to three main constituents, showing the social reach of Salafi
discourse.74
First, most disenfranchised sectors of Jordanian society - urban poor in Amman and
Zarqa, or in impoverished southern cities such as Ma’an and Tafilah - could find in Al-Albani’s
Salafism a venue to connect their religious devotion with a more satisfactory and fulfilling
explanation of their predicaments.75 Al-Albani’s work rearranges here what we may refer to as
popular or folk Islam. How far is this form of Islam from Al-Albani’s Salafism? Far enough for
most people not to embrace it and for some devout Muslims to openly disparage it;76 yet close
enough for most to understand its spirit, and for some to actually adhere to it. Put differently,
Salafism and popular forms of Islam widespread in Jordan are hardly equivalent.77 Salafism
entails embracing practices,78 attitudes and beliefs79 quite peculiar - when not outright
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unacceptable80 - to the average Jordanian. Yet again, the reference to the pious ancestor, the idea
of a pure and uncontaminated Islam, the reliance on the canonical holy texts, a general aversion
to perceived ‘western’ corrupting practices (alcohol consumption, mingling of sexes, subversion
of traditional social roles),81 the general aversion for Shi’ism and, last but not least, the proximity
with Wahhabi Saudi Arabia make the transition possible, if certainly not automatic.
Second, it is not only the poor and the disenfranchised who adhere to Salafism. Quite
importantly, the firm and secure structure Salafism provides may be very appealing to educated,
pious believers, who subscribe to its ‘scientific’ - ‘ilmiy - pretension. Some adepts chose to
follow this path precisely in light of its purported further sophistication in understanding Islam:
Abu Rumman explains, speaking of a Salafi, that “his social background helps to explain his
proclivity for Salafism: he was raised in a family that appreciates knowledge, literature, and
culture, and they apply this knowledge in their daily lives.”82 This proclivity may account also
for adepts hailing from those less cultured milieus mentioned above. Salafism alleged firmer grip
on religious tenets may entice precisely because it offers the possibility of bridging a perceived
educational gap: “[a]lthough the Tafila Salafis tend to have only a modest education (high school
diplomas, with one or two exceptions) they are interested in furthering their religious
education.”83
An excerpt from a conversation with two Salafis may illustrate these last two points:
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“Was it difficult to embrace Salafism? Did it require major changes to your view of Islam?”
“Salafism supports the unity of god [yushajji’u at-tawhid] and the five prayers and the holy
Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet, PBUH. I believed all that before adhering to Salafism:
now my basis is more solid, and my faith stronger [imaniyy ‘aquwa]”
“A lot of people here are good Muslims, but they don’t understand how our Salafi path is the
sound one [tariqatuna al-salafiyah hiya al-sahiyah]. I tell them: why don’t you come and listen to
our imam [the Salafi preacher who had just given the sermon] and understand the message of our
call [risalah da’watina]?”84

Third and last, Al-Albani’s Quietist Salafism attracted also individuals with previous
direct and active political engagement. In particular, Palestinians-Jordanians, at one point
involved in the (mostly secular) politics of anti-occupation and liberation movements, turned to
Quietist Salafism.85 It offered a way out of the seemingly hopeless politics of conventional forms
of activism. The rejection of political parties (either secular or Islamist), the insistence on the
futility of activism especially when divorced of religious inner renovation or oblivious of sound
doctrinal background, a message of purpose and meaning to be found in a space thus
conveniently separated from conventional politics:86 Salafism could confront and re-direct a
multifaceted sense of resentment and disillusion into the inner world of religion.87
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Al-Albani’s vision could insert these disparate sets of grievances originating in different
milieus and out of diverse experiences according to a singular logic88 that was poised to enhance
coherence. In this sense, systematization shall not engender further alienation from the
intellectual ‘high culture’89 on the part of the masses. The opposite is true. The organic
intellectual offers more coherent ways to understand current predicaments by intervening in and
relying on the masses’ common sense inventory.
Quietist Salafism and the Social Appropriation of Tradition
The three mechanisms of diffusion, elaboration and systematization compound into the
process of social appropriation of tradition. As discussed in Chapter 3,90 this process intends to
capture both the traits Salafism shares as a social movement with similar phenomena as well as
its defining and specific traits. In the case of Quietist Salafism of the Al-Albani variant, this
process seeks to redefine group identity along the coordinates provided by the template of the
‘pious ancestors.’ The rediscovery via tarbiyah-education of such exemplary religious tradition
and the attendant socialization occur via study groups, seminars, lectures, Qur’an recitation
gatherings, and Friday prayers.91 In this way, what may often start as a quest for personal
renovation ultimately results in an episode of social mobilization, where doctrinal orthodoxy and
behavioral orthopraxis are deeply intertwined, enhancing community building, boundaries
setting and, crucially, collective claim making. In the words of Al-Albani,
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“There is a great conflict taking place between all the Islamic movements that exist in this field
today – this field of reform – all of whom are involved in the efforts being made to resurrect the
Islamic way of life, and to bring about a return to an Islamic life, and to reestablish an Islamic
state. It is with great regret that I say that these different groups are in a very sharp disagreement
over the starting point of reform. We disagree with all the other Islamic groups on this point. We
see that one must simultaneously commence with purification and education. But to begin with
political matters…! Those who busy themselves with politics will find their faith and creed in
desolate ruin.”92

This refusal of dealing with conventional politics results in Salafis engaging in a form of
social mobilization espousing particular features: it seems to stand in between ‘classic’ social
movement formations93 and what Asef Bayat called “social non-movements.”94 Quietist Salafism
appears lacking structure, central organization, defined and specific guidelines for political
action, and clear leadership roles. Yet the social and political import of Salafis mobilization is
evident if we consider their form of engagement a Gramscian war of position carried out within
civil society: in its trenches95 they endeavor to spread via da’wah their core values, principled
beliefs and authoritative meanings, seeking a renovation of Muslims first as individuals and then
as a community.
The contours of this kind of mobilization are rather distinctive of Quietist Salafism and
allow the movement to purport an accommodationist stance vis à vis the state: as I have
92

Al-Albani, Mohammad Nasir ad-Din. “Al-Tariq al-Rashid Nahwou al-Kayan al-Islami [The Guided Path towards
Building the Islamic Entity], Al-Maktaba al-Islamiyya, 1999, pp. 378-379.
93
See chapter 2, section “Evolution of the Field: a Bird’s Eye View.”
94
See Bayat, Asef. Life as politics: How ordinary people change the Middle East. Stanford University Press, 2013.
These actors embody the “shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people” and engage in social activism to
bring about social and political change through their “fragmented but similar activities,” p. 15. They are
characterized as “non-movements,” moreover, because they lack formal leadership and organizational structures.
95
Expression used by Gramsci, who speaks of ‘trenches and embankments’ making up the fabric of civil society.
For an exhaustive commentary about the relation between civil society and political power, see Thomas, Peter. The
Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism. Brill, 2009.

180

contended throughout, this non-militant, non-confrontationist stance in relation to state
institutions shall not obscure the ultimate political nature of the movement. In fact, their strategy
cannot - and their foundational texts certainly do not - disguise a bid for the ultimate
reconstitution of the caliphate (evidently incompatible with the current Jordanian regime, as we
will see below).
It has proven difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy how many people regard
themselves as Salafis in Jordan. During my research, I was given figures ranging from as few as
5,000 to as many as 100,000 adherents (over a population, refugees excluded, that amounts
perhaps to some 6.5 millions).96 Again, especially when talking about Quietist Salafis, there are
two issues: first, there is no roster of people belonging or affiliated with this current, in
conformity with the rejection of all organizations that may configure as ‘modern’ (i.e., bid’a)
institutions. Second and consequently, the definition itself of who is a Salafi is not
straightforward, being in many cases a matter of degrees and self-ascription. An educated guess
may suggest some 30,000 recognized Salafis of all stripes, the overwhelming majority Quietist.
However, more significant than sheer numbers, is the following assessment from Abu Rumman
and Abu Hanieh, probably the two outmost experts on the topic:
“[t]he general social mood in the country [...], today, is more conservative, religious and closer to
Salafism, which has spread and proliferated for both domestic and external reasons – the most
important of these being the proximity of Saudi Arabia and the success experience in the spread
of the Salafist da‘wa, which enjoys much support and access to various channels and tools.
Today, this form of religious jurisprudence and this religious vision have come to dominate
Jordan’s mass, popular social culture."97
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The seemingly deep religious character of Jordanian society meets indeed the eye of even
the less attentive onlooker. As observed in the previous chapters, Jordan underwent, like many
other countries in the region and beyond, a marked religious revival from the 1980s.98 Salafism
represents one manifestation of this trend, building and proliferating upon such general and
widespread sense of piety within the country.99 It is worth remembering how the religious
discourse of the masses, steeped in common sense, is at one time ostensibly apolitical and
latently political.100 The process of social appropriation accounts for how such potential is
unlocked: it makes religious discourse into a more coherent ideological project, which advances
alternative dispensations about how power relations are (to be) arranged.
The role of Salafi preachers such as Al-Albani and those who took over his mantle (‘Ali
al-Halabi and Salim al-Hilali most importantly)101 is of particular relevance in the case of
Quietist Salafism. Precisely because of its lack of a proper, official hierarchical structure and
corresponding structured organization, the reputation and recognized authority of the scholars is
paramount to give shape and consistency to an otherwise all too amorphous movement. Meijer
may overstate the point a bit when he says, “only the Salafī movement is a movement of the
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ʿulamāʾ. Only they have the correct knowledge (ʿilm) of the texts.”102 Yet, as the recognized
repositories of Islamic knowledge, the scholars provide that fundamental service through their
ideological effort to make the movement a “cognitive territory,” as suggested by Eyerman and
Jamison, the only way in which a social movement truly defines itself within society.103 As
finally argue Abu Rumman and Abu Hanieh,
“[i]ndeed, their lessons and studies in the Islamic faith and creed, jurisprudence, and Hadith
actually “ideologize” knowledge – or, transform learning into “ideological knowledge” where the
focus is concentrated on what distinguishes the Salafist creed and jurisprudence from other
Islamic groups, sects and movements. And, this “ideological knowledge” cultivates a dialectic
tendency and confrontational logic in the current’s individuals.”104

That the state should be the primary target of Quietist Salafism is not immediately
apparent; yet, it remains the ultimate horizon of their thinking precisely when performing the
subtle and strategic ‘retreat from politics’ - a position that the Jordanian regime considers with
much circumspection behind the official posturing.
Quietist Salafis and the State: Ambiguity and Latent Confrontation
The war of position waged by Quietist Salafis may in fact be a peaceful war for the hearts
and minds of Muslims, but a war nonetheless. As it finally aims at radically reconfiguring the
political structure of the country, it is apparent to all - and to the Jordanian regime first and
foremost - that this strategy configures ultimately a counter-hegemonic project.
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As illustrated by Wiktorowicz,105 the regime in Jordan utilizes a number of technologies
to stymie oppositional voices emerging from the religious discursive space. These technologies
manifest in various fashions (the presence of only state-controlled mosques, the control of Friday
sermons scripts, the suspension, removal or even imprisonment of non-compliant imams and
preachers, the establishment of regime-sponsored Islamic organizations and ad hoc religious
ministries):106 the control over the religious field is a prime concern for the regime as it deploys a
specific articulation of Islamic discourse to legitimize its rule. A number of Middle Eastern and
Muslim majority states do the same,107 yet the Hashemites are particularly vested in grounding
their legitimacy in Islamic references:108 former guardians of Mecca and Medina, they claim
direct descent from Prophet Muhammad, they are recognized as the protectors of the Al-Aqsa
Mosque and the Dome of the Rock compound in Jerusalem. The application of shari’ah, while
limited to matters of personal status, is much referred to in public discourse and speeches.
The Hashemite regime tries in this way to monopolize the religious discourse. It fosters a
de-politicized, conservative, ritualistic and non-confrontational Islam: “Jordan spends hundreds
of million on religious courts and religious education. The state is going literally beyond its
prerogatives so to affirm its legitimacy.”109 Indeed, this move is part of that multifaceted
discursive repertoire the regime has deployed: a peculiar case of “authoritarian pluralism,” as
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Moaddel argued,110 capable of articulating democratic features with illiberal practices,
conservative social mores and strong ties to the West.111
In this context, Quietist Salafis insert their alternative Islamic discourse in the interstices
of the regime discourse. The red lines - what can be said and what cannot - are not clearly drawn,
with the exception of the institution of the monarchy and the monarch himself known to be
beyond reproach. By negotiating while never assaulting such boundaries, Quietist Salafis can
claim to stand for an alternative, yet non-confrontational, version of Islam in relation to the state
official discourse. In the end, the following holds true: Al-Albani’s vision of spiritual change and
reforms, “would eventually lead to the required end of establishing an Islamic state [...]; this
inevitable evolution, towards this “ultimate end”, did not require a confrontation with the
prevailing authorities in the meantime. It also did not require any questioning of the legitimacy
of the current authorities – as the ultimate aim would take place, with time, despite the current
state of affairs.”112
State officials have chosen to second this position, publicly recognizing the compatibility
of Salafism, at least in its non-militant branch,113 with the institutions and religious discourse of
the kingdom. Various political activists - representing religious and secular groups - described
this move on the part of the regime as a blatant example of divide and rule: while allowing the
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http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=MNJ05&articleID=MNJ050008&articlePages=1
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Quietist to operate, it would simultaneously draining potential support for the Muslim
Brotherhood and permit a Salafi option for those individuals who may be tempted to join the
more militant and violent Jihadi formations.114
Yet, the security perspective ultimately dominates the approach of the state institutions in particular the mukhabarat - in dealing with Salafis of any color.115 This fact belies the
awareness on both sides - state institutions and Quietist Salafis - of the sort of ‘marriage of
convenience’ stipulated in light of temporarily converging and overlapping interests, and despite
the evident incompatibility, in the long run, of the Hashemite rule with the Quietist Salafis’
counter-hegemonic project.
Lost in translation? Ideologues’ Unintended Consequences: Al-Albani and alJama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (JSM)
What I have submitted about the ways in which intellectuals as (religious) ideologues
impact social and political mobilization has avoided any deterministic claim. Trying to assess
how a certain ideology plays out in a socio-historical domain does not mean that the reception –
and thus the consequences – of such ideology will be the same at all times, in all places; nor does
it imply that different understandings of the same ideological construct cannot be possible.
Whoever reads the work of an intellectual has leeway to interpret it. It can draw his or her own
conclusions. Such readings may have not been foreseen by the intellectual or even be at odds
with her avowed intent.
In the case of Al-Albani, a brief discussion on his influence in Saudi Arabia may
illustrate these observations. As Lacroix argues, “[e]ven though Al-Albani taught for only a
114

Conversations with Muslim Brotherhood leader (name not recorded upon request), Sahab neighborhood, Amman,
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relatively short time in Saudi Arabia [...] his ideas had a very strong impact there [...] he
encouraged a vast revival of interest in studying the hadith and its authenticity.”116 The most
immediate manifestation of such impact was the emergence of al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya alMuhtasiba or JSM (“the Salafi Group which Commands Right and Forbids Wrong”).
The JSM represented a peculiar manifestation of Saudi Islamism. It was related with both
the official Wahhabi discourse and the oppositional stance of the Sahwah.117 However, it
espoused unique traits. The JSM took inspiration from Al-Albani’s neo- Ahl al-Hadith approach
and the Salafi manhaj he was developing.118 It was characterized by literalism, social
conservatism, “a strong focus on ritual practices, a declared disdain for politics, and yet an active
rejection of the state and its institutions.”119 While we can clearly read Al-Albani’s footprints
when it comes to literalism, social mores and avoidance of politics, an active rejection of the
latter is not part of his call. Even less in line with Al-Albani’s thinking is the way in which the
JSM will articulate such ‘active rejection:’ it did not configure a militant Islamist stance.120
Instead, it stood for a messianic project. It did not intend to upset existing – mundane – power
relations, nor was it looking for a revolution against the house of Sa’ud. Rather, the JSM sought
to hasten the advent of the Mahdi,121 according to their reading of the scriptures an undertaking
more propitious at the beginning of an Islamic century (based on the hijrah calendar).122
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This messianic vision was behind the most notorious operation carried out by a radical
offshoot of the JSM led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi. On November 20, 1979, together with some
300 followers, Al-‘Utaybi stormed the holy compound in Mecca, taking several hostages. They
were not looking for a revolution against the house of Sa’ud: “[t]heir aim was to have al-Qahtani
[a follower of ‘Utaybi] consecrated as the Mahdi between the black stone corner of the Ka'ba and
Ibrahim's station of prayer (al-maqam) as tradition requires.”123 Saudi authorities, with the
assistance of French and Pakistani special forces, broke the siege after two weeks.124
We may juxtapose the kind of mobilization that Al-Albani’s work influenced in Jordan
and in Saudi Arabia. In the former, his disciples regarded his teachings as fundamentally
devotional and pietistic. Direct action could and should be avoided, or at the very least
postponed. In the Saudi Kingdom, some of his admirers added a messianic element to his
teachings, resulting in a call for immediate – and clamorous – action. This decision clearly
violates Al-Albani’s intended message. We notice a failure to mobilize would-be adherents along
the lines his works suggested. Considering the mechanisms I proposed, we can postulate where
this failure may have occurred. Al-Albani’s ideological stance, while quite defined by the late
1970s, was not yet as sophisticated as it would become during his stay in Jordan; nor such stance
could speak to different environments (Jordan vis à vis Saudi Arabia) and elicit the same
responses on the target audience. In other words, we witness primarily a lack of proper
elaboration of his ideology; and subsequently incapacity to systematize adequately the common
sense of JSM members via such ideology – some of his followers ultimately choosing instead
‘Utaybi’s ‘messianic’ version of Salafism.
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124

188

Conclusion
In this chapter, I outlined how the works and pronouncements of Al-Albani shaped and
informed the Quietist branch of Salafism. Al-Albani remains a pivotal figure to understand how
specific sets of ideas emerged and developed, congealing into an ideational construct which
espouses the traits of an ideology. On the basis of this ideology, Al-Albani successfully
mobilized followers via the process of social appropriation of tradition, making an exclusivist
claim to an uncontaminated and true Islam. In Al-Albani’s view, this appropriation entailed the
re-definition of the Muslim in the modern era, first as an individual and then as a group.
Purifying oneself from soiled and un-Islamic (or improperly Islamic) society and politics could
be achieved by education, understood as rote learning of the Sunnah and the Qur’an. The results
have been noteworthy in terms of both social following, cultural impact, and – last but not least –
political import.
Yet, Al-Albani’s Quietist Salafism cannot steer clear from a number of issues. First, let
us consider internal intellectual consistency: what is ultimately Quietist Salafism’s understanding
of politics? How do they intend to square the circle between an ideological movement that
purports to encompass the totality of the existence and yet with the same determination shuns
away from a proper and explicit engagement with the political? How can it reconcile this
position with a call to the caliphate, furthermore rather amorphous in its contours?
Second, Salafism’s call for exclusive access to Islam fostered much resistance in nonSalafi Muslims (needless to say, constituting the overwhelming majority). If appropriating
tradition was meant to secure a common, shared and firm understanding of Islam, it generated
instead exactly the opposite. As Meijer elaborates, “[f]or although [Quietist Salafism] pretends to
be apolitical or even anti-political and is against internal strife (fitna) within the umma, which

189

supposedly results from politics and machinations, the movement itself uses instruments of
power to obtain hegemony in the transnational Islamic movement and ultimately becomes itself a
political movement, provoking resistance and ultimately fostering internal strife.”125
In this sense we can read Abu Hanieh and Abu Rumman’s contention: “[c]onservative
[i.e. Quietist] Salafism has yet to convince the Jordanian masses with its political discourse.”126
In fact, this observation highlights some of the difficulties Salafism as an ideology encounters in
systematizing and thus successfully relating to wider strata of society. I am not here submitting it
cannot become a mass movement: in many ways it already is. Rather, it points at the changing
nature of any such discursive formation, which at all times emerges within and relates to specific
historic circumstances which call for new, different, and varying assessments – regardless of the
ahistorical posturing of Salafism. In many ways, as we are going to see in the next chapter, the
rise of Jihadi Salafism bears evidence to this claim.
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Chapter 6 – Relentless Confrontation: Jihadi Salafism and Al-Maqdisi’s
‘Loyalty and Disavowal’ Call

Introduction
Jihadi Salafism hails from the same intellectual history of Quietist Salafism. As the
literature on this topic indicates, there is a clear consensus regarding the common origin of the
two branches.1 In fact, both chronologically and intellectually, Jihadi Salafism represents a more
recent development emerging out of a wider Salafi discourse. The often fierce polemic
infuriating between the Quietist and Jihadi currents2 centers around the interpretation of specific
historical circumstances, the choice to be made in light of these considerations, and relatively
more nuanced topics (for example, the issue of excommunication or takfir) enabling or
restraining specific courses of action. But the fundamental tenets of Salafism are not a matter of
debate.3
To further illustrate this contention, I will present the figure and work of Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi (1959- ). His relation with Al-Albani’s intellectual endeavor transcends
the confines of the Hashemite kingdom, where they both spent the most significant parts of their
lives. The episode of the JSM described in the previous chapter4 connects the two scholars,

1

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29.3 (2006): 207-239.
See for example Al-Muharij, Anwar. Munathmat Hibr al-Ummah li-l-Khawarij [Debate of the Ink of the Ummah
towards the Khawarij (‘Out-goers’)], Al-Albani Center for Methodology and Research, Amman, 2015. This small
pamphlet published by the Al-Albani Center accuses Jihadi Salafis (especially ISIS, see fn. 12 below) of being
modern ‘Khawarij,’ a heretical Muslim sect active in the first days of Islam. The Khawarij were known for their
intransigency over doctrinal matters, which led them eventually to consider the rest of the Muslim ummah as infidels
and thus alienating their fellow believers.
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See for a discussion on these tenets Chapter 4, section “Salafism: the geography of a discursive field.”
4
See Chapter 5, section “Lost in Translation?”
2
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insofar as Al-Maqdisi took inspiration from Al-’Utaybi5 as to be considered by some his
intellectual heir;6 and Al-Albani, as we have seen, profoundly influenced the JSM in the first
place. The rise of Al-Maqdisi as a prominent Jihadi ideologue occurred when Al-Albani had long
established himself as the one of the most respected authorities within Salafism. The younger
and up and coming scholar was to encounter Al-Albani’s work and legacy given their far
reaching impact on the foundational coordinates of Salafism.
At the same time, they were to read the highly volatile political and social climate of the
late 1980s and early 1990s7 in vastly different fashions. Al-Albani campaigned for a devotional
and ‘apolitical’ stance. Al-Maqdisi was instead at helm of the first true and significant surge in
Islamist militancy in Jordan:8 intellectually, by further elaborating upon Salafi tenets at large so
to justify violent confrontation with the existing regimes in the Arab world; operationally, by
founding the first Jihadi Salafi group in the country, Bay’at al-Imam.9 Together with him and his
closest acolytes, the entire Jihadi Salafi movement in Jordan mushroomed.
The attention of this chapter on Bay’at al-Imam may seem unwarranted: the group met a
swift demise and operational failures. Why insist on it? Let us consider the cognitive nature of
social movements:10 they are creators of meaning, enterprises to interpret, understand and then
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Wagemakers, Joas. A quietist jihadi: the ideology and influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Cambridge
University Press, 2012, p. 35-7.
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7
See Chapter 4, section “Realignment: political and economic shifts at the end of the century.”
8
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http://www.tawhed.wsr?idtwiam56. See below for more information on the group.
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act. In this sense, one cannot underestimate the impact of Al-Maqdisi’s Bay’at al-Imam in
Jordan: it represented “a milestone in bringing the Jihadi Salafist da‘wa out into the public fore.
The movement had, indeed, developed from small, disjointed groups scattered throughout the
kingdom into a single, unified ideological movement. Even if many times it lacked a common
organizational framework, it had a unified intellectual and spiritual leadership.”11 Moreover,
Bay’at al-Imam is one of most influential incubators for later incarnations of the same cognitive
coordinates. Much more ominous embodiments of Jihadi Salafism, namely Zarqawi’s Tawhid wa
al-Jihad/Al-Qa’idah fi Bilad al-Rafidayin and its successor Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
(ISIL, a.k.a. ISIS, a.k.a. Da’esh in its Arabic acronym), or again Jabhat al-Nusra/Fatah ashSham,12 found their origin in this early Jihadi experiment. Testament to this is the fact that AlMaqdisi’s pivotal role in furthering Islamist armed militancy was then recognized in a US Army
report dating 2006, where he was deemed as the most influential thinker within the Jihadi Salafi
universe.13
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Interestingly, the foremost expert on Al-Maqdisi, Joas Wagemakers, describes him as a
‘quietist jihadi,’14 contesting Wiktorowicz’s famous tripartition of Salafism amongst Quietists,
Politicos and Jihadis.15 Al-Maqdisi indeed never manifested, at a personal level, the extreme
militant and violent propensity that is supposedly the trademark of Jihadi Salafism. Wagemakers
does present a good case for amending Wiktorowicz’s typology, or at least to recognize its grey
areas. Yet, for the purpose of the present study, it is Al-Maqdisi’s work and production that is
primarily under scrutiny in connection with its political impact. And Al-Maqdisi’s ideology
clearly outlines a confrontational and militant stance in relation to incumbent regimes in the Arab
and Muslim world. In this sense, much of the political ambiguity and brinkmanship of Quietist
Salafism is promptly foregone. Al-Maqdisi’s ideology and attendant political project call for a
‘war of movement.’
Life of Al-Maqdisi
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi16 was born ‘Isam Tahir al-Barqawi in 1959 in Nablus, the
Palestinian city at that time under the control of Jordan.17 From a middle class family, his father
decided to leave the West Bank in 1963 and move to Kuwait. The Gulf country was in fact a
major destination for the uprooted Palestinian diaspora.18 Over there, his father would find a
position in the Ministry of Health, granting a relatively well-off upbringing to the young ‘Isam.
In matters of faith, Al-Maqdisi’s family was not particularly religious, but their son would
manifest early on in his teens a conspicuous interest in the study of Islam. His parents wanted
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him however to pursue a scientific career, and at first Al-Maqdisi complied. In the early 1980s,
he headed to Mosul, Iraq, to enroll at the local university and study biology. However, he soon
felt out of place: religion kept drawing more interest; and he resented the overly secular climate
of the Iraqi university, with mixed classes and no gender separation, making apparent his already
socially conservative views on that matter.
Therefore, in 1982, he elected to leave and go to Medina, where he expected to find
opportunities to deepen himself in religious studies. Lacking the means to pay for his tuition
fees, Al-Maqdisi could not enroll at the Islamic University, but he was granted the possibilities to
use its facilities - such as the rich library - by the university administrators.
At this time, Al-Maqdisi did not pay particular attention to the vibrant political scene in
Kuwait, where his family was still living: dominated by the PLO, Palestinian politics in Kuwait
were ostensibly nationalistic and bereft of significant religious flavor. Instead, the Saudi
environment proved to be much more stimulating for his intellectual development. He came into
contact with the writings of Al-’Utaybi, Saiyd Qutb and his brother Muhammad;19 there he met
his first mentor, Muhammad Surur. A Muslim Brother in Syria, he had fled the country after the
bloody confrontation with the Ba’thist regime ending in the Hamah massacre of 1982.20 Surur
himself was to drift away from the Brotherhood and embrace Salafism while in the Saudi
Kingdom, thus exposing his protégé to its principles. It also very likely (although not confirmed)
that Al-Maqdisi met Al-Albani in one of his lectures in Medina, thanks to Al-Albani’s
connection with Bin Baz who would sponsor occasional trips south of the Jordanian border for
his old acquaintance.
19
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Al-Maqdisi was hardly enthralled by the Islamic life under the Saudi regime: his first
major works21 represented a relentless attack on the Islamic credentials and discourse put forth
by the Saudi regime.22 The main coordinates of Al-Maqdisi’s ideology were in fact already
noticeable: the rejection of the ‘Islamic’ character of a regime where legislation is not purely
founded upon shari’ah; thereby the relegation of the rulers outside the abode of Islam by means
of takfir; and the necessity of direct rectification of this state of affairs by means of jihad.23
Shortly after the compilation of these treaties24 he returned briefly to Kuwait, only to
head to Afghanistan, at the time in the midst of the confrontation with the USSR, which had
invaded the country in 1979. Much has been written25 about the Afghan theatre as a pivotal stage
for the radicalization of an entire generation of Islamists and, in particular, the emergence of the
so-called ‘Arab-Afghans.’ In this context, Al-Maqdisi manifested traits that will characterize his
political persona for the years to come: his participation in the actual fighting would be
extremely limited, as he preferred to devote himself to da’wah (‘calling’ or ‘proselytizing’),
preaching and theorizing Jihadi Salafism. While his avoidance of the battleground will come to
haunt his reputation amongst some Islamist circles,26 his intellectual work will instead firmly put
him in the pantheon of Salafi Jihadi theorists, especially after to the publication of the works he
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wrote while in Medina.27 It remains unsure what kind of ties Al-Maqdisi enjoyed with the
emerging leadership and cadres of Al-Qa’idah. Most likely they were not deep, although he
knew personally both Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri.
As the war was drawing near the end, a young and disgruntled Jordanian would arrive in
Peshawar, frustrated by the lack of fighting opportunities with the departure of the last Soviet
troops: Ahmad Fadil al-Nazal al-Khalayl, better known with his nome de guerre of Abu Mus’ab
al-Zarqawi. The encounter between the two men,28 despite or perhaps precisely because their
profoundly different personalities (reflexive, placid and bookish Al-Maqdisi; thuggish, violent
and uneducated Al-Zarqawi), would prove momentous. With the end of the Afghan experience
and the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam’s Iraq began a sort ‘repatriation’ of the Arab-Afghans to
their countries: for Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi this meant Jordan. It was at this juncture that
they would found together Bay’at al-Imam. Once the organization was dismantled, the Jordanian
authorities sentenced the two to fifteen years in prison in 1994. A highly productive period for
Al-Maqdisi, he took advantage of the time behind bars to cement his reputation as a leading
jihadi ideologue, smuggling his writings to the outside world.
With the death of King Hussein, a royal pardon granted amnesty to various inmates,
including members of Bay’at al-Imam. While Al-Maqdisi chose to remain in Jordan, Al-Zarqawi
- whose relation with his intellectual mentor had soured during the years in jail - left and went
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first to Afghanistan and then to Iraqi Kurdistan.29 While they were not to see each other again,
and despite a personal fall-out,30 Zarqawi will never renege on Al-Maqdisi’s teachings, rather
grounding his future actions in the justifications and rationales provided by his erstwhile guide.
On his part, Al-Maqdisi would regularly enter and exit Jordanian prisons on various
charges (despite being exonerated in every case) for his alleged relations with groups such as AlQa’idah and its regional franchises (in particular Zarqawi’s Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad)31 and, more
recently, the Islamic State. Release from prison is usually granted upon Al-Maqdisi’s acceptance
to speak against those groups and restrain from pronouncements about politics in every other
domain; incarceration occurs when the government deems such stipulations violated. Now
approaching his sixties, Al-Maqdisi has become a widely recognized public figure in Jordan
beyond Islamist circles, security apparatchik and academic researchers.
Al-Wala’a wa al-Bara’: Loyalty and Disavowal Setting the Boundaries of the Islamic
Polity
“We believe that it is obligatory to rebel against the leaders of unbelief [imāms al-kufr]
from the disbelieving rulers that are emplaced over the necks of the Muslims. We believe that
they have apostated from the religion [dīn] due to their replacement of the shari’ah and
legislation of Allāh, and seeking judgment in the tyrants [tawaghīt]32 of the East and the West
and allying with the enemies of Allāh and having enmity towards His religion and His allies.”33
Al-Maqdisi’s message is one of rebellion against the incumbent rulers (the tyrants
[tawaghīt]) and their regimes. The label ‘jihadi’ attributed to his branch of Salafism refers to the
29

Brisard, Jean-Charles, and Damien Martinez. Zarqawi: the new face of Al-Quaeda. Polity, 2005.
See Al-Maqdisi, 2004.
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See Abu Rumman and Abu Hanieh, 2013, p. 343.
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Also ‘idols,’ (sg. taghut) or anything worshipped other than god; see ibid, 383.
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Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad. Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna [This is Our Creed], available at www.tawhed.ws/t, 1997, p.
66.
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way in which rebellion and change shall come about: an active and direct engagement with
politics by means of jihad,34 which for Al-Maqdisi may configure as both violent operations and
preaching activities - da’wah.35 While relying on the same Salafi principles,36 he would develop
a confrontational and revolutionary doctrinal practice37 at odds with Al-Albani’s regarding the
preferred ways to relate to the political domain and means to establish an Islamic state.
In this sense, his most lasting ideological contribution is the principle of “al-wala’ wa albara’” or ‘loyalty and disavowal.’38 Indeed, while Al-Maqdisi’s production is vast and still
growing at the time of writing,39 it has maintained however remarkable consistency around this
concept. At the most fundamental level, ‘loyalty and disavowal’ indicates to whom the pious
(true) Muslim should give his allegiance and from whom he should disassociate: loyalty - alwala’ - to god only; and disavowal - al-bara’ - from beliefs and practices which would lead
astray from the proper worship of god. Al-Maqdisi defines it as, “loyalty [ikhlas] to the worship
of god alone in every meaning that the word worship encompasses [bi-kull ma tahwihi kalimat
al-‘ibada min ma’anin] and the disavowal [al-bara’] of polytheism and its people.”40
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The term jihad – entered now even in Western vocabulary – indicates ‘effort’ or ‘struggle’ in Arabic. In the
context of Islam, this effort stands primarily for self-improvement in the path of god (the ‘greater’ jihad). Under
specific circumstances, this effort may configure also a political and military one when the ummah is deemed under
attack (the ‘lesser’ jihad). While the first type of jihad is incumbent upon every Muslims, the second type requires
only part of the community to engage in it. The literature on the concept of jihad is extremely voluminous. See for
an introduction Firestone, Reuven. Jihad: the origin of holy war in Islam. Oxford University Press, 1999; Bonner,
Michael. Jihad in Islamic history: doctrines and practice. Princeton University Press, 2008.
35
Al-Maqdisi, 1997: “[w]e believe that da’wah, action and expending efforts for the purpose of replacing them is
obligatory upon the Muslims every one according to his capability,” p. 66.
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In his foundational piece, Wiktorowicz, 2006, refers to that as ‘aqidah or ‘creed.’
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Wagemakers, 2012, p. 166.
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www.tawhed.ws/t. Translations from the original Arabic are usually provided in a number of other languages,
including English, French, Russian, German, Spanish, Urdu and Farsi. The website is often unavailable or
unreachable, and it may change address, creating no small difficulties for the researcher.
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Al-Maqdisi, 1984, pp. 13-14. In the same vein, he further specifies, “[a]nd from what is opposite to the disavowal
from the shirk and its people, there is also the allegiance to the religion of Allāh and to His supporters,” ibid, p. 43.
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Al-Maqdisi anchors ‘loyalty and disavowal’ to the main theological pillars of Salafism, in
particular tawhid (god’s monotheistic unity). Tawhid is defined along unity of worship, attributes
and lordship.41 Given this understanding of tawhid, Al-Maqdisi does not confine Islam to the
realm of private or personal domain or to a shared cultural discourse. The all-encompassing traits
of tawhid make Islam also into political dispensations pertaining to power relations. He then
focuses on the relation between the unity of worship (tawhid al-’ibadah) and modern political
systems, in particular the legislative process. If, he argues, tawhid mandates the worship of god
alone; and if Islam represents a comprehensive system of belief and practice;42 then worshipping
anything not mandated by Islam is tantamount to violating the principle of tawhid, and hence an
act of unbelief (kufr). The legislative process, producing man-made laws which cannot be found
in the holy texts of Islam, is thus deemed not only incompatible with true Islam, but also
fundamentally opposed to it:
“know that your Islam and your tawhid will not be perfected and the meaning of ‘there is no god
but god’ will not be realized and that you will not find your way to Paradise until you disbelieve
and disavow every idol, the most important which is this: the modern idol that most people
follow, pay and worship with the worship of legislation.”43

From this passage we may evince two key considerations. First, whoever is in charge of
drafting man-made laws is a taghut, as he implements binding dispositions other than the
shari’ah. The result is worshipping something other than god. Consciously doing so - knowing
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See Chapter 4, section Salafism: the geography of a discursive field.
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Al-Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad. Kash al-Niqab ‘an Shari’at al-Ghab [Unveiling the Law of the Jungle], available at
www.tawheed.ws/t, 1988, p. 16. See also, Al-Dimuqratiyah Din [Democracy is a Religion], available at
www.tawhed.ws/t, n.d.
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the will and rules of god yet ignoring and contravening them44 - would place the legislator
outside the abode of Islam [dar al-Islam]. He then cannot anymore command obedience. This
operation, “takfir” (‘to declare someone an infidel [kafir, pl. kuffar]’)45 sentences self-ascribed
Muslims in the abode of unbelief [dar al-kufr], thus putting him on par with non-Muslims. Takfir
is a concept of paramount importance in the ideology of Jihadi Salafism. It is a tool that permits
clearly separating and discriminating between in-group and out-group, drawing those community
boundaries representing an essential feature of any ideology.46 Ultimately, takfir enables singling
out enemies.
Second and relatedly, disavowal from the tawaghit and the kuffar must be accompanied
by a perfected commitment - i.e., loyalty - to one’s profession of faith.47 By virtue of this
operation, Al-Maqdisi comes to question how one can declare himself or herself Muslim when
both loyalty and disavowal have not been performed along these lines.
At this juncture, Al-Maqdisi’s thinking becomes more markedly political. The principle
of ‘loyalty and disavowal’ implies a call to abandon and reject modern institutions and their
ideological foundations. They are example of ‘associationism’ [shirk]48 in that they contravene
the absolute unity - transcendent and preeminent - of god and its rulings. For Al-Maqdisi,
modern political institutions stand for competing belief systems with their attendant religious-
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Al-Maqdisi, 1997, pp. 26-30.
Takfir may be loosely juxtaposed to the Christian notion of ‘excommunication.’
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See Hanson, Stephen E. Post-imperial democracies: ideology and party formation in third republic France,
Weimar Germany, and post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge University Press, 2010; Wagemakers, 2012, p. 149. In the
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and Muhammad is its messenger [la lah illa allah wa muhammad rasul allah].’ Al-Maqdisi’s words, “disbelieving
in all of the tawāghīt is obligatory upon every Muslim by (the virtue of) half of the testimony (shahādah) of Islām,”,
1997, p. 53.
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For a discussion of shirk and shirkiyat, see Chapter 4, section “The history behind the concept: Salafism as an
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political implications.49 In other words, parliaments, parties, ministries, bureaucracies and so
forth represent unwarranted and perilous bid’a soiling the Islamic ummah.
Therefore, modern political institutions are instances of both apostasy (violating tawhid)
and tyranny (resulting from the violation of tawhid). And, unlike what the Quietists would
maintain, this state of affairs should not be tolerated. Al-Maqdisi calls for open enmity against
those who in his view betray Islam:
“The basis [asl] of the religion of Islam and its basis [qa‛idah] lie in two matters. The first: the
command to worship Allāh alone with no partners associated with Him and the encouragement
upon this with the allegiance based upon it and the declaration of disbelief [takfīr] of whoever
leaves it. The second: the warning against associationism [shirk] in the worship of Allāh and
being stern in that and having enmity based upon that and the declaration of disbelief of whoever
commits it. And this was the Tawhīd that the Messengers called to.”50

Who shall be specifically the object of disavowal (bara’), enmity and last confrontation?
Al-Maqdisi tries to define carefully who the tawaghit are. As we mentioned, he considers those
legislating - kings, presidents, ministers, MPs - as the prime culprit: “Verily, we are free from
you and from your constitutions and your laws of shirk and your government of kufr. We have
rejected you, and it has become openly seen between us and you, hostility and hatred forever,
until you return to Allāh and submit and follow His law alone.”51 He also adds to his list who he
refers to as ‘helpers of the idols/tyrants’ [ansar al-tawaghit], those who assist sustaining and
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See Gentile, Emilio. "Political religion: a concept and its critics–a critical survey. "Totalitarian movements and
political religions 6.1 (2005): 19-32. Again, alternative truths cannot be present in the Salafi discourse bereft, as it
is, of any room for pluralism.
50
Al-Maqdisi, 1984, p. 35.
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Ibid, p. 64.
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perpetuating the incumbent political order: the coercive apparatus (the police, the army, the
security services) and the judiciary (attorneys, judges):52
“And included in this also, is the warning of entering into their allegiance and from entering into
their obedience and feeling relieved or protected by them and going into their transports and
increasing their ranks by being employed in that which assists them upon their falsehood
and affirms their governments and preserves or implements their false laws, such as the army and
the police and the intelligence services and other than that.”53

Al-Maqdisi, crucially, does not include people working for the state in various other
capacities (such as civil servants, public employees, professional consultants, etc…).54 His
attention, as he singles out his enemies, is on political society and those who upheld, in that
realm of power relations, the existing regime. It is against them he launches his jihad in a clear
example of ‘war of movement.’ While he mentions preaching activities (daw’ah) and personal
restrain (only if compared with other Jihadi leaders) when it comes to engagement with violence,
this considerations cannot disguise that for Al-Maqdisi there can be no reform of the incumbent
tyrannical regimes. The main locus of power is the state apparatus. Rejection and confrontation
by jihad are the means to alter the status quo. Therefore, from a Gramscian perspective AlMaqdisi’s focus on ‘war of movement’ cannot articulate a properly counter-hegemonic project: it
is not within the trenches of the civil society that the battle will be won, but with a direct strike to
the Winter Palace of the Hashemite regime.

52

Wagemakers, 2012, p. 91.
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The Most Influential Jihadi Ideologue: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s
Revolutionary Praxis
I argued in the previous chapter how we can account for the role Salafi sheikhs play
within traditional Salafism by looking at the work and impact of Nasir ad-Din al-Albani. Salafis
scholars like him provide cognitive coordinates, anchored in a vision of a cherished and ideal
past, to sustain an amorphous social movement featuring a distinct communal identity. The
movement manifests a peculiar ‘apolitical’ stance in relation to the social and political status
quo. The scholars’ recognized knowledge and expertise in a cogent (Islamic) orthodoxy and
orthopraxis underpin this process.
Jihadi Salafis do also regard religious knowledge and expertise as important and
recognized; yet these qualities are valuable insofar as Salafism supports a program of
revolutionary political change - in ways that Quietists would find unacceptable.55 Jihadi Salafism
offers an ideology articulating a combative and antagonistic praxis.56 In this sense, Wiktorowicz
argues that, “whether someone in the community becomes a jihadi depends on the resonance of
the contextual analysis made by jihadi scholars and entrepreneurs.”57 Al-Maqdisi, amongst
others, was to be at the forefront of this contextual analysis. The cognitive coordinates the
scholar provides may foster a confrontational and revolutionary attitude vis à vis the existing
status quo.
Diffusion
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In response to my question as to the strategy adopted by the Jihadis, a Quietist scholar said: “what have they
obtained? Nothing - only to be incarcerated and spread a false image of Islam.” Conversation with a Salafi scholar at
Al-Albani Center for Methodology and Research, 6/28/2016 (name not recorded upon request).
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Wiktorowicz, 2006, p. 208.
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Al-Maqdisi’s intellectual parable represents a further development of Salafism, building
upon but steering away from the trend Al-Albani embodied. As noticed above, the two scholars
may have crossed path in Saudi Arabia; at any rate, the younger Al-Maqdisi surely engaged the
works of older, reputed scholars such as Al-Albani and Bin Baz. And just like for Al-Albani, his
period of study in Saudi Arabia was to be crucial. He delved into Hanbalism, acquainting himself
with classic thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and Wahhabism,
acknowledging the influence over his religious views of the scholars of al-Da‘wah alNajdiyyah.58 Furthermore, as Al-Albani cut the Gordian knot of the troubled (or even
contradictory) relation between Wahhabism and Salafism59 from a methodological and
theological perspective, Al-Maqdisi more resolutely did the same from a political perspective.
He pointed at the inconsistencies between the politics of the House of Sa’ud and their averred
religious discourse. In this sense, the experience of the JSM and Juhayman al-’Utaybi made a
lasting impression on the young Al-Maqdisi. The siege of Mecca would represent a powerful
instance of Salafi-inspired religious mobilization, with the caveats discussed previously.60
However, it is when moving to Afghanistan that Al-Maqdisi truly immersed himself in a
thriving environment of jihadi thinkers. He came into contact with Abdullah Azzam’s61 radical
branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the repository of Saiyd Qutb’s revolutionary ideology. Al-

58
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Maqdisi proceeded then to insert this revolutionary posture into his Salafi framework, in ways
not dissimilar from fellow Jihadi Salafi theorists Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu
Qatada al-Falastini62 and Abu Mus’ab al-Suri.63
When he settled in Jordan in the early 1990s, Al-Maqdisi carried all these different
intellectual experiences, representing a shared inventory for most Afghan Arabs. What set him
apart, as he sought to spread such notions across the Hashemite Kingdom, was precisely the role
he could perform as an intellectual. He belonged to a critical community,64 posing as a hub in the
wider network of Jihadi leaders and scholars. He had contacts and relations, means to spread the
ideas he had come in touch with: for example, fellow Jordanian Jihadi thinker Abu Qatada, then
based in London, started publishing Al-Maqdisi’s writings and recorded speeches in his
magazine al-Minhaj: “[i]t was through this publication that members of al-Qa‘ida became
familiar with al-Maqdisi’s teachings.”65 Especially after the publication of Millat Ibrahim66 and
Al- Kawashif67 and later Al-Dimuqratiyah Din,68 his reputation within Salafi circles grew
considerably,69 as did the circulation of the Salafi discourse he had come in touch with and
developed while in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Jordan.70
After his arrest following the case of Bay’at al-Imam, Al-Maqdisi redoubled, as we have
seen, his intellectual efforts. He wrote a text clarifying his position for would-be adherents (as
62
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the title evidently suggests: Hadhihi ‘Aqidahtuna, ‘This is Our Creed’); and ran a journal while
behind bars, explaining “[w]e also produced a magazine called “Review of the Monotheistic
Unity” [Majallat At-Tawheed]. The brothers used to write its articles and make copies of it to
distribute to the prisoners around the jail.”71 Such articles were then often smuggled outside the
prison. As Jihadi Salafi expert Marwan Shahadah pointed out to me: “Why is Al-Maqdisi so
important? He brought into the country Ibn Taymiyah and Abdul Wahhab. Sure, there were some
people who knew them before Al-Maqdisi. But his value and reputation as a scholar made the
difference. You read Al-Maqdisi and you know his knowledge is based on [the knowledge of]
those scholars. He got us to know them.”72
Elaboration
Al-Maqdisi’s intellectual production and activity was crucial in developing and building
upon the authors he was introducing to the Jordanian context. His effort is most clearly in
evidence as he strove to accommodate within an Islamic (Salafi) framework a revolutionary
political program.
In discussing al-wala’ wa al-bara’, his most enduring intellectual legacy, we must notice
how this expression can be found in the Qur’an;73 in the writings of Ibn Taymiyah and
Muhammad al-Wahhab;74 and more recently, in Juhayman al-’Utaybi.75 However, Al-Maqdisi’s
deployment of the concept is unprecedented. He makes ‘loyalty and disavowal’ into a political
instrument, not merely a theological and devotional notion. In this regard, Al-’Utaybi had
already added political flavor to it, but he had not claimed that al-wala’ wa al-bara’ entailed
71
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considerations about violations of the shari’ah and attendant practices of takfir (Al-’Utaybi, as
we saw, did not go as far as calling for the disavowal of the Saudi monarchy). Al-Maqdisi
instead believed that, “a legislative dimension was implied in or can at least be justifiably
deduced from Wahhabi writings on al-wala’ wa al-bara’ and the qur’anic verses that deal with
this concept,” and then went on to introduce “an entirely new connection [between al-wala’ wa
al-bara’ and takfir] that he nevertheless tries to ground in Islamic and especially Wahhabi
tradition.”76 We can readily see the reason behind such attempt: referring to authors outside the
hallowed circle of scholars Salafis deem legitimate, or without firm reliance to the Qur’an and
the Sunnah, would result in unlawful – and unacceptable - innovation (bid’a).
If Al-Maqdisi’s work on al-wala’ wa al-bara’ is in any case rooted in the discursive
literature of Salafism, we must also consider how he drew from and elaborated upon concepts
widely adopted by Islamists of other stripes too. In this sense, the influence of Saiyd Qutb77 and,
indirectly, Abu ‘Ala al-Mawdudi,78 is evident by Al-Maqdisi’s adoption of the notion of
hakimiyah and jahiliyah (which, for example, are not discussed by Al-Albani). The former, a
76
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term not to be found in the Qur’an and Mawdudi’s single most important contribution, indicates
the absolute sovereignty of god also in worldly matters. The latter is Qutb’s own elaboration of a
classic notion indicating mankind pre-Islamic state of ‘ignorance’ when not yet aware of Allah’s
message through the Prophet. For Qutb, a condition of (neo-)jahiliyah is endemic to the
contemporary Muslim world making it Islamic only at face value and therefore on par with dar
al-kufr. The two concepts work together: a state of modern jahiliyah makes it impossible to
uphold the rule79 and sovereignty of god. Al-Maqdisi’s focus on the legislative process, as noted
above, specifies how the principle of hakimiyah is violated: by enforcing man-made laws, which
not merely (or not only) by virtue of their content are bound to infringing upon god’s hukm and
therefore tawhid, but precisely because of the process that produces and makes them binding.80
Al-Maqdisi does not supinely adopt Qutb’s ideas about hakimiyah and jahiliyah; rather,
he specifies the contours and features of both. Qutb regarded the entire society as a jahiliy
(‘ignorant’ or better ‘affected by jahiliyah’) polity, placing everyone living in nominally Muslim
countries outside the abode of Islam. In other words, Qutb would perform takfir on the entire
body politic. Consequently, the call for jihad extended against the incumbent system of power as
a whole ‘integral state.’81 Al-Maqdisi concentrates instead on the figure of the tawaghit. He tries
to single out who is responsible for this state of affairs. As discussed, his take on politics leads
him to zero in on state institutions (the political society) and pay less attention to civil society,
which he does not recognize explicitly as a locus of power (or, at least, it is of lesser importance:
he does preach for daw’ah activities which would necessarily target such domain, yet only
complementing the more militant and violent Jihadi operations).
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What Al-Maqdisi’s ideology loses in reach and breadth (not declaring kafir the entire
body politic), it gains in clarity and specificity. When it comes to hakimiyah, he anchors his
position to the concept of taghut. While already present in the Islamist discourse and political
vocabulary, Al-Maqdisi however takes it “to a step further in the literature of Jihadi Salafism by
his extensive use of this notion in his discourse:”82 taghut straddles, from a more religious
meaning - idol - towards a more decisively political notion - tyrant. This accusation ultimately
ties together tawhid, shari’ah, jahiliyah and hakimiyah and lays the foundation for a political
rebellion against the incumbent tyrannical regime: “al-Maqdisi considers disavowing state
constitutions and statutory laws as kufr as part of the requirements of al-tawhid.”83
Systematization
Al-Maqdisi arrived in Jordan in 1991. He was not alone, as we have seen: the ArabAfghans were making their way back home (alongside with Al-Maqdisi, also Al-Zarqawi and
Abu Qatada were soon reunited in Amman), a generation forged by the battle against the Soviets.
For the Arab-Afghans, jihad had been a lived and real combat experience, profoundly shaping a
worldview where Islam assumed radical militant contours.
To compound matters further, Jordan was facing three momentous challenges: the impact
of the IMF financial and economic measures; a series of democratizing reforms; and the looming
peace negotiations with Israel, resulting in the treaty of 1994.84 It is not easy to separate neatly
the effects of these events in relation to the emergence in the country of various Islamist
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formations and Jihadi Salafism in particular.85 The relevance of strained socio-economic
conditions is undeniable, as they have been the background for the emergence of confrontational
Islamist groups in the modern Muslim world at large.86 In this sense, the draconian Structural
Adjustment Program measures adversely impacted the livelihood of many Jordanians, especially
as they followed and resulted from the poor economic performance of the 1980s. Widespread
discontent had already been simmering, as the popular (mostly East Bankers) protest of 1989
showed clearly. The move of the monarchy to quell the unrest was precisely to inaugurate a
hesitant, but nevertheless significant, opening up of the political system. The regime boasted in
its official discourse terms such as democracy, rule of law, elections, and representative
institutions.
It is therefore in this context that we need to situate Al-Maqdisi’s message. Unlike AlAlbani and Quietist Salafis in general, whose references to current social and political events are
less prominent and relevant, for Jihadi Salafis they feature instead at the forefront of their
concerns. Particularly receptive ears could be found in the community of the Arab-Afghans,
many of whom had already been exposed to Jihadism and were therefore prone to embrace a
specific (Salafi) configuration of jihad.87
In this sense, Al-Maqdisi attempted to provide precisely that specific configuration: a
cognitive framework that would articulate the sense of frustration (linked to the economic
conditions), resentment (due to the perspectives of a peace across the Jordan river), and
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skepticism (concerning the democratizing measures in relation to the authoritarian nature of the
Hashemite regime)88 permeating society across different strata.
Al-Maqdisi, given his attention on the political system (i.e., the Gramscian political
society) and specifically on the legislative process, was particularly adamant in condemning the
regime for its democratic overtures. Introducing Hadhihi ‘Aqidatuna, he says, “I wrote
"Unveiling the Falsehood in the Provisions of the Constitution". This book scrutinizes the
Jordanian Constitution and debunks its contradiction to the Law of Allah, the Most High. It
exposes the explicit Kufr and corruption found in the Legislative Councils with evidence from
Sacred Texts and the intellect. We offered this book to a number of parliamentarians who visited
the jail.”89 Al-Maqdisi seems fully conscious of his role as guide of the Jihadi movement: “Some
of the brothers who recently embraced this Da'wah were inevitably making few mistakes due to
their enthusiasm or hastiness and extravagance, which usually disappear by seeking knowledge90
I anticipated these events by writing a number of essays which expose the reality of our Da'wah
and presents it in its glittering face that pleases Allah.”91 He concludes by declaring: “I have
presented proofs that necessitate the overthrowing of Kafir rulers, the breaking away and
revolting against them, and the fighting against them till they are replaced. The proofs of these
are numerous in the Book and the Sunnah, as well as the clear and explicit sayings of the
scholars of this Ummah.”92 In his prison years, after the debacle of Bay’at al-Imam, he would
insist and further clarify the same points in Al-Dimuqratiyah Din.
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Al-Maqdisi’s manifesto and most important work, Millat Ibrahim, already contained all
the elements to grant religious legitimacy, ideological coherence and clear guidelines to steer and
direct the fragmented resentment affecting sections of the Jordanian populace. The incumbent
taghut and hence kuffar regimes are to blame. As Lahoud explains, “[t]he overall tone of the
book is characterised by an assault, along doctrinal lines, on existing temporal authorities, be
they institutions or prominent figures, who present themselves as legitimate religious or political
leaders.”93 Al-Maqdisi was thus to articulate a vague and undefined opposition to the status quo
along precise lines, and indicate a correct praxis according to such contours: “Allāh has made
every Muslim responsible to hate the disbelievers (Kuffār) and made it compulsory (Fardh) upon
him to take of them as enemies, as well as taking them as enemies and declaring their disbelief
(Takfīr), and having disavowal (Barā’ah) from them, even if they are their fathers or their sons
or their brothers.”94 Ultimately, “Jihad is a religious duty that is permissible and cannot be
arrested or abolished till the Day of Judgment.”95
If Al-Maqdisi thus targeted the political system - with its man-made laws and
democratizing traits - as a whole, he also tapped into sentiments of deep felt anti-Zionism and
opposition to the peace process with Israel: “This 'peace' process is in reality not a temporary
legal accord similar to what used to be held between Muslims and their enemies in the past due
to a necessity. Rather, they are agreements and accords of brotherhood, friendship and truly
permanent affiliation with the Kuffar.”96 This aversion to Israel was already present, again, in
Millat Ibrahim. Espousing anti-Semitic traits, Al-Maqdisi links a rapprochement with Israel with
al-wala’ wa al-bara’, hence making such course of action tantamount to an attack to Islam itself:
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“[a]nd with what could I refute with the people who desire the establishment of the Khilāfah,
while they cannot even differentiate between the expression, “The children of Ibrāhīm”, which
the Tawāghīt use nowadays to appease the Jews and enter into peace conferences with them; an
expression which is intended to annihilate the ties of faith (Īmān) and dissolve the very
foundation of the religion and shake the basis of “Allegiance and Disavowal” (Al-Walā’ WalBarā’).”97
As we are going to see below, the state was to play into the hands of Al-Maqdisi as he
labored to mobilize would-be Jihadis by systematizing and giving coherence to their worldview.
In particular, tough policies on the part of the state (towards secularist and leftist movements, as
well as more ‘moderate’ Islamist formations) were shortsighted: “This “siege on the (Islamist)
moderates” actually worked to reinforce and strengthen the arguments and discourse of the
“radical Islamists”. Indeed, it led certain individuals to seek underground and subversive
channels to express their frustrations, ideas, and visions within a discourse that disavowed the
state and the constitution, rejected democracy and took a harsh posture with regard to the socioeconomic reality – many were ready, at times, to take up arms and use force in an attempt to
change this reality.”98
Jihadi Salafism and the Social Appropriation of Tradition
The three mechanisms described above compound in a process of social appropriation of
tradition.99 This process accounts for how the scholar’s intellectual production unlocks the
political potential of religious discourse. However, unlike their ‘apolitical’ counterpart, in the
case of Jihadis the social appropriation of tradition manifests an explicit political re-articulation
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of group purpose and identity. Harking back to a hallowed and cherished tradition - the paradigm
of the pious ancestors - calls here for an immediate and direct engagement with politics.
Consequently, if for the Quietists the social appropriation of tradition entailed the emergence of a
movement akin to a social non-movement,100 for the Jihadis it would manifest in the formation of
a vanguardist, cell-based and underground mobilization of vastly different import. Given their
understanding of social reality - dominated, as we have seen, by a concern about political society
and less importance being attributed to civil society - Jihadi Salafism will inform accordingly its
type of mobilization, resulting in a movement apt to fight a ‘war of movement:’ transformation
of society shall not come about via (internal and individual) purification and education, but as a
forceful act on the part of a (politically) committed vanguard.101
In the Jihadi discourse such vanguard is referred to as “al-ta’ifah al-mansourah” or the
‘victorious sect:’ “the sect that represents the champions of this religion in every era.”102 Jihadis
see themselves as such trans-historical agent, epitomizing their - alleged - fundamental raison
d’etre: bringing back, here and now, the rule of god on earth (hakimiyah) as it was in the age of
the pious ancestors. As Al-Maqdisi and like-minded Salafi thinkers have maintained, what stands
in the way of this project is first and foremost the modern state in its different specific
incarnations across the Muslim ummah.103
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The idea of a committed vanguard in charge of shaping politics - and ultimately history is not exclusive, of course, of militant Islamists. It is easy to see similarities especially with
modern left wing movements.104 In the Jihadi discourse, the ‘victorious sect’ is a politicalreligious concept which translates and embodies, at the level of praxis, what Jihadi ideology (as
exemplified, in this study, by Al-Maqdisi’s foundational concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’) has
conjured up at the ideational level - more precisely, with Gramsci, at the philosophical level.
For al-Maqdisi, the task of the vanguard is clear: make the historical conform to the
ideological by means of such praxis informed by jihad. This primacy of praxis within Jihadi
Salafism is evident when juxtaposed to the approach of the Quietists. Their avowed retreat from
the social and the political does not entail a specific concern on an outward behavioral
commitment: Quietist Salafis behavioral coordinates, however strict,105 are reflection of an inner,
personal renewal which maintains primacy over outward behavior. Conformity to the orthodoxy
will bring about, as a consequence, orthopraxis. For Jihadi Salafis, it is primarily the engagement
with the orthopraxis that signals and brings about doctrinal orthodoxy: therefore, praxis as jihad
cannot but occupy the very center of their worldview.106

Modernity's Moral Predicament. Columbia University Press, 2014. and An-Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed. Islam and the
Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari’ah. Harvard University Press, 2008.
104
The idea of a committed vanguard group in charge and capable of steering the course of history is best
exemplified by Lenin’s theory about the state, revolution, and ideology (which he uses more in classic Marxist
understanding of ‘misapprehension of social reality.’ See Lenin, Vladimir Ilʹich, and Todd Chretien. State and
revolution. Haymarket Books, 2015. Meijer talks of the concept of tatbiq, ‘planning,’ when it comes to Jihadi
Salafis’ strategy to change reality. Tatbiq ends up “producing a Salafist activist concept of praxis that is comparable
to Leninism,” Meijer, Roel. “Introduction,” in idem, ed., Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement. Hurst &
Co, 2014 [2009], p. 24. Again, these considerations suggest how politics for Jihadi Salafis is deeply rooted in
modernity.
105
See Chapter 5, fn 77, 78, 79.
106
And for Al-Maqdisi, orthodoxy alone will not do (in this sense clearly parting ways with the Quietists). In this
passage against a pure theoretical and non-practical understand of tawhid, he states, “[a]nd some of those who
assume, may assume that this Millah [i.e., religion] of Ibrāhīm could be implemented in our time (merely) by
studying the Tawhīd and knowing its three categories and knowing its types by way of theoretical knowledge alone,
while remaining silent concerning the people of falsehood and not declaring and openly demonstrating the
disavowal [i.e., bara’] from their falsehood,” 1984, p. 38. Italics and capitalization as in the English translation of
the text.

216

Consequently, it is not so much the ultimate success of the project that is to show its
inherent validity; the actions undertook in name of that project in conformity with a certain view
of history and reality are the prime benchmark to assess its worth. Actions are not judged in
relation to results: this is what renders the ideology of Jihadi Salafism so reckless (especially in
its current manifestations, see fn. Above about Daesh) in its refutation of instrumental rationality
(FN - I would like to thank Prof. Muhammad Khair Eiedat for pointing this out to me. See fn.).
Praxis itself as the embodiment of the unadulterated and pristine Islam of the pious ancestors: in
this sense, the historical necessity of the return of the Caliphate is less located into a utopian
future, but rather within an a-historical past that can be rescued here and now by means of praxis
- jihad. The a-historical nature of this past is exemplified by the absence of reference to
“grandeur of civilization achievements...There is no lineage of kings, no people’s history.
History here is also not simply the dead past but a past vitalized by deaths; war is its motor
force.”107
In this context, Al-Maqdisi was to make apparent and convey the political import
inherent in this worldview. As Shahadah poignantly told me, “Al-Maqdisi translated Ibn
Taymiyah, Abdul-Wahhab and as-salaf as-salih. Not in the sense of mere language [fa mish bitariqah al-tarjamah al-lughawiyah al-basitah], but by connecting ancient texts with present
circumstances [awda’a haliyah].”108 Al-Maqdisi offered a rendition of Islamic tradition not only
functional, but conducive to a radical and violent politicization. The entire historical and
intellectual trajectory of Islam appears to be, in his ideological apparatus, a history of betrayal of
a hallowed and otherwise perfect tradition. The re-appropriation of such tradition intends to
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rectify history gone awry.109 What primarily stands in the way of such vision, in Al-Maqdisi’s
understanding of social reality, is the modern state - as manifested in the power relations of
political society: its fundamental institutions, practices, and, ultimately, philosophy. It is
therefore against this state that he seeks to fight his ‘war of movement’ and spur political
mobilization.
As Bhatt argues, within the ideological coordinates of Jihadi Salafism, “[t]here are only
two authentic agents of history in this universe, the ‘scholar’ and the ‘martyr.’”110 Abdullah
Azzam himself was to concur: “the ‘map of Islamic history’ is coloured with two lines from the
black ink of the scholar and the red blood of the martyr.”111 For Jordan, the black ink was to be
Al-Maqdisi, and the red blood Al-Zarqawi.
Jihadi Salafis and the State: Rejection and Adjustment between the ‘Ink of the
Scholar’ and the ‘Blood of the Martyr’
The trajectory of militant Jihadi Salafism in Jordan presents a movement, if compared to
neighboring countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq or Syria, far less capable of sustaining a
serious security threat to the state and its citizens. Yet, the Jordanian theatre has represented a
major stage for Jihadism: in the Levantine country were sown seeds later contributing in
important ways to the surge and development of global Jihadism. Indeed, as this form of militant
109

In this sense, the systematic destruction of historical relics and by current Salafi groups such as ISIS answers
precisely to this logic. The erasing of competing and thus politically challenging traditions is grounded their
understanding of bid’a. This destruction exemplifies once more how the universe of the Salafis is bereft of any
conception of pluralism.
110
Bhatt, 2014, p. 32.
111
It is worth reporting the full citation here: “More beautiful than this is when the hand of the scholar which
expends the ink and moves the pen is the same as the hand that expends his blood and moves the nations,” Azzam,
Abdullah Yusuf. Martyrs: The Building Block of Nations, available at
http://english.religion.info/2002/02/01/document-martyrs-the-building-blocks-of-nations/, publication date n.d. AlMaqdisi himself reasons along similar lines, highlighting once again the political responsibility of scholars: “what
we suffer from today is the ignorance of the sons of the Muslims and the concealment of the truth from them, along
with the added falsehood and the uncertainty of the stance concerning allegiance and disavowal (Al-Walā’ walBarā’). Furthermore, this resulted from the silence and the concealing of this truth by the scholars (‘ulama) and the
callers (du’at),” 1984, p. 71. Italics and capitalization as in the English translation of the text.

218

Islamism rejects - more neatly than other Islamist movements112 - the very concept of nation
state, it is to be expected that its various and yet connected manifestations would span and travel
across state borders.113
As I have discussed, the Jordanian state has put forth a diverse set of discourses in order
to be able to appeal to a variety of actors and groups.114 In this pluralist – albeit never truly open
- discursive space Quietist Salafism could find its niche. The Quietists’ ambiguous yet nominally
amicable relation with state power has made them a preferred target for the Jihadis’ reprimands.
In the words of Al-Maqdisi, “[t]he enemies of Allah acknowledge any organisation or group as
long as it is based on the Irjaa'i belief115 as they used to ask some of our arrested brothers: "Why
don't you seek your learning at Ali Al-Halabee [sic] Abu Shaqrah or Al-Albanee [sic] and
others? You forsake these Sheikhs for a terrorist?"”116 While the Quietist Salafis have sought to
insert their stance and ideology within the interstices of the regime discourse, the Jihadi Salafis
have steadily opposed such discourse.
Thus, Jihadis’ ideological rejection of Jordan’s ‘authoritarian pluralism’ entailed the
contestation of the regime claims to legitimacy. In particular, Jihadis contest vehemently the
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Hashemites’ rule religious credentials.117 In this specific discursive field, the end result is a
competition between two rival and mutually exclusive religious discourses.118 The regime
proposes a ‘liberal’ and ‘moderate’ version of Islam, compatible with both its alleged democratic
(or democratizing) nature and accepted international norms of human, political and civil rights,
citizenship, gender equality, and so forth (despite the actual conditions on the ground on all these
accounts).119 On their part, the Jihadis consider the regime kafir, combating the Hashemites in
the same religious discursive field upon which the monarchs instead try to justify their rule. The
Jihadi challenge is, in this sense, radical: it contests the very roots of the regime claim to
authority, legitimacy and, ultimately, hegemony over the body politic. For the Jihadis no
accommodation is ever possible - at the most, only tactical retreats or strategic re-assessments.
The ideological construct put forth by Jihadi thinkers such as Al-Maqdisi leaves no room for
compromise.
As mentioned, the first embodiment of this position was Bay’at al-Imam. The group
gathered around Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi after their arrival in Jordan in the early 1990s.120
The members of the group called themselves Jama’a al-Muwahidin, ‘The Group of the
Monotheistic Unity.’121 There are somewhat conflicting accounts in terms of the social and
educational background of those who joined: mostly poor, uneducated and disenfranchised
youngsters of both Palestinian and East Bank descent (some of them Afghan Arabs too)
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according to Wagemakers;122 relatively middle class and educated according to Abu Rumman
and Abu Hanieh.123 In any case, the role of Al-Maqdisi is not under dispute. He was already
quite known in Islamist circles, his works already been published: he conferred ideological
consistency to an amorphous movement that was emerging out of widespread resentment and
dissatisfaction, providing the necessary coordinates to envision a full-fledged political project.124
Bay’at al-Imam would never become what Al-Maqdisi’s ambitious ideas - and AlZarqawi’s more brazen inclinations - had envisioned: a vanguard of the ‘victorious sect.’ As its
network was expanding beyond Amman, setting up potential cells across the country, the group
had yet to carry out any meaningful operation. Some of its members decided to take action,
calling for a retaliation mission in Israel after Baruch Goldstein, an American-Israeli right wing
extremist, went on a shooting rampage in Hebron, West Bank, on February 25, 1994.125 AlMaqdisi was to give reluctantly his consent with a fatwa, since he would have preferred to
concentrate efforts on Jordan.126 The group started thus planning an attack against Israel (with
which Jordan was about to normalize relations), collecting a number of weapons Al-Maqdisi had
smuggled from Kuwait.127 The police however got word of the plan and arrested the core 16
members of the organization, including Al-Maqdisi and Al-Zarqawi.128 They were sentenced to
15 years in prison.
The prison years, as I have already observed, were of great importance for the future
developments of Jihadism. These developments were ideological, organizational and at last
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operational. Al-Maqdisi’s stature as a prominent ideologue only increased after the verdict,129
thanks also to his defiant attitude during the trial, when he refused to recognized the authority of
the court. He did not stop writing, and if anything his position hardened behind bars.130
However, during this time, Al-Maqdisi’s learned, scholarly and deliberate persona found
it hard to compete for the leadership of the movement with the uncouth and uneducated, but
more determined and resolute Al-Zarqawi. The younger pupil had none of the intellectual
sophistication of his mentor. His charisma depended instead on a thuggish and violent character
that well suited the prison environment.131 Soon, erstwhile friends and comrades Al-Maqdisi and
Al-Zarqawi started drifting apart.132 On the one hand, Al-Maqdisi was focused on refining his
theoretical and intellectual position. Looking for ways to contrast and combat the Hashemite
regime, he became more and more persuaded to concentrate on da’wah as a proper way of
carrying out jihad in the Jordanian context. This more ‘moderate’ attitude, as noticed a feature of
Al-Maqdisi’s personality, could hardly disguise the implications one could draw from his works.
On the other hand, Al-Zarqawi was seeking for the next battlefield after the missed
opportunity in Afghanistan and the collapse of Bay’at al-Imam.133 He was bent on leaving Jordan
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as soon as possible and taking the ideas of Al-Maqdisi to what he deemed their logical
conclusions: a violent and relentless confrontation with any kafir regime, wherever opportunity
might arise.134
Upon their release in 1999, the project of Bay’at al-Imam was over, victim of the
divergences between the intellectual leader of the movement, Al-Maqdisi, and the operational
one, Al-Zarqawi. The former was under tight security surveillance. As mentioned before, this is
the situation Al-Maqdisi confronts to this very day. He has thus and refrained from exposing
himself too much (notwithstanding frequent periods of detention). Instead, “Al-Zarqawi was
busy organizing groups of local and foreign individuals to carry out militant operations.”135 The
result of this lack of coordination between the two leaders made the Jihadi movement in Jordan
“foggy, gelatinous [...] [S]ome of its members were organized, others were tied to and loyal to
al-Zarqawi, while still others were satisfied to work in the field of da‘wa, advocating the Jihadi
Salafist discourse and mobilizing society towards this ideology.”136
This situation persists to an extent to this very day. As it was not easy to gauge the
amount of individuals regarding themselves as ‘Salafis’ in the case of the Quietist branch,137 this
difficulty is compounded when it comes to Jihadis. In principle, it would be easier to do the
math, insofar as Jihadism tends to operate via cells and close-knit formations, and thus differing
from the amorphous Quietist movement. Yet, this is only partially true. If it was possible, for
example, to imprison and condemn the central elements of Bay’at al-Imam, that leaves us with
very little clue as to whom was affiliated with the larger network the movement was building;
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much less who embraces the fundamental tenets and worldview of Jihadism. Last but not least,
official government statistics and data on this point are not made available. Therefore, it is
primarily an exercise in educated guessing to say that there may have been a couple of hundreds
Jihadis as the movement appeared in Jordan in the early 1990s. By the late 1990s and early
2000s, it has mushroomed to some 1,000 or even 2,000 individuals.138 At the time of writing,
with the Middle East experiencing one of its most severe political crisis ever, it has been
estimated that at least 3,000 Jordanians joined ISIS since 2014, with an estimated 400 or 500
fighters been killed.139 The number of sympathizers is arguably much larger.140 In other words,
Jihadism seems to be on the rise, a much stronger and more threatening phenomenon than it once
was.
In this context, the state response has been fundamentally based upon a security
approach:141 “[t]he Jordanian state strategy in confronting the rise of the Jihadi Salafist
movement over the last 15 years is a narrative replete with crackdowns, arrests and prosecutions,
as well as constant surveillance of the group, its members and their activities.”142 This security
strategy is predicated upon the capacity to closely monitor, infiltrate and ultimately disband
Jihadi groups: “[i]ndeed, it is not a strategy that pays attention to or gives enough consideration
138
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to “preventive” measures – or, in other words, curtailing the various conditions, causes,
and environmental factors that have helped catalyze its rise and nurture its activities.”143
This approach has granted Jordan, as noted at the beginning, a degree of stability and
safety rather unique for regional standards. Yet, the main breach in the security system was to
come by no other than Al-Zarqawi himself with the 2005 Amman hotels bombing. If the ink of
the ‘scholar’ Al-Maqdisi and blood of the ‘martyr’ Al-Zarqawi thus parted ways, yet, just like
Abdullah Azzam’s metaphor suggests, the symbiotic link connecting ideology and praxis,
thought and action, was not to be as easily severed.

Lost in Translation? Al-Maqdisi and the Surge of Violent Jihadism
Al-Zarqawi left Jordan heading first to Afghanistan and then, through Iran, he reached
Iraqi Kurdistan prior to the US led invasion of the country in March 2003.144 There, he set up a
number of training camps, becoming involved with the local Islamist movement. As the US
proceeded to dismantle the institutions of the Iraqi state, Al-Zarqawi launched a relentless
campaign against whomever he deemed a kafir. His group changed name a few times (from
Ansar al-Islam to Tawhid wa al-Jihad - a clear reminder to Jama’a al-Tawhid - and then AlQa’idah fi Bilad al-Rafidayin in 2004),145 yet it maintained the same utterly exclusivist outlook.
Al-Zarqawi became by 2005 the leader of the Islamist Sunni opposition not only to the US
forces, but also to the reconstituted Iraqi regime under Ayad Allawi first and then Ibrahim alJafa’ari, the other Iraqi political formations (whether secular or Islamist), the entire Shi’a
community (which makes up between 55 to 60% of the Iraqi population), and anyone
143
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collaborating, directly or indirectly, with all of the above. He accompanied this uncompromising
stance with practices so gruesome and horrifying (basically inaugurating the decapitation of
hostages and the subsequent release of the video), embracing violence so recklessly, that even
the leadership of Al-Qai’dah itself (not known for calls to restrain to its affiliates, as Al-Zarqawi
had become) requested him not to indulge in such tactics,146 as they were alienating wider and
wider strata of the Iraqi population - not to mention Muslim world public opinion.
Al-Zarqawi’s violence was to strike Jordan on November 14, 2005 with the notorious
bombings of major hotel complexes in Amman. The attacks killed 60 people, mostly attendees at
a wedding party, and wounded hundreds. This operation represents to this very day the most
severe breach in security in the kingdom, and contributed to making Al-Zarqawi amongst the
most wanted men on the planet.147
Al-Zarqawi was to be killed in a US airstrike on June 7, 2006, at the height of the civil
war that his groups sought to ignite between the Sunni and Shi’a communities.148 However, his
legacy survives to this very day. The notorious Islamic State is but the last incarnation of Jihadi
Salafi ideology, adopting more firmly the violent practices of Al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qa’idah fi Bilad
al-Rafidayin as a staple element of its repertoire of contention,149 what makes Jihadi Salafism the
global threat we know nowadays is its willingness to exercise takfir on anyone not deemed part
146
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of the ummah, justifying - even requesting - an attack against such individuals or groups, and act
consequently.150
Insofar as we can trace the ideology of the Islamic State to the work of Al-Maqdisi - and I
claim this operation to be totally warranted - we may ask ourselves to what extent the Jordanian
scholar’s intellectual production has been either misused, misinterpreted, or correctly
understood. I contend that just as Al-Albani’s teaching could provide logic and justification for
envisioning the siege of Mecca - despite his open opposition to such operations - in the same
way Al-Maqdisi’s works, especially his theorization of bara’ and takfir, has partaken in
engendering outcomes not foreseen - and most likely not desired - by their author.
There is indeed evidence of Al-Maqdisi’s displeasure, if not open opposition, to a wanton
use of takfir and relative deployment of violence.151 Such opposition, as his inclination to
consider da’wah a valuable - if not a more effective in some circumstances - tactic to carry out
jihad, could not prevent his readers and acolytes at any rate to read his works otherwise. In
addition, some inconsistencies of his ideological apparatus left room for such alternative
readings beyond, possibly, the intent of the author. For example, we have seen how Al-Maqdisi
goes at length to place limits on takfir while at the same time insisting on a sweeping and
encompassing bara’. These two propositions are hardly reconcilable. Al-Maqdisi’s nuances and
details which he is at pain to explain can be easily misinterpreted and expanded to include
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everyone opposed or even neutral152 to his proposed vanguardist project. Whether Al-Maqdisi
wished or not, in his works, to inspire movements such as ISIS can never be ascertained for sure.
What can be more readily assessed is the potential inscribed in Al-Maqdisi’s writings, which
definitely contained elements to inspire, shape and justify such developments.
Last, it is interesting to pay attention to a significant episode which involved Al-Maqdisi
and the leadership of ISIS. After the Islamist group captured Jordanian fighter jet pilot Mu’azh
al-Kasasbah in December 2014, the Jordanian authorities tried to secure his release by having
Al-Maqdisi (at the time in prison and promptly freed) negotiate with his fellow Islamists.
Nobody knew that, at the time of such negotiations, ISIS had already executed Al-Kasasbah.153
At any rate, the intervention of Al-Maqdisi154 on behalf of the ‘kafir’ Jordanian regime to secure
the life of a member of its armed forces could not but elicit intense polemics within the Islamist
community, its sympathizers and the larger public.
Al-Maqdisi deemed contrary to his views the action of the Islamic State. The Islamist
fighters in Syria and Iraq, who shunned his appeals to ‘moderation,’155 made manifest how,
indeed, intellectuals and scholars can only have impact under certain conditions: first and
foremost, their organic relationship and consequent possibility to shape and inform the
worldviews of their followers and audience. Far removed from the battlefield,156 Al-Maqdisi’s
new pronouncements could not rival his old ones, produced in the context of militant opposition
to the Saudi and Jordanian regimes. The Islamic State could, in fact, readily relate to such earlier
works of Al-Maqdisi to inform, justify and sustain its politics.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I offered an analysis of the work and impact of Abu Muhammad AlMaqdisi, one of the most important Jihadi theoreticians. His political project, pivoted around the
concept of ‘loyalty and disavowal’ or al-wala’ wa al-bara’, transforms Salafi theological notions
– first and foremost tawhid - into tools for political mobilization. Unlike their Quietist
counterparts, Jihadi scholars such as Al-Maqdisi make no mystery of their political proclivities.
They put forward a political project that does not seek accommodations within the coordinates of
the Jordanian regime official discourse. Their aim is precisely to explicitly refute and fight such
discourse. Hence, the process of social appropriation of tradition becomes in the Jihadi case an
uncompromising call for rebellion and revolution.
There are three main and connected observations on this point. First, much more so than
the Quietist, Jihadi Salafism espouses the traits of a modern social movement. Not only in its
mode of operation - small vanguardist cells - Jihadism showcases its modern traits; but
especially, as Meijer points out, given that the, “embrace of chaos and dissent, so abhorrent to
Albani [sic] and others, but characteristic as an expression of transition and rebirth, is taken for
granted and even welcomed as a means of cleansing and creating a tabula rasa.”157 In this sense,
the engagement - at the intellectual and practical level - with a thoroughly modern institutions as
the state makes the call for tradition and authenticity the Jihadis put forward as contradictory as
hollow. Their project, based on a forceful recreation of the Caliphate by means of a ‘war of
movement,’ has in fact no clear historical roots and referents, given their wanton destruction of
everything Islamic - including its philosophical, historical, political and social legacy - not
conforming to their discourse about the pious ancestors. Consequently, it is intellectually poor
even in Al-Maqdisi, a sophisticated and prolific scholar. In Jihadism, the contours of such future
157
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polity are grounded in a past, a tradition merely discursive and detached from the histories of the
people it should like to appeal to. Al-Maqdisi’s Caliphate or Islamic state ends up being much
less defined as opposed to the various rationales and justifications he provides to fight the kafir
regimes of the Arab and Muslim world.
Second and relatedly, I maintained how this ultimate poverty of the political thinking of
Jihadi Salafism is manifest when considering the primacy of praxis, evident by looking at Jihadi
groups trajectory, discourse and ideology. It is not so much the realization of the Islamic state
that will prove Salafis correct: it is the very engagement in activities ultimately and potentially
conducive to such polity that justifies jihad. Whence Jihadism righteousness in both ideology
and practice, its sense of historical necessity, its excesses in violence: in this sense, Lahoud
correctly observes how, “Al-Maqdisi’s vision may not end up precipitating the formation of a
new type of totalitarian regime, but like other absolutist oppositional ideologies it could easily
serve to facilitate the destabilisation of various existing regimes.”158
Finally, if Al-Maqdisi has resented the development of Jihadism into a movement
characterized by brutality, violence and fear, he has little room for complaint: rather than a
misunderstanding of his works on the part of his readership and followers, the more recent and
ominous manifestation of Jihadism since the early days of Bay’at al-Imam have hardly betrayed
the spirit of his message.
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Conclusion

Making Contention
All too often episodes of contention are reified, and no proper attention is devoted to
agency. Structural factors, be them material (socio-economic conditions, regime type,
technology, geography, and so on) or ideational (culture as a system of signifiers and meanings,
prevailing values and orientations, patterns of social relations, and so on) tend to crowd the
theoretical landscape. Provide the correct recipe - widespread grievances of some sort, the means
to act upon them, a set of overlapping social cleavages and a powerful narrative - and one can
explain the appearance of social mobilization and political contention. Let us be clear: there are
very good reasons for doing so! Structural features are inescapable for offering any meaningful
account of macro episodes of contention. Yet, we must combine and relate such accounts to the
role of agents and actors: again, it is worth reminding ourselves, with Skocpol, how revolutions
do not merely come, but they are made.1 We can frame the same idea in a language dear to
International Relations theorists: agency and structure are co-constitutive, and we cannot reduce
one to the other.
It is with these broad considerations in mind that I carried out the present research. I tried
to evince the role of scholars within contentious politics by looking at their intellectual
production: what was it about their works and pronouncements that made them into ‘popular
intellectuals,’ ideologues capable of influencing, spurring and sustaining episodes of social and
political mobilization? The challenge was not merely theoretical, in that my main empirical focus
was located in the Arab Middle East and it dealt with Islamist politics. Therefore, I have tried to
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heed to Kurzman’s warning about the perils of Orientalism:2 on the one hand, steering clear from
simply superimposing ‘western’ theories onto ‘non-western’ experiences; on the other hand, not
suggesting irreducible differences between them. I hope my theoretical effort, which takes cues
from western scholarship and it is informed by a non-western episode of social and political
mobilization, may walk such fine line. Indeed, the fast growing literature on this topic
(mobilization in non-Western settings) confirms that there is both the possibility as well as the
space to take on this challenge.
In the case of Jordanian Islamist thinkers, the production of Nasir ad-Din al-Albani,
representing Quietist Salafism, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, representing Jihadi Salafism,
provided the puzzles and material to elaborate my theoretical account. In this concluding chapter,
I wish to summarize my main findings: both in regards to our theoretical understanding of
contentious politics; and in regards to Salafism, briefly discussing its impact on the politics of the
Middle East and beyond.
Three Mechanisms and the Social Appropriation of Tradition
In my research, I asked not why certain episodes of social and political mobilization
happen. I was interested in explaining how they occur. In particular, I sought to understand the
role of intellectuals and thinkers within such episodes. To put it otherwise, I have not inquired
about the presence or absence of certain conditions or variables. Instead, I tried to single out
mechanisms I posit to be present in the fabric of social reality; and I proposed how they may be
at work in instances of mobilization.3
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I relied on the insights about mechanisms and contention of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam;4
and then on the work of Kurzman, in particular his contention that all mechanisms are,
fundamentally, cognitive ones.5 Following this intellectual trajectory, I proposed to consider
mechanisms as heuristic devices that help us understand the role of scholars’ and intellectuals’
production in episodes of contention. I have proposed three mechanisms: diffusion, the spreading
of ideas connecting different intellectual locales; elaboration, the production of novel insights on
top of the existing ideological repertoire; and last, systematization, the reconfiguration of the
common sense understanding of the audience. These mechanisms are never ‘necessarily’
activated given some ‘objective’ circumstances. Rather, they are contingent upon wider
structural conditions, be them economic, social, cultural. To put it differently, they do not work
independently from the broader social context.
As Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam suggested, mechanisms may compound into a process, if
and when activated. In our case, they compound in the process of social appropriation, whereby
the aims and purposes of a group are re-defined in order to sustain social and political
contention. The intellectual production of the scholars under examination entailed a re-definition
of the community of believers: it provided the cognitive coordinates (articulated in what I
referred to as an ‘ideology,’ see section below) by which it was possible to put forth a political
project bent on altering existing power relations.
In discussing a process of social appropriation in the context of contemporary Salafism, I
qualified it as the process of social appropriation of tradition. I contended that the specific
content of Salafism as a political project features prominently this cognitive dimension: an
exemplary discursive tradition - the community of the early days of Islam - functions as a
4
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template for mobilization. It is against this template that Salafis scholars seek to understand
reality, diagnose its ills, and call for mobilization, the ultimate goal being the (supposed) reestablishment of the original Islamic polity.
Gramsci, Organic Intellectuals and Salafis’ Political Projects
I have grounded these theoretical claims in a wider social theory, namely the Marxist
approach heralded by Antonio Gramsci.6 It provides a map of social and political relations
wherein we may locate a specific actor - the organic intellectual - and connect her activity to
other, different domains of society: the economic realm, class configuration, political structure,
its institution, patterns of social relations and reproduction, and then dominant or hegemonic
discursive constructs, common sense, and practices. In this complex web, organic intellectuals
operate exploiting its opportunities and confronting its constraints. Their primary function is to
endow the social class they hail from with identity, moral guidance and purpose. They are
central, for Gramsci, for understanding hegemony (as well of course for potential configurations
of counter-hegemony). What the intellectual production of the organic intellectuals can do is to
propose or advance alternative - contentious - propositions vis à vis the existing dominant or
hegemonic power relations. These propositions manifest as an ideology: a relatively stable and
coherent political project that seeks to alter such power relations. In a nutshell, I hold ideology as
social theory plus normativity: it answers the questions, “What is society? What ought we to
change, and how?”
Ideology is the product of the laboring of the intellectuals under examination; and the
mechanisms I discussed above illustrate how ideology works in shaping the perception of social
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reality - and thus positing the possibilities to change it - on the part of (potential) adherents and
followers. It is in this sense that organic intellectuals may be considered as ideologues or
‘popular intellectuals.’
Ideologues’ efforts to inform the cognition of social reality (in the ways I posited above
with the three mechanisms) are both enabled and limited by structural circumstances. Hence, to
speak of possibility to shape worldviews, and thereby spur and sustain a social and political
movement, it is not to speak of necessity. For example, Salafi preaching may be particularly
effective after an intense economic crisis; or during a period of acute social and cultural stress: in
the case of Jordan, think about the economic measures implemented in 1989, or the relocation of
thousands of Jordanians-Palestinians in the Kingdom following the Kuwaiti war of 1990-91, or
again the shock of the peace with Israel in 1994. Salafi scholars had no say in the occurrence of
any of those events. Yet, they could capitalize on them by providing an ideology relating to the
common sense and worldview of those whom they sought to address. Nor speaking of possibility
is tantamount to claiming ideologues can control how their message may be received and
understood: Al-’Utaybi’s siege of Mecca flies in the face of Al-Albani’s call of restrain from
politics; Al-Maqdisi may complain about ISIS application of his pronouncements, and meet only
indifference when not scorned.
In any case, both Al-Albani and Al-Maqdisi proposed alternative readings of social and
political reality. These readings - ideologies - are not innocuous, or inert, precisely due to the
position of these actors in a wider social structure and the function they may perform within it. In
fact, they called for alternative power arrangements, and met success – however qualified - in
doing so: Salafism is a phenomenon to be reckoned with on the part of the Hashemite regime.
And its political project is never solely confined to the small Levantine kingdom.
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Quietist and Jihadi Salafism: Final Considerations on Their Politics
When I began in earnest my field research in Jordan, the movement known as ISIS, ISIL
or Da’esh had just made its shocking appearance: after storming eastern Syria and taking control
of Raqqah, it rose to international prominence when it conquered Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city,
in June 2014. A year later, it controlled an expanse as vast as England, and it seemed poised to
keep wreaking havoc not only in the region at large, but also outside it. ISIS, like its kin AlQa’idah in its different local franchises, may outlast its current incarnations. Let me explain what
I mean by this.
As I delved more into the tenets, principles and, ultimately and more importantly,
ideologies of Salafism, I could trace how the likes of ISIS and Al-Qa’idah are part and parcel of
a specific way of looking at the relation between religion and politics. I am extremely reluctant
to subscribe to any essentialist view purporting Islam as a militant religion, much less a
necessarily violent one. Yet, it is possible for Islam - like for most other ideational constructs,
and surely for those constructs we nowadays consider ‘religions’ - to evolve and eventually
espouse a specific understanding of its tenets: namely, in our case, Salafism. And Salafism,
unlike Islam at large, features a discourse with much more precise coordinates: epistemological,
theological, moral, social and, at last, political. In other words, Salafism can easily become an
ideology.
In light of these considerations, when looking at current events, armed jihadi Salafism
may not represent in the long run the most relevant threat to stability, democracy and progressive
politics. The all too violent means often adopted by the likes of Al-Qa’idah and ISIS tend to
alienate vast segments of the Muslim population in the region; their military prowess can be
crushed by much more powerful states; their resort to terrorism only goes to show how it is
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indeed the weapon of the weak. Regardless of the fear these acts inspire in western and eastern
publics alike, terrorism has never lent to regime change or whole revolution bar the presence of
significant inroads within society.
What about the Quietists? To answer this question, let me go back to the war of position
versus war of movement that Gramsci outlined. Jihadis wage the latter in the ways we know. Yet
Quietist Salafis’ war of position may represent a much bigger problem than their overtly violent
counterparts: making societal inroads is indeed the core of their strategy. They have deeper roots
in wider sectors of society.7 Refutation of progressive politics runs for them just as deeply as for
the Jihadis. Quietist Salafis are in this sense radical, while not armed. They may represent a
formidable trench in the war of position for the progressive change in the Muslim world, a force
that cannot be confronted with merely security measures (as I argued in Chapter 5). In other
words, Quietist Salafis may truly engage in a wholesome counter-hegemonic project unlike their
Jihadi counterpart, and thus result all the more efficacious (or menacing, depending on one’s
politics) in fostering social and political change.
At the same time, while it is plausible to think about defeating Jihadi Salafism with
security measures in its current and various embodiments, there is no guarantee of vanquishing
the ideas - the ideologies, as I have contended - that underpin and structure those incarnations.
Let me use a line from a movie to get my point across (as Slavoj Zizek would like to do): in V for
Vendetta’s final showdown, the masked hero is being repeatedly shot and yet keeps on fighting.
Answering to his assailant's puzzlement, he hisses, “beneath this mask there is more than flesh:
beneath this mask there is an idea, and ideas are bulletproof.” While we would cheer for V’s

7

As an official in the Ministry of Political Development told me, “the problem with this country is that there are
6000 mosques and 30 libraries!” A fertile ground, I would contend, for a movement like Salafism.
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political project (the destruction of a fascist dictatorship in a dystopian England), we rightfully
cringe at the Jihadi one: but, from a theoretical standpoint, V’s line works perfectly for both.
Yet we could nevertheless ask: is Salafism, regardless of its specific and current
manifestations, capable of evolving into a viable political project? This question tackles Roy’s
thesis of the ‘failure of political Islam.’8 From a Gramscian perspective, this is hardly possible:
“Religion and the common sense cannot constitute an intellectual order because they cannot be
reduced to a unity and coherence even in individual consciousness not to speak of the collective
consciousness: they cannot be reduced to unity and coherence "freely" because this reduction
could only happen in an authoritarian way, as in fact has happened in the past in a limited
fashion.”9 Hence, any political philosophy grounded in religion can never be the seed for truly
progressive and emancipatory politics. It only unravels into one or another form of
authoritarianism.
Suspending for the sake of argument the evaluation of such proposition, I would like to
keep pursuing this line of thought and recall the Salafi understanding of ‘tradition’ that I
proposed in this study. We may notice here how modern Salafism rejects one of modernity
discourse main drives: the future as the place for the realization of mankind. For such discourse,
progress, prosperity, development can and ought to be reached by casting away the burden of the
past, exemplified by a cumbersome tradition, to craft a new polity whose template may or may
not be defined, but which nonetheless has never existed before. The teleological drive of the
main narratives of modernity is future bent. Salafism epitomizes the contradictions embedded in
modernity, as it is a product of modernity at the same time as it is a reaction to it. Salafism’s
future is already defined: it is a rediscovered and reclaimed past. The blueprint for the future is

8
9

Roy, Olivier. L’échec de l’Islam politique. Esprit, 1992.
Gramsci et al., 1971, pp. 325-6.
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not strictly an eschatology, in that Salafis claim it did exist historically. All the same, Salafism
ends up stultifying modernity: their a-historical reliance and nostalgia for a (discursive) tradition
leads them to what Shaygan calls the “worship of beginnings,”10 which treats modernity as if it is
a conspiracy - thus impeding any reasoned and fruitful engagement with it.
A Future Project with Other ‘Cattivi Maestri’
How far can my claims travel? Producing a theory with the broadest application possible
- the Holy Grail of ‘generalization’ - was not my intent. At the same time, I did not wish to
provide a purely ideographic account. Again, here I refer to the fine line that Kurzman talks
about, and I return to the point I made before: social appropriation juxtaposed to social
appropriation of tradition. With this, I sought to square the circle between an undue
generalization because culturally, historically and contingency blind; and a hypersensitive
account of the specific experiences of the cases at hand, unwarrantedly locating them in a place
beyond the pale of comparison with other episodes of mobilization. There are similarities, in that
we are dealing with episodes of social and political mobilization in the language of mechanism
and process; yet, this is not tantamount to negate the idiosyncrasies of any given episode, and the
peculiar ways in which its politics manifest.
However, in order to better assess the viability of my theory - or in which ways it may
need to be modified - I plan to explore other important episodes of mobilization and contention.
In this sense, the role of scholars and thinkers’ production would still feature at the center of my
analysis and would orient my research.
In fact, one such episode of contention spurred my initial curiosity about the role of
intellectuals in mobilization, an episode much closer to my own experience and culture: on April
10

Shaygen, Darius. Les Illusions de l’Identité. Editions du Felin, 1992.
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7, 1979, Toni Negri, then professor of political science at the University of Padova, was to
appear as a defendant, along many others, in a public trial regarding left-wing armed radicalism.
Between the 1970s and the early 1980s, Italy knew a period of deep political volatility, with the
formation of extreme groups both on the right and on the left. For the latter, organizations such
as Autonomia Proletaria (Proletarian Autonomy), Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power), Lotta
Continua (Relentless Struggle) and, of course, the notorious Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) dotted
the landscape, making those days known in Italian history as ‘Gli Anni di Piombo’ (The Years of
Lead). Public attorney Pietro Calogero held Negri, a radical leftist thinker to this day, responsible
for the contentious actions (armed struggle, terrorism, together with episodes of mass civil
disobedience and resistance to the authorities) those various organizations carried out making
explicit reference to his ideas. Bent on getting rid of the liberal-democratic order, Negri had
become the intellectual referent of an entire area of so-called ‘antagonism.’At the same time, he
never personally engaged in any act of violence, nor, for that matter, absolved or condoned such
acts when perpetrated by others.
The jury sentenced him to twelve years in prison. After many legal and political
vicissitudes (including taking refuge in France for some fifteen years), he was finally released in
2003. In the meantime, he had become an internationally renowned political thinker in the
context of the anti-globalization movement. Together with Michael Hardt, he has authored three
volumes, Empire, Multitude and Commonwealth which are regarded as a no-global manifesto.
His figure is still controversial: hailed as a ‘cattivo maestro’ (bad teacher) by vast sectors
of Italian intelligentsia and public opinion, Negri’s relation with left wing extremism, contention
and armed struggle is matter of endless debates. I hope the reader will not have missed the
parallels with the object of my analysis throughout these pages: Negri, more like Al-Maqdisi in
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his penchant for a ‘war of movement’ than Al-Albani’s more cautious attitude, would represent
an interesting and compelling case to compare and juxtapose movements so different, and yet to
similar, and improve our understanding of ideas and contention, intellectuals and mobilization.
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Email: mramaiol@syr.edu
Webpages: http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/psc.aspx?id=77309415608
https://syr.academia.edu/MassimoRamaioli
Education
2017 Ph.D. Political Science, Syracuse University
Fields: Comparative Politics, International Relations
2007 M.A. Near and Middle Eastern Studies, SOAS, University of London, UK
Thesis: “Saddam Hussein Ba’athi Rule: A Case of Totalitarianism? State and Society in
Iraq, 1979-1990”
2005 M.A. African and Asian Studies, University of Pavia, Italy
Thesis: “Religione e Politica nella Società Iranica: Dai Teologi di Stato allo Stato dei
Teologi [Religion and Politics in the Iranian Society: From the State’s Theologians to the
State of Theologians].” - Regione Toscana MA Thesis Award, Florence, Italy
2003

B.A. Social Sciences, University of Pavia, Italy – magna cum laude

Research Interests and Specializations
Middle East Politics, Political Islam and Religious Radicalism, International Relations Theory,
Contentious Politics, Postcolonial Theory.
Dissertation Project
Dissertation Title: “Contentious Politics in the Arab Middle East: Jordanian Salafism and the
Social Appropriation of Tradition”. In which ways do Islamist ideologues affect the trajectory of
political and social mobilization through their ideological work? In this project, I analyze how
Islamist ideologues impacted Salafi movements in Jordan between 1988 and 2005. The first case
deals with ‘Quietist’ Salafis, who engage mostly in preaching, proselytizing and provision of
social services. They refrain from direct political activities or overt confrontation with state
authorities. The second movement is 'Jihadi' Salafism. It espouses a confrontational, radical and
violent stance vis à vis state power. Jordanian Jihadi-Salafism has been the precursor of groups
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such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State (ISIS). I contend that Salafi Islamist ideologues
impact political and social mobilization through three main mechanisms: diffusion, elaboration
and systematization. Together, they compound into a process I call the ‘social appropriation of
tradition.’ This research clarifies in important ways how Islamist ideologues contribute to
processes of social mobilization and radicalization by adapting and articulating a shared religious
tradition.
Dissertation Committee:
Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Dr. Gavan Duffy, Dr. Hossein Bashiriyeh, Dr. Mark Rupert, Dr.
L.H.M. Ling
Publications and Manuscripts
“Questione Libanese, Forze di Pace in Medio Oriente e l'Impegno dell'Italia [The Lebanese
Issue: Peace Forces in the Middle East and the Contribution of Italy],” Il Politico, University of
Pavia, Vol. I, January 2010. With Giuseppe Lissi.
“Interviewing Salafis,” in Doing Political Science Research in the Middle East and North Africa:
Methodological and Ethical Challenges, ed. by F. Cavatorta and J. Clark, Oxford University
Press, forthcoming.
“Discourse and Policy Change: United States and Tibetan Resistance in the Cold War,” with
Sinan Chu, manuscript under review at Journal of Cold War Studies.
“Politicizing Salafi Discourse,” manuscript under review at American Journal of Islamic Social
Sciences.
Teaching Experience - Instructor
Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Global Community, Academic Year 2012-2013
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University
Middle East Politics, Summer Session I, 2013
Center for International Exchange and Education, Amman Study Center
Politics of Development, Academic Year 2016-2017
International Politics of the Middle East, Academic Year 2016-2017, Summer Session I
and II, 2017
Jordan: A Case Study, Academic Year 2014-2015
Seminar on the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict, Academic Year 2014-2015, Summer Session
I and II, 2015
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Sijal Institute for Arabic Language and Culture, Amman
Seminar on Postcolonial Theory and International Relations, Summer Session 2017
Teaching Experience – Teaching Assistant
Department of Religion, Syracuse University
Discovering Islam (on line), Academic Year 2015-2016
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University
Middle East Politics, Fall 2009, Fall 2011, Spring 2014
Introduction to International Relations, Spring 2010, 2012, Fall 2013
Politics of Iran, Fall 2010
Political Conflict, Spring 2011
Department of Political Science, University of Pavia
Contemporary and Modern History, Academic Year 2003-2004
Selected Conference Presentations
“Critical Discourse Analysis between Postcolonial Theory and Foreign Policy Making,” Western
Political Science Association Conference, Vancouver, April 2017.
“The Logic of Othering: Dynamic Constructions of Tibet and China in US Foreign Policy
Discourse”, Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, April 2013; and
nternational Studies Association, New Orleans, February 2015. With Sinan Chu.
“Contentious Politics in the Arab Middle East: Islamism and the Social Appropriation of
Tradition”, Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa Conference, Washington DC,
November 1, 2014.
Grants and Awards
2016

International Institute of Islamic Thought Research Grant

2015

Roscoe Martin Dissertation Research Grant

2014 Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa Research Grant
2014 Summer Research Grant, Middle Eastern Studies Program, SU
2014 Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs Research Grant, SU
2013 Travel Grant, Eisenhower Library
2013 Maxwell School Summer Fellowship, SU
2012 Maxwell School Summer Fellowship, SU
2011 Maxwell School Summer Fellowship, SU
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2010 Summer Research Grant – Department of Political Science, SU
2004 BA Best Student Award, University of Pavia
2004 Summer Language Training Scholarship, University of Pavia
Lectures and Invited Talks
Selected Lectures at Syracuse University
“Hezbollah between Lebanon and Iran”, PSC 340 – Politics of Iran (November 3, 2014)
“Globalization, Culture and Identity”, MAX 132 – Global Community (October 18, 2012)
“Lebanon: A House of Many Mansions”, PSC 344 – Middle East Politics (November 18, 2011)
“Iraq: Politics, Security, Democratization?”, PSC 344 – Middle East Politics (April 7, 2014;
November 8, 2011), and PSC 300 – Security in the Middle East (February 2, 2011)
“Politics and Islam”, PSC 344 – Middle East Politics (February 6, 2014; September 27, 2011;
November 5, 2009)
“Islam: sects, doctrines and its Middle Eastern geography”, PRL 602 - Introduction to Public
Diplomacy and Communications (September 6, 2011, September 5, 2012, February 23, 2016)
Invited Talks
“Islam and Islamism,” (April 24, 2016) United Church, Fayetteville, NY.
“Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? The Rise of Salafism in the Middle East,” 2015
Leaders of Democracy Fellows Alumni Conference, Istanbul (December 3, 2015)
“Fahm Badil li-l-Mujtama’ al-Madaniy: at-Taghrir wa al-Muqawamah fi Antonio Gramsci
[Alternative Understanding of Civil Society: Change and Resistance in Antonio Gramsci],” 2015
Leaders of Democracy Fellows Alumni Conference, Istanbul (December 5, 2015), and Sijal
Institute for Arabic Language and Culture, Amman (November 7, 2016)
“The War in Syria: Regional Scenarios and US involvement” (October 25, 2015), United
Church, Fayetteville, NY.
“A Gramscian Read of Modernization: An Alternative Discourse on Development” (March 1,
2015), Center for International Exchange and Education, Amman, Jordan.
“Political Islam: The Challenge of Modernity” (October 6, 2012 and September 30, 2015),
“Islam: Approaching a System of Meanings” (September 19, 2012), The New School for Social
Research, New York City, NY.
“History and Politics of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (April 25, 2011), Central New York
Council for the Social Studies, Chittenango, NY.

Ramaioli CV - 4

“Islamismo come Fenomeno Moderno [Islamism as a Modern Phenomenon]” (March 23, 2009),
Rotary Club, Lodi, Italy.
Academic and Departmental Service
Discussant
“States and Parties in Contemporary Africa”, Political Science Research Workshop, Maxwell
School, Syracuse University (October 18, 2011)
“The Dynamics of Islamist Radicalization and De-Radicalization: A Cross-Regional Analysis”,
Political Science Research Workshop, Maxwell School, Syracuse University (February 18, 2011)
Graduate Studies Committee (2011-2012 and 2012-2013 Academic Years)
Graduate Studies Admission Committee (2010-2011 Academic Year)
Reviewer
Journal of Cultural and Religious Studies (February 2016 - )
Journal on Muslim Philanthropy and Civil Society (November 2016 - )
Professional Development
Future Professoriate Program (FPP), Syracuse University (2011-12 Academic Year). Organized
incoming departmental graduate students’ orientation program and professional development
seminars, in particular regarding qualifying exams preparation, teaching assistant’s role and
duties, addressing international students’ concerns and needs.
Institute for Qualitative and Multimethod Research (IQMR), Syracuse University (Summer
2014). During this two week intensive methods training workshop, I focused on discourse
analysis, ethnography, and process tracing.
Non-Academic Positions
Middle East Contributor, Quadrante Futuro, Centro Einaudi, Torino, Italy (January 2016 –
present). I provide monthly reports on the political economy of the Middle East in the context of
regional and global developments (http://www.quadrantefuturo.it/ )
Educational Project Coordinator, Scuola Media Francesca Cabrini, Sant’Angelo Lodigiano,
Italy (October 2008 – May 2009). I coordinated a teaching project for socially disadvantaged
teenagers in junior high school. I covered basic history, geography and English.
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Intern, Italian Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (January-April 2006). I provided daily press review,
back office work, and assisting diplomats.
Language Skills and Training
Languages
Native Italian, Advanced Arabic, Advanced French, Basic Spanish.
Arabic Language Training
•
•
•
•
•

Level B Certificate – Institute des Langues Vivantes, Tunis, Tunisia (July 2004)
Intermediate Arabic Certificate - Higher Language Institute, Damascus University, Syria,
(October 2007 - March 2008)
Upper level I – Lebanese American University, Beirut, Lebanon (June - August 2010)
Advanced level – American Centre, Fes, Morocco (June - July 2011)
Media Arabic – MALIC Center, Amman (September-December 2014)
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Milano School of International Affairs
The New School of Social Research
lingl@newschool.edu

Dr. Tazim Kassam
Associate Professor
Department of Religion
Syracuse University
tkassam@syr.edu

Ramaioli CV - 6

